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***Timeline and Outline for
North Korea Issue***

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Key Abbreviations:

DMZ: Demilitarized Zone (at North Korea/South Korea border)

DPRK: Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)

IAEA: International Atomic Energy Commission

ICBM: Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

KCIA: Korean Central Intelligence Agency

KCNA: Korean Central News Agency

NPT: (Nuclear) Non Proliferation Treaty

ROK: Republic of Korea (South Korea)

SEA: South East Asia

THAAD: Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense

USFK: United States Forces Korea

WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction

North Korean Heads of State:

Kim Il-sung, September 9, 1948-July 8, 1994

Kim Jong-il, July 8, 1994-December 17, 2011

Kim Jong-un, December 17, 2011-present

Since the end of the Korean conflict of the 1950's, the United States' relationship with the Democratic Republic of North Korea (DPRK) has been precarious at best. The decades of impasse and dead-end negotiations have left the international community in a dire situation. In more recent years, this crisis has escalated as the United States and its allies attempt to negotiate for the denuclearization of North Korea. The United States and its allies have tried imposing sanctions, initiating diplomatic talks, import and export control, and various other avenues in this pursuit. However, thus far, nothing has convinced the current leader, Kim Jong-un, to seriously consider total denuclearization by U.S. standards.

Since his inauguration, U.S. President Donald Trump has shifted U.S. policy towards North Korea. During his first year of presidency, Trump labelled the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism. This viewpoint departs greatly from President Barack Obama's policy of "strategic patience," and instead aligns with the position held by George W. Bush. Trump teased Kim on Twitter, in press briefings and speeches, and threatened the DPRK with a possible military strike. Although his rhetoric towards the North Korean regime has been hostile at times, Trump's scheduled meeting with Kim Jong-un certainly points towards a move in the right direction. North Korea released three U.S. prisoners, and even demolished the nuclear test site at Punggye-ri.

This timeline offers a look at past negotiations with the North Korean regime, and is intended to illustrate the limitations and complications of previous diplomatic efforts. Studying the lessons learned from past efforts is vital to the success of future negotiations.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Korean War

At the conclusion of the Pacific War of World War II, the United States' fondest wish for East Asia was that its countries would be peacefully independent, economically beneficial to both themselves and the West, and not dominated by any single power hostile to Western interests.¹ However, in the midst of rebuilding Europe, no one was thinking about Southeast Asia. The focus of the free world was rebuilding Europe and subduing the USSR. This lack of attention eventually led to the problems in Asia today, particularly those on the Korean Peninsula. In those few moments where the west failed to step in, while the United States and the other world powers focused on Europe, communist, and extreme ideas rooted deeply in North Korea under Russian supervision.

¹ Robert Blum, "A Political Perspective," *Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War* (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath & Co., 1990), 108-109.

In this time of negotiations and rebuilding, the United Nations formed to hopefully solve future disputes through diplomacy, not military actions. One of the newly-formed UN's first tasks was brokering peace and facilitating legitimate elections in both North and South Korea.

After World War II, Japan's reign over Korea ended. The country was divided at the 38th parallel, with the United States occupying the South and the USSR occupying the North. The United States supported anti-communist Syngman Rhee in the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea), where the UN successfully supervised elections in 1948. The Soviet Union used its veto power to block elections in the North.² Instead, Joseph Stalin appointed Kim Il-sung as the leader of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea). The UN General Assembly acknowledged the ROK as the only valid Korean government on the peninsula, and continued to seriously discuss reunification.³ Unfortunately, this dream was never realized. Both Kim Il-sung and Syngman Rhee were autocratic administrators, neither willing to recognize let alone work with each other's regime.⁴

The Korean conflict began on June 25, 1950, when the North Korean Army invaded the ROK with 135,000 troops.⁵ UN Security Council Resolution 82 demanded the North cease all hostilities, but to no avail.⁶ The United Nations quickly internationalized the war as an anti-communist crusade.⁷ China and the Soviet Union aided the North throughout this conflict, while the UN, led by the United States aided the South.

Within the first two months of fighting, ROK forces (along with their U.S. counterpart), were pushed back to the Pusan Perimeter in South Korea. Things looked bleak. Then, United States Army General Douglas MacArthur turned the tide with a risky and widely disputed amphibious landing at Inchon. Inchon was secured. Shortly after, UN forces retook the capital, Seoul, partially severing a vital North Korean supply line. MacArthur's success almost created an untenable disaster. If UN forces had halted at or near the 38th Parallel, the war might have ended. As the UN forces approached the Chinese border at the Yalu River, a surge of Chinese troops crossed the river and entered into the war. This intervention forced the UN forces to retreat from October 1950 through mid-1951.⁸ General MacArthur attempted to convince President Harry Truman to allow the use of atomic weapons to cauterize the Yalu River Valley to prevent the Chinese from either advancing or retreating. The general's adamant stand led to his dismissal. This placed American political and military leadership at odds and created turmoil within the State Department.

The remaining years of the conflict became a war of attrition. The front line stayed at or very near the 38th Parallel. Negotiations were insubstantial. Neither the North nor the South were willing to give up. Finally, the fighting ended on July 27, 1953, when the Korean War Armistice Agreement entered into effect. This armistice created the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) at the 38th Parallel and required all forces to remove troops, supplies, and equipment from the DMZ.⁹

² Gary D. Joiner, Ph.D., *Deterrence: A Brief History and a Case Study in Cold War Practice, 1945-1953* (Shreveport, LA: LSU-Shreveport, 2016), 39.

³ U.S. Army Engineers Officers in Korea, *Remembering the Forgotten War*, ed. Barry Fowle and John Lonquest (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Office of History, 2004), xvi.

⁴ U.S. Army, *Remembering the Forgotten War*, xvi.

⁵ James Stokesbury, *A Short History of the Korean War* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1990), 14.

⁶ UN Security Council Resolution 82, June 25, 1950.

⁷ Joiner, *Deterrence*, 40.

⁸ Roy Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1998), 37.

⁹ "The Korean War Armistice Agreement," signed at Panmunjon, Korea, July 27, 1953.

This conflict left both North and South Korea devastated, and the two countries' relationship would never be the same. The clear victors here were China and North Korea. The two countries celebrated their early victories over the strongest country in the world. They forced the all-powerful United States to retreat for months. This ultimately distinguished these communist nations in the eyes of their subjects and crushed all anti-communist dissent. This propaganda solidified these communist regimes' prestige for decades. China was now a world power. Through the remainder of the 1950s and the 1960s, the Korean issue settled into a diplomatic stalemate and a heavily armed truce.

1970's:

Kim Il-sung (DPRK) reached out to ROK and U.S. in 1972. Seoul's KCIA Director Lee Hu Rak visited Pyongyang May 1972 to discuss both parties' desire to peacefully reunite Korea. The delegation reached a unanimous agreement for reducing DPRK-ROK tensions by promoting the reunification of Korea. The parties agreed on the following principles for reunification in the "July 4 North-South Joint Statement:"

1. Reunification must be achieved with no reliance on external forces or interference.
2. Reunification must be achieved peacefully, without the use of any military forces.
3. Both parties must promote national unity as a united people over any differences of our ideological political systems.

The parties agree to:

1. Implement the appropriate measure to stop military provocation which may lead to unintended armed conflicts, to cultivate an atmosphere of mutual trust between North and South by refraining from vilifying the other side.
2. Restore the severed national lineage and promote mutual understanding by implementing multi-faceted North-South exchange of information
3. Expedite the North-South Red Cross meetings, currently under negotiation, ardently longed for by the Korean people.
4. Establish direct phone contacts between Pyongyang and Seoul in order to prevent accidental military clashes by prompt and accurate resolution of any urgent potential problem.
5. Establish the North-South Coordinating Commission, co-chaired by Director Lee Hu Rak (ROK) and Director Kim Young Ju (DPRK), to implement the items agreed upon above, to resolve North-South issues, and to promote the reunification of the fatherland.¹⁰

Soon after the announcement of the Joint Statement, there was intense argument over the interpretation of the three key principles of the document: independence, peaceful unification, and great national unity. The two sides went back and forth for months after signing the agreement, but unrest and turmoil in South Korea ultimately unraveled the deal. North Korea suspended the agreement and further discussion after the kidnapping of Kim Dae-Jung¹¹ by the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). Kim was kidnapped from a hotel in Tokyo in 1973 by the KCIA because of his outspoken criticism of President Park Chung-Hee's Yushin Program, which granted the president dictatorial powers. Yushin enabled the

¹⁰ July 4, 1972 North-South Joint Statement, signed Lee Hu Rak and Kim Young Ju.

http://www2.law.columbia.edu/course_00S_L9436_001/North%20Korea%20materials/74js-en.htm

¹¹ Kim Dae Jung served under Korea's first president, Syngman Rhee. Kim won a seat in the House, and was a natural choice for the opposition candidate for the 1971 presidential election against Park Chung-hee. Kim was kidnapped from a hotel in Tokyo in 1973 by the KCIA because of his outspoken criticism of President Park's Yushin Program, which granted the president dictatorial powers. Upon his release, Kim was barred from politics in Korea. His political rights were restored in 1979 when Parks was assassinated.

ruling party to remove any opposition in the South, allowing Park to completely hijack the North-South dialogue. This dashed Kim Il-sung's wishes to unite Korea by undermining Park's government, and to allow the democratic/opposition forces in South Korea to seize power.¹²

North Korea values a mutually trustworthy partnership above all else. The North's aggressive reactionary nature created an unstable and uncertain negotiating environment in the 1970's, the ramifications of which weaken present-day DPRK-Western relations. Failed talks cause the North Korean regime to act even more boldly, as their propaganda techniques are institutionally vicious.

According to Korean Workers' Party Secretary Kim Dong-gyu (DPRK), this peace agreement did not completely fail (at least for North Korea). In communications with Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu, Kim Dong-gyu explained that this campaign ultimately provided the North with undeniably "good press." The campaign had largely eliminated the [in North Korea's view] unjustifiable and false charges that the North was a belligerent country and called into question the U.S. justification for the continued stationing of U.S. troops in the South:

Moreover, throughout our dialogue with the South we exerted a revolutionary influence on the population in South Korea, we revealed the true state of affairs, and we further intensified the inclination for peaceful unification in South Korea. At the same time, we managed to isolate the puppet clique in South Korea even more, not only internally but also internationally, and we put it in a state of panic and turmoil. After coming to the North, South Korean leaders realized that the entire population is tightly united around the party, and that the enthusiasm and political consciousness of our people are very high.

The puppet clique is in a state of turmoil, it is planning how to impose its domination so as to be able to keep up in a confrontation with us. To this end, they declared martial law, they dissolved the Parliament, they closed down schools and they modified the constitution. In this crazy game for prestige, the puppet clique used the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea to show that what they do counts as "freedom and democracy." Such deceitful fascist activities will only provoke greater indignation and protests from the South Korean population and the world public opinion.

Another great success we achieved in our peaceful offensive campaign was that we managed to demonstrate that there is absolutely no pretext for American troops to be stationed in South Korea. Until now, American imperialists were carrying out a propaganda [campaign] to maintain their troops stationed in South Korea to prevent a war and to defend this country [South Korea]. But since we declared we do not intend to invade South Korea, and through the Joint Communiqué we took upon ourselves the responsibility not to fight one against the other, American troops can no longer stay there under the cover of UN troops.

To sum up, throughout the entire dialogue with the South, we scored important victories. Honestly speaking, the situation is currently much more favorable than beforehand, when South Korean revolutionaries carried out their activity in the underground/in illegality.

¹² "Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No. 061072," March 1, 1973, Wilson Center Digital Archives. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114019>

The South Korean puppets, realizing they cannot win anything from the North-South dialogue, are now, on the one hand, supporting the slogan of “peaceful unification” but, on the other hand, they are undertaking actions which are stalling the process of unification. The so-called Prime Minister of South Korea, in a recent trip to the United States, said it would be impossible to achieve the unification of the homeland before 1980, when they will assure their superiority in the balance of power with the North. Last year, while inspecting military units on the battlefield, Park Chung-hee said that the dialogue between the South and the North was a confrontation with communists, who had a different manner of acting; therefore, [the South Koreans] had to build up their forces and must not hasten the dialogue and the exchange of views with the North.¹³

Propaganda fuels the DPRK’s extreme power over its people. In any scenario, the North has, can, and will solely blame outside powers for any failed attempt to broker a denuclearization deal. To the DPRK regime and North Korean citizens, outside parties instigated this turmoil in the first place, and North Korea is absolutely free of blame and innocent of all harsh accusations from the outside world.

MAIN ISSUES 1970’s: Political instability in ROK (Kim Dae-Jung kidnapping), DPRK and ROK could not agree on terms/specifics, DPRK ulterior political motives, ROK President Park’s dictatorial rule

1980’s- early 1990’s:

In **1983**, North Korea proposed a three-party negotiation involving the North, South Korea, and the United States. However, on October 9, 1983, North Korea orchestrated an assassination attempt against South Korean president Chun Doo-hwan. As a result, these proposed talks never happened. However, talks resumed in 1984 when the North sent manpower and supplies to the South after severe flooding. North and South experienced a brief period of goodwill, with several cultural exchanges and the reunification of families. This time of relative amicability ended abruptly with the 1986 South Korea-U.S. military exercise *Team Spirit*. These joint military exercises halted high-level DPRK-ROK talks again in 1993.¹⁴

Meanwhile, North Korea joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1985, but did not complete its agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. In **1987**, North Korean agents detonated a bomb aboard Korean Air Flight 858, killing all 104 passengers and 11 crew members. This act of terror was allegedly the North’s response to their failed attempt to gain support from other communist nations to boycott the 1988 summer Olympics in Seoul.

From September 4-7, **1990**, high-level negotiations between the North and South were held in Seoul. Simultaneously, the DPRK and ROK were both admitted into the United Nations. The agreement reached here, the *Agreement of Reconciliation, Non-aggressions, and Exchanges of Cooperation* and the

¹³ Kim Dong-gyu, “Minutes of Conversation taken on the Occasion of the Audience Granted by Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu to the Delegation of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea,” March 8, 1973, Wilson Center Digital Archives. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114038>

¹⁴ Don Oberdorfer. *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (New York: Basic Books, 2014).

Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula went into effect on February 19, 1992.¹⁵
The *Agreement of Reconciliation* aimed to:

1. Peacefully unify North and South
2. Reaffirm the three principles of said unification previously agreed upon in the July 4, 1972 South-North Joint Communiqué
3. Remove the state of political and military confrontation to achieve this national reconciliation
4. Avoid armed aggression of hostilities to reduce this tension and ensure future peace
5. Realize multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation to advance common national prosperity
6. Exert joint forces to achieve peaceful unification¹⁶

The *Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula* read as follows:

The South and North, Desiring to eliminate the danger of nuclear war through denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and thus create an environment and conditions favorable for peace and peaceful unification of our country and contribute to peace and security in Asia and the world, declare:

The South and the North...

1. Shall not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons.
2. Shall use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes.
3. Shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.
4. Shall conduct inspection of the objects selected by the other side, and agreed upon between the two sides, in accordance with procedures and methods to be determined by the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission.
5. Shall establish and operate a South-North joint Nuclear Control Commission within one month of the effectuation of this joint declaration.
6. Shall enter into force as of the day the two sides exchange appropriate instruments following the completion of their respective procedures for bringing it into effect.¹⁷

These agreements are almost exactly the same as the “July 4th North-South Joint Statement.” Two decades later, and the two countries still seemingly wanted to work towards the same goal... So what happened? These agreements had no outlandish requirements, nothing undoable, and aimed to finally achieve the ultimate goal of both countries: peaceful unification. The Joint Nuclear Control Commission (mentioned above) was indeed created, and held 13 meetings in 1992 and 1993, but did not come to any agreements. Because of this failure, the declaration was never entered into force. It seems like failing to

¹⁵ “Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, and Exchanges of Cooperation between the South and the North,” February 19, 1992.

https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/KR%20KP_911213_Agreement%20on%20reconciliation%20non%20aggression%20and%20exchangespdf.pdf

¹⁶ “Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, and Exchanges of Cooperation between the South and the North,” February 19, 1992, Signed by Prime Minister (ROK) Chung Won-shik and Premier, Administration Council (DPRK) Yon Hyong-muk.

¹⁷ “Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” February 19, 1992.

http://www2.law.columbia.edu/course_00S_L9436_001/North%20Korea%20materials/koreadenuclearization.htm

keep momentum is a common issue in past declarations and agreements between North and South. Keeping momentum is key in all high-level negotiations.

By the time the two countries agreed upon this safeguards agreement in 1992, the North was already suspected of having extracted enough plutonium to produce two nuclear weapons.¹⁸ The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was ultimately unable to verify the DPRK's non-nuclear status, which led to direct U.S. intervention with the 1994 U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework, which froze the DPRK's plutonium-based "power program."¹⁹ Although the Joint Nuclear Control Commission failed to seal this deal, the agreed upon framework held until the early 2000's.

From **1994 through 1998**, North Korea faced a general economic crisis accompanied by widespread famine brought about by the loss of Soviet economic support and general economic mismanagement. A 2011 U.S. Census Bureau report assessed the damage. Between 1993 and 2000, an estimated 500,000 to 600,000 North Koreans died from starvation.²⁰ During this same time, South Korea was one of the fastest growing economies.²¹ Despite a widespread economic crisis that hit Asia throughout the 1990s, the South Korean economy rapidly recovered to become one of the fastest-growing developed countries well into the 2000s.²² South Korea grew while the North stagnated.



Satellite image of the Korean Peninsula at night, NASA Earth Observatory, January 30, 2014.

¹⁸ Wade Huntley, "North Korea and the NPT," *Foreign Policy in Focus*, October 2005.

¹⁹ Huntley, "North Korea and the NPT," *Foreign Policy in Focus*, October 2005.

²⁰ U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division, "A Reassessment of Mortality in North Korea, 1993-2008," Presented to the Population Association of America, Washington D.C., March 28, 2011.

²¹ Michael J. Seth, *South Korea's Economic Development, 1948-1996* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 14; This ROK economic growth did not come without sacrifice and problems. Under dictatorial leaders, the ROK saw growth, but often at the expense of the worker with the suppression of labor and political dissent, authoritarian nature of the Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan regimes, the exploitation of cheap female labor, and low wages and long hours. These authoritarian but goal-driven regimes were key to the ROK's economic take-off, but not without cost.

²² Seth, *South Korea's*, 14.

Later, in **1994**, Kim Jong-Il not only pledged to dismantle his nuclear reactors, but actually began the process while facing rigorous on-site inspections. The United States promised to deliver proliferation-proof reactors and to provide fuel for oil-powered electric plants, but the U.S. never followed through, and the reactors were never delivered.²³ Simultaneously, the North moved its enrichment program underground. Consequently, the Bush administration cancelled the agreement completely. It seems both the U.S. and the DPRK are culprits in creating this dysfunctional relationship built on distrust and deception. The only way to salvage this relationship is for both the U.S. and the DPRK to be totally transparent with expectations and the reality of the situation. Going to negotiations expecting a full agreement that will actually be entered into force in a short period of time is unreasonable. It has taken decades for the relationship to disintegrate into such turmoil, so it is important to place long-term objectives before short-term goals.

MAIN ISSUES 1980's-early 1990's: Empty promises by both North Korea and the U.S., loss of momentum, lack of transparency, DPRK famine, short timeline, failure of Joint Nuclear Control Commission to come to agreement.

Late 1990's-early 2000's:

After the Cold War, North Korea faced economic crisis, and in **1998**, South Korean President Kim Dae-jung announced the Sunshine Policy towards the DPRK. This policy came about largely because of the growing gap in the economies of the north and south and aimed to soften North Korea's attitude toward the South by encouraging interaction and economic assistance. As the ROK grew, the DPRK fell into severe economic decline. This was largely due to spending vast sums on its nuclear program, while neglecting the basic economic needs of North Koreans. Despite all odds, namely the First Battle of Yeonpyeong in 1999, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il held their first Inter-Korean Summit in 2000. This all looked promising – the two leaders still agreed to meet just after a naval battle between their countries. North-South cooperative business developments began, including railroad infrastructure development and the building of a special administrative region in the North at Mount Kumgang. On June 15, 2000, the North-South Joint Declaration was adopted.

This Declaration, like all previous declarations between the two, aimed to:

1. Reunify the two Koreas independently.
2. Reunify the two Koreas peacefully.
3. Solve humanitarian problems (reunion of families and starvation in DPRK).
4. Encourage economic exchange to benefit both countries.
5. Create an open line of communication between the North and South.

Then, as in previous talks, the progress slowed. Political instability in the South, namely the impeachment of Unification Minister Lim Dong-won, stalled the progress further.²⁴ The final blow to this promising time of cooperation was the September 11, 2001 terror attacks on the World Trade Center. After these attacks, U.S. President George W. Bush labeled North Korea as one of his “Axis of Evil” countries. The North officially cut off talks with the South at this point.

²³ Dobbins, “What Will Kim Jong Un Want?” March 12, 2018.

²⁴ It came to light that Kim Dae-jung's administration had paid North Korea hundreds of millions of dollars to participate in the 2000 summit talks.

Until **2002**, North Korea's nuclear capability was largely contained. But just before the **2005** Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Conference, North Korea openly stated for the first time that it possessed nuclear weapons.

Towards the end of the Bush Administration, it seemed that the U.S. did a 180 on its stance towards the DPRK. While in promising (albeit small) negotiations with the North, the DPRK promised to give information on the real capacity of their program. President Bush then lifted two sanctions on North Korea. Of course, the North never followed through on this verification as promised. Former National Security Advisor for President GW Bush noted Pyongyang's backsliding after the Bush Administration took a softer approach. Bush lifted these sanctions for nothing, and even his Administration officials said he compromised too much for no reward. Then the North tested a nuclear weapon to welcome Obama as president.²⁵

MAIN ISSUES late 1990's- early 2000's: Loss of momentum, political instability in South Korea, and further alienation by the George W. Bush administration ("Axis of Evil"), and the loosening of sanctions by the GW Bush Administration for no concessions by the DPRK.

2010-2016:

South Korean President Lee Myung-bak ended the *Sunshine Policy* towards North Korea in 2010 over an incident in the Yellow Sea. On March 26, 2010, the ROK vessel *Cheonan* sank off the coast of Baengnyeong Island. President Lee Myung-bak's administration ultimately labeled this as a torpedo attack by the North Koreans, but the North rejected this accusation. Because of the incident (and subsequent accusations) both the North and the South severed ties with each other. President Lee cut all trade with North Korea, while Kim Jong-il announced all previous agreements between the nations were now null and void.

North Korea fired upon South Korea's Yeonpyeong Island again on November 23, 2010. Two South Korean Marines were killed, along with 10 North Koreans. President Lee warned that if the North continued such aggression, he would retaliate by destroying a nearby North Korean missile base.

On December 17, **2011**, Kim Jong-il died, passing his position to Kim Jong-un.

On **March 16, 2012**, the Korean Central News Agency announced the launch of the *Kwangmyongsong-3* (or *Unha-3*) satellite into space to commemorate the birth anniversary of Kim Il-sung.²⁶ The satellite entered into orbit on December 12, 2012. Of course, world leaders (namely U.S., ROK, and Japan) saw this as a disguised test of long-range missile technology, and the U.S. deployed warships to the region.²⁷ The increasingly hostile rhetoric of Kim Jong-un coupled this alleged missile test, the U.S., ROK, and Japan suggested that Kim intended to attack Japan, the U.S., and/or the ROK. Even Russia condemned this launch publicly. This action was a clear violation of UN Security Council resolution 1874, which barred the DPRK from any launch using ballistic missile technology.²⁸

On **January 22, 2013**, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2087 in response to the launch.

²⁵ Council on Foreign Relations, Interview of Michael J. Green, "Wariness on Bilateral Process with North Korea," October 23, 2009.

²⁶ "North Korea says it Successfully Launched Satellite into Orbit," *MSNBC News*, December 12, 2012.

²⁷ "North Korea Defies Warnings in Rocket Launch Success," *BBC News*, December 12, 2012.

²⁸ UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, "Statement from the United Nations [regarding DPRK satellite launch]," December 12, 2012.

The United Nations not only condemned the DPRK launch, but demanded that the DPRK not proceed with any further launches using ballistic missile technology, and comply with resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) by suspending all activities related to its ballistic missile program and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launches. Additionally, the UN demanded the DPRK abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner; immediately cease all related activities; and not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, nuclear test or any further provocation. The Council called for enhanced vigilance by Member States and directed the relevant sanctions Committee to issue an Implementation Assistance Notice in the event a vessel refused to allow an inspection authorized by its Flag State or if any vessel flagged by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea refused to be inspected, in line with its obligations. Reaffirming its support for the six-party talks, the Council called for their resumption and urged all participants to intensify efforts to fully and expeditiously implement the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement issued by China.²⁹ Resolution 2087 also froze the assets of the Korean Committee for Space Technology, the Bank of East Land, the Korean Kumryong Trading Corporation, Tosong Technology Trading Company, Korea Ryonha Machinery Joint Venture Corporation, and Leader (Hong Kong) International.³⁰

Less than a month after the UN passed Resolution 2087, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization detected abnormal seismic activity near North Korea's previous nuclear test sites.³¹ As a result, the UN Security Council passed another resolution, Resolution 2094, which strengthened the existing sanctions by blocking bulk cash transfers and expanding the scope of materials included in said sanctions.³² Aggressive actions continue through 2013. In July, a DPRK ship was found to be carrying weapons from Cuba. The DPRK restarted its Yongbyon reactor in August 2013. Korea continues on this destructive path through 2014, as the DPRK test fired 30 short-range rockets and 2 medium-range rockets off its coast, deliberately violating UN sanctions.³³

Throughout **2014 and 2015**, several crashed North Korean drones were found near the DMZ. On these drones, investigators found surveillance photos of the Blue House, which is the HQ and residence of the ROK head of state. Despite these incidents, in his 2015 New Year's address, Kim Jong-un announced that he was willing to resume talks with the South. Just months after this promising declaration, an explosion in the DMZ wounded two ROK soldiers.³⁴ The South blamed the North, but the North denied the accusations. The ROK restarted propaganda broadcasts to the North and asserted the Pyongyang would "pay a severe price" for this aggressive act.³⁵ Throughout 2016, North Korea tested long-range ballistic missiles, intermediate-range ballistic missiles, submarine launch missiles, and carried out its 4th nuclear weapons test.

Despite the heightened state of tensions, the ROK and DPRK agreed to talk in late **2016**. In September 2016, North and South Korea seemed to be close to an agreement ending hostilities. However, North

²⁹ UN Security Council Resolution 2087, January 22, 2013.

³⁰ UN Security Council Resolution 2087, January 22, 2013.

³¹ "Timeline on North Korea's Nuclear Program," *New York Times*, November 20, 2014.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ "Land Mine Blast," *BBC News*, August 10, 2015.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

Korea continued to test missiles. On September 9, 2016, the DPRK carried out its 5th nuclear weapons test.³⁶ Talks ended and the South announced it would assassinate Kim Jong-un.³⁷

2017-Present:

Throughout 2017, North Korea conducted a series of missile tests. In February, they launched the ballistic missile *Pukguksong-2*. In March, North Korea launched four ballistic missiles which landed 300km off the coast of Japan. Again, in April, another missile launch. With this increased activity, the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery became fully operational in South Korea. THAAD is a defensive measure to ensure the security of South Korea, designed to intercept short and medium-range ballistic missiles.³⁸ This move infuriated the North Koreans, and China was openly leery about this system as well.³⁹ China is worried that the deployment of THAAD could shift strategic stability equilibrium in advantage of the United States, giving Washington better early warning and tracking of Chinese ICBMs.⁴⁰

In **2017**, South Korea's newly-elected president promised to restore the *Sunshine Policy*. However, missile tests continued. In June, North Korea tested the *Hwasong-14* ICBM. In July, the U.S., ROK, and Japan reported that North Korea tested an ICBM that ranged 10,400km, which put Los Angeles, Denver, and Chicago within range.⁴¹ Additionally, there were leaked reports that North Korea had produced miniature nuclear warheads for ICBM delivery.⁴² This discovery deepened concerns that North Korea's capability to credibly threaten the United States, South Korea, and their allies has advanced far faster than anticipated and raised the official estimate for the DPRK's total number of bombs at the ready.⁴³ The newly-elected U.S. President Donald Trump reacted by tweeting on August 8, 2017 that "North Korea best not make any more threats to the United States... or they will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen."⁴⁴ In response, North Korea unveiled the regime's plan to launch four intermediate-range ballistic missiles towards Guam.

Meanwhile, throughout the fall of 2017, the North continued with aggressive missile tests. On August 28, 2017, the North launched its *Hwasong-12* missile, which flew over 2,700km and overflew Japan.⁴⁵ In September, a photo surfaced of Kim Jong-un with a thermonuclear weapon allegedly small enough to fit on an ICBM that could reach the United States.⁴⁶ Additionally, on September 3, 2017, North Korea conducted its sixth nuclear test. This was the North's most powerful test yet, with an explosive yield in excess of 100 kilotons TNT equivalent, with a seismic estimate of 6.1.⁴⁷

³⁶ Jack Kim, "South Korea says North's Nuclear Capability 'Speeding Up,' Calls for Action," *Reuters*, September 9, 2016.

³⁷ Paula Hancocks, "South Korea Reveals Plan to Assassinate Kim Jong-un," *CNN*, September 23, 2016.

³⁸ Ankit Panda, "What is THAAD and What Does it Do?" *Diplomat*, February 25, 2016.

³⁹ Panda, "What is THAAD," 2016.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ Anna Fifield, "North Korea Fires another Missile," *Washington Post*, July 28, 2017.

⁴² Joby Warrick, "North Korea now Making Missile-Ready Nuclear Weapons," *Washington Post*, August 8, 2017.


⁴³ Warrick, "North Korea," 2017.

⁴⁴ Donald Trump, *Twitter.com*, @realDonaldTrump, August 8, 2017.

⁴⁵ "Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy," *Arms Control Association*, May 2018.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ "DPRK September 2017 Unusual Seismic Event," Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission, September 3, 2107. <https://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/developments-after-1996/2017-sept-dprk/>



DPRK September 2017 Unusual Seismic Event,” Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission, September 3, 2107.

In response to the North’s sixth test, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2375, which imposed the strongest sanctions to date on the DPRK. The resolution targeted the DPRK’s last major export by fully banning textile exports, preventing overseas workers from earning wages that finance the Northern regime, cutting off over 55% of refined petroleum products going to North Korea, and fully banning all joint ventures with North Korea to cut off foreign investments, technology transfers, and other economic cooperation with the DPRK.⁴⁸

Following the passing of Resolution 2375, President Trump addressed the UN General Assembly on September 19, 2017. In his speech, he threatened to “totally destroy North Korea... Rocket Man is on a suicide mission for himself and for his regime.”⁴⁹ In response, Kim called President Trump “mentally deranged” and said he would “pay dearly for this speech.”⁵⁰ North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho explained that this “paying dearly” possibly meant a hydrogen bomb test over the Pacific and that “our rocket’s visit to the U.S. mainland is inevitable.”⁵¹ On September 23, 2017, U.S. B-1 strategic bombers flew near North Korea’s coast, the farthest north they have flown in the 21st Century.⁵² This move, along with Trump’s comments constituted as a declaration of war according to DPRK Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho.

⁴⁸ UN Security Council Resolution 2375, September 11, 2017, “FACT SHEET: Strengthening Sanctions on North Korea.” <https://usun.state.gov/remarks/7969>

⁴⁹ Matt Stevens, “Trump and Kim Jong-un, and the Names They’ve Called Each Other,” *NY Times*, March 9, 2018.

⁵⁰ Stevens, “Trump and Kim,” March 9, 2018.

⁵¹ “At UN Assembly, DPRK denounces U.S. President’s ‘reckless and violent’ Comments,” *UNNews.org*, September 23, 2017.

⁵² “Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy,” *Arms Control Association*, May 2018.

This back-and-forth is a trademark of the Trump presidency thus far. Engaging belligerents with aggressive rhetoric has been Trump's go-to throughout his campaign and presidency. Only time will tell if this tactic proves successful, as Trump is set to meet with Kim Jong-un himself on June 12, 2018 in Singapore.

On November 6, 2017 Trump met with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to solidify their intentions for trilateral cooperation on the matter. Two days later, Trump met with South Korean President Moon Jae-in for similar discussions and called on China to use its leverage to achieve a diplomatic solutions.⁵³ Later that month, North Korea launched an ICBM that landed 1000km away in the Sea of Japan. Despite this action, U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson condemned the launch, but also insisted that "Diplomatic options remain viable and open, for now... The United States remains committed to finding a peaceful path to denuclearization and to ending belligerent actions by North Korea."⁵⁴

The relationship seemed to be thawing between the North and South even further when Kim Jong-un proposed to send a delegation to the 2018 winter Olympics being held in South Korea. On January 2, 2018, South Korea agrees to the talks and the North-South hotline is reopened and reconnected for the first time since February 2016. At the Pyeongchang Olympics, The North and South competed as a single entity with their united women's ice hockey team.⁵⁵ Along with their hockey team, the North Koreans sent Kim Yo-jong (Kim Jong-un's sister) and Kim Yong-nam, President of the Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea, to participate in high-level talks with a South Korean delegation. As a show of good faith, the U.S. and ROK agreed to postpone annual military exercises (*Foal Eagle*) until after the Winter Olympics. Kim Jong-un's sister, Kim Yo-jong, met with ROK President Moon during her visit to the Pyeongchang Olympics, extending an invitation to meet in Pyongyang at a later date. Even more promising, Kim Yo-jong also agreed to meet with U.S. Vice President Mike Pence. Unfortunately, Kim Yo-jong cancelled last minute, citing Pence's meeting with North Korean defectors and the new sanctions put in place at a January 16 summit in Vancouver, Canada.⁵⁶

The upward momentum continued on May 5, 2018, as a South Korean envoy headed to North Korea for the first time in eleven years.⁵⁷ This envoy included Chung Eui-yong, Moon's National Security Advisor, and Suh Hoon, the South Korean Director of the National Intelligence Service.⁵⁸ These officials announced the next day that the North was willing to talk with the United States about denuclearization and security guarantees.⁵⁹ At this ROK-DPRK meeting, North Korea also committed to pausing nuclear and ballistic nuclear tests while talks between the U.S. and DPRK take shape. President Trump accepted Kim's official invitation to meet June 12, 2018 in Singapore to achieve permanent denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. The sheer symbolism of this meeting holds as much promise and hope as all past efforts combined, as this would be the first meeting ever held between a sitting U.S. president and the North Korean leader. President Trump tweeted that all sanctions must remain in place until a mutually beneficial agreement is reached, which is a step in the right direction.⁶⁰ As mentioned, in past attempts, U.S. presidents and other world leaders have given too much too soon to North Korea in hopes of getting

⁵³ "Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy," *Arms Control Association*, May 2018.

⁵⁴ Rex Tillerson, U.S. Secretary of State, "U.S. State Department Statement Condemning North Korea Missile Launch," November 28, 2017.

⁵⁵ Luke Brown, "When North met South: Unified Korean Hockey Team makes History," *Independent UK*, February 4, 2018.

⁵⁶ "Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy," *Arms Control Association*, May 2018.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ "Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy," *Arms Control Association*, May 2018.

⁶⁰ Donald Trump, *Twitter.com*, @realDonaldTrump, March 8, 2018, 5:08PM.

Kim to the negotiating table. President Trump's hardball tactics have seemed to work thus far, but extreme skepticism still remains. North Korea has indeed played into South Korea's hope of reunification and fear of attack, but still, the progress being made here is unparalleled. The North has met with South Korea, U.S. delegates, and even Chinese President Xi Jinping in recent months.

Meetings between North Korea and both the Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo points to the shifting geopolitical landscape on the Korean Peninsula. Although the separate meetings between these two and Kim are not directly related, they are certainly both promising. Although Kim Jong-un planned to meet with U.S. President Donald Trump on June 12, 2018 in Singapore, now North Korea has threatened to cancel the summit, citing planned joint U.S.-ROK air combat drills (*Max Thunder*), however, the U.S. State Department has received no official cancellation at this point.⁶¹ The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) did officially announce the cancellation of high-level ROK-DPRK talks just hours before the planned meeting near the Korean DMZ.⁶²

Singapore Summit, June 12, 2018:

President Donald Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un met at the historic Singapore Summit on June 12, where the two agreed to work towards the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. After the meeting, President Trump insisted that North Korea will fulfill their end of the deal, although no deadline to reach this goal was officially set or mentioned in the signed document. In his press conference after the summit, Trump said the document was "very comprehensive" and that the deal "is going to happen."⁶³ Details of the process of denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula are said to follow. As mentioned before, the downfall of many past negotiations has been dwindling momentum, so it is absolutely key to keep the ball rolling. These two leaders, who threatened each other publicly just months earlier, officially committed to peace in the following document:

Joint Statement of President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) held a first, historic summit in Singapore on June 12, 2018.

President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un conducted a comprehensive, in-depth and sincere exchange of opinions on the issues related to the establishment of new US-DPRK relations and the building of a lasting and robust peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. President Trump committed to provide security guarantees to the DPRK, and Chairman Kim Jong Un reaffirmed his firm and unwavering commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Convinced that the establishment of new US-DPRK relations will contribute to the peace and prosperity of the Korean Peninsula and of the world, and recognizing that mutual confidence building can promote the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un state the following:

1. The United States and the DPRK commit to establish new US-DPRK relations in accordance with the desire of the peoples of the two countries for peace and prosperity.

⁶¹ "N. Korea Suspends Talks with South, Threatens to Cancel U.S. Summit," *Aljazeera*, May 16, 2018.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ Transcript of Press Briefing with President Trump, Singapore, June 12, 2018.

2. The United States and DPRK will join their efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.
3. Reaffirming the April 27, 2018 Panmunjom Declaration, the DPRK commits to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
4. The United States and the DPRK commit to recovering POW/MIA remains, including the immediate repatriation of those already identified.

Having acknowledged that the US-DPRK summit -- the first in history -- was an epochal event of great significance in overcoming decades of tensions and hostilities between the two countries and for the opening up of a new future, President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un commit to implement the stipulations in the joint statement fully and expeditiously. The United States and the DPRK commit to hold follow-on negotiations, led by the US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, and a relevant high-level DPRK official, at the earliest possible date, to implement the outcomes of the US-DPRK summit.

President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have committed to cooperate for the development of new US-DPRK relations and for the promotion of peace, prosperity, and the security of the Korean Peninsula and of the world.

DONALD J. TRUMP

President of the United States of America

KIM JONG UN

Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

June 12, 2018

Sentosa Island

Singapore⁶⁴

Despite the significance of this meeting, there are still many concerns and unanswered questions. The four-hour long meeting seemed to ease the decades of tension between the U.S. and the DPRK, and is indeed a very important moment in history, but this document is more of a symbol for the serious negotiations to come. The U.S. and South Korea are still technically at war with the North, but this document greatly reduced the likelihood of armed conflict in the near future.⁶⁵

Before this meeting, a main concern for strategists was the premature loosening of sanctions, or the U.S. giving too much and receiving too little. President Trump kept his word, however, that he would not lift sanctions until there is some verifiable progress. In response to his critics, Trump insisted that “We haven’t given up anything...I agreed to meet -- I’m here. The meeting was every bit as good for the United States as for North Korea.”⁶⁶

But was it?

A major point of contention surrounding this meeting was that Trump even agreed to meet Kim in the first place, citing his blatant disregard for the basic human rights of his people, the consolidation of his

⁶⁴ “Full Text of Trump-Kim Signed Statement,” *CNN*, June 12, 2018.

⁶⁵ Jennifer Jacobs, “Trump, Kim Sign Historic Pledge towards Peace,” *Bloomberg*, June 12, 2018.

⁶⁶ Transcript of Press Briefing with President Trump, Singapore, June 12, 2018.

power through executions,⁶⁷ extreme indoctrination techniques, and the widespread starvation of his people.⁶⁸ The North Korean dictator gained an immeasurable amount of legitimacy and esteem from this summit. To North Koreans, Kim's regime has now reached a level of mythical proportions despite his crimes. Additionally, neither Japan nor South Korea, the two most under threat in this situation, were mentioned in the signed joint statement. There was also no mention of reunification of North and South Korea. Despite these problems, this meeting is a good start to the long process of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula.

In addition, it is important to understand what denuclearization means to both North Korea and the United States. Future negotiations ultimately depend how much each side is willing to give and what they expect in return.

North Korea:

WHAT DOES DENUCLEARIZATION MEAN TO KIM? Freezing nuclear production as leverage to get US/others aid to avert economic catastrophe. The North views denuclearization as a long-term objective, shying away from the U.S.'s tendency to focus on short-term goals. Kim Jong-un will think of denuclearization as a process, a movement toward a certain end. In Kim's mind, complete denuclearization, however, means removing all nuclear weapons from the entire Korean peninsula. To the North, this means that the U.S. should not replace any weapons removed from South Korea 25+ years ago, and should remove the large deployment of U.S. troops in the South.

WHAT WILL KIM GIVE? The possibility of discussing complete denuclearization with U.S.-led delegation. Remember, all concessions offered by the Northern regime must be verifiable. Kim won't denuclearize past the point of giving up what he thinks is necessary to defend his country unless there are security guarantees from the United States. That means assurances that the United States won't try to overthrow the Kim family or invade the country, as well as guarantees about the U.S.-South Korean military alliance.⁶⁹ On May 9, 2018, three American detainees were released into U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo's custody. This shows a willingness for the DPRK regime to work with the current U.S. administration on solving the present issues. Kim is desperate to grow his economy, so perhaps he will denuclearize and focus on economic growth.

MAIN OBSTACLES: DPRK will not deliver on un-verifiable concessions. Although North Korea may be willing to fulfill their commitments, the US and ROK must perform rigorous on-site verification provisions.⁷⁰ Keeping up political and diplomatic momentum is perhaps the most important component of successful negotiations with North Korea. In the past, any lull in productive talks has caused the DPRK to back down, back out, or retaliate. Additionally, the U.S./allies have no way to know the DPRK's actual nuclear capability at this point in time, so successfully removing and/or destroying all materials is improbable.

⁶⁷ In a 2016 report released by the Institute for National Security Strategy, a South Korean think tank, Kim Jong-un is reported to have executed 340 people, of which 140 were senior government officers, since coming to power. He is also suspected of assassinating his half-brother Kim Jong-nam (2017) and uncle Jang Song-thaek (2013).

⁶⁸ "Report on the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," United Nations General Assembly, February 7, 2014.

⁶⁹ Anne Gearan, "Denuclearization," *Washington Post*, March 4, 2018.

⁷⁰ James Dobbins, "What Will Kim Jong Un Want and What He Might Give," RAND Corporation, March 2018.

United States:

WHAT DOES DENUCLEARIZATION MEAN TO U.S.? The complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantling, halting, freezing, and hindering of current and future nuclear production facilities in North Korea. Freezing the DPRK's nuclear-missile program is a more realistic and achievable goal, however.

WHAT WILL THE U.S. GIVE? Security guarantee to not invade or topple DPRK regime, economic assistance to avoid complete economic collapse (through compensation for dismantling facilities), normalization of relations through the lifting of sanctions, and the removal of troops from ROK, and monetary incentives for the regime.

MAIN OBSTACLES: Focusing on long-term goals/not short-term, performing rigorous on-site verification provisions to ensure DPRK follows through on commitments and concessions, upholding the credibility of the NPT, and not inspiring other nations to pursue similar belligerence as a bargaining chip. Additionally, keeping China in check is of the utmost importance. Allowing China to take a lead role in brokering this deal could ultimately forfeit the United States' hegemony over the Pacific region and SEA.

Options:

1. Negotiations
2. Economic Sanctions
3. Information Operations
4. Military Options:
 - a. Maintain the status quo
 - Pros: Low risk of escalation
 - Cons: Fails to freeze/stop DPRK from creating long-range missiles and nuclear weapons
 - b. Arm surrounding region/deter DPRK
 - i. Deploy forces (esp. naval) to ROK and Japan on more permanent basis; Up naval presence to credibly threaten DPRK
 - ii. Stealth jets/bombers, carriers, nuclear subs, guided missile destroyers
 - iii. Up cyber presence to credibly threaten DPRK
 - Pros: This increased presence could interdict any shipment that could advance nuclear production and create a sense of safety for ROK
 - Cons: Disregards denuclearization and moves to simply freezing the program, this increased presence could be seen by DPRK to justify weapons program, high risk of escalation
 - c. Destroy all DPRK ICBM sites and launch pads and shoot down all DPRK testing missiles
 - Pros: Would deprive DPRK of crucial data needed to advance their nuclear program
 - Cons: Disregards denuclearization and moves to simply freezing the program, DPRK could still test short-range missiles, high risk of escalation on peninsula, U.S. is not certain of the full scope of DPRK's missile infrastructure, U.S. would need to commit high # Navy assets (Destroyers) to the region, puts surrounding Asian countries in danger of DPRK retaliation
 - d. Denuclearize by force

- Pros: North would be completely denuclearized
 - Cons: Extremely high risk of escalation, extreme danger to surrounding Asian countries/U.S. allies, a lot of guesswork involved in targeting North Korean nuclear missile sites, loss of life, possible need for ground troops/deployment of U.S. Special Forces, puts U.S. in a position to commit troops and materiel to Korean peninsula long-term, possible all-out nuclear war
 - e. Decapitate regime
 - Pros: Could lead to complete denuclearization
 - Cons: Leads to full-scale war on the Korean Peninsula, thus putting all U.S. allies and troops in the region at high risk, high civilian death toll in DPRK (and possibly ROK and surrounding regions), long-term commitment of U.S. troops, money, materiel to region
5. Walk away

Main issues:

TERMS AND DEFINITIONS: The North views denuclearization as a long-term objective, shying away from the U.S.'s tendency to focus on short-term goals. Kim Jong-un will think of denuclearization as a process, a movement toward a certain end. More of a freeze than total dismantling, unless, of course, the U.S. offers to pay for the dismantling as well as new energy infrastructure. In Kim's mind, complete denuclearization means removing all nuclear weapons from the entire Korean peninsula as well as the large deployment of U.S. troops in the South.

The United States views denuclearization as the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantling, halting, freezing, and hindering of current and future nuclear production facilities in North Korea.

Experts say that the Trump-Kim meeting could be a success if the United States is willing to accept a freeze rather than total denuclearization. However, both South Korean officials and President Trump (on *twitter*) assert that "Kim Jong Un talked about denuclearization with the South Korean Representatives, not just a freeze."⁷¹

It is imperative that preliminary negotiations begin immediately. The problems in North Korea are extremely dangerous and could easily escalate into full-on armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Entering into formal negotiations without a true sense from Kim and his delegation of what North Korea expects to receive (and what they are willing to give up) will without a doubt have the June 12 meeting and negotiations end like all other past attempts: stalling, and then the termination of negotiations.

DISTRUST: Since Trump pulled the U.S. out of the Iran Nuclear deal, why should the DPRK make a deal? It was the right decision to pull out of the Iran deal, but it is unclear how Kim will ultimately respond. Like past negotiation attempts, this could sway the North Koreans. Past DPRK leaders have tended to shy away from deals due to other parties' internal instability.

Additionally, there are an unknown number of weapons at unknown locations throughout North Korea. Even if the DPRK agrees to "give up their weapons," it is impossible to ever know what percentage the regime actually forfeits. Although fully verifiable denuclearization is an

⁷¹ Donald Trump, *Twitter.com*, March 8, 2018, 5:08PM.

impossible goal, a deal would still benefit from a deal where North Korea is barred from testing and firing ICBMs. Luckily, this facet of any deal struck can be monitored and verified.

SECURITY GUARANTEE: As mentioned previously, Kim might expect the U.S. to remove all 28,500 U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) based in South Korea as part of a security guarantee in exchange for the DPRK's denuclearization. However, South Korean President Moon Jae-in dismissed claims that those U.S. troops would leave if a peace treaty was signed. President Trump has agreed with both the North and South on this matter.

However, promising too much while receiving too little verifiable progress from the North is the true definition of a bad deal. Although North and South Korea have made great strides towards a permanent treaty (to replace the Korean conflict armistice agreement), the issue of how far to take this security guarantee could be a deal breaker for Kim.

SANCTIONS: The DPRK will use the negotiation process to argue for the lifting of sanctions. U.S. negotiators should not send any signals that sanctions will be lifted if the North Koreans are not serious about some level of verifiable denuclearization. North Korea has, however, realized that to grow their economy they must be able to trade with the rest of the world. This realization by the regime, and the desperate state of the North Korean economy, signals that the need for economic stabilization and growth is a top priority of negotiations. However, loosening sanctions in exchange for real results would be fine, but exchanging these sanctions just to get the DPRK to talk is unacceptable. These sanctions are one of the U.S./allies' strongest bargaining chip, so sanctions and Japanese and South Korean interests in the region should not be sacrificed just to make a deal before the clock runs out. The normalization of relations with the U.S., ROK, Japan, and China through denuclearization is the ultimate goal of talks, so lifting sanctions must only occur when verifiable progress in North Korea is achieved.

GOOD PRESS: No matter the outcome, Kim Jong-un wins if he goes through with meeting with U.S. leaders in June 2018. A photograph of him shaking Trump's hand would solidify his status within his country, ultimately giving the current DPRK regime even more status and supreme control over his subjects. At the June 12 meeting, Trump met Kim, shaking his hand as an equal.

CREDIBILITY OF THE NPT: Only through a peaceful, comprehensive, negotiated settlement can the Korean Peninsula be denuclearized. If the U.S./others give too much to North Korea to lure them back to compliance within the NPT obligations as a non-nuclear state, other states may resist compliance to get a similar deal. Giving North Korea too much special attention and bowing to their wishes just to get them back in the fold may inspire other belligerents to act out as well.

The U.S. and others should use these upcoming negotiations to set the precedent for all future issues of denuclearization. In the interest of upholding the NPT's credibility, negotiators should resist treating Korea as an exceptional case, even if that constrains the scope of the agreement that is (hopefully) reached.⁷²

JAPANESE CONCERNS: Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has met and spoken with Trump numerous times in recent months over Japan's concern about the Trump administration's handling of North Korea. Abe scheduled a last minute trip to Washington for June 7, 2018 to discuss these concerns: growing fears of U.S. decoupling from Japan, the U.S. and Japan's

⁷² Huntley, "North Korea and the NPT," *Foreign Policy in Focus*, October 2005.

differing priorities on North Korea, long-term economic interests, and, most of all, Japan's fear of isolation, or facing China alone.⁷³ Overall, Japanese analysts are convinced that these negotiations with the DPRK are a ploy to divide the U.S., Japan, and the ROK while extracting concessions and aid.⁷⁴

SOUTH KOREAN CONCERNS: Since the June 12 Singapore meeting, President Trump has insinuated that a main goal is to remove all 28,000 U.S. troops from South Korea. According to the signed Trump-Kim document, the U.S. also agreed to suspend joint U.S.-ROK military exercises as a show of good faith. However, this could jeopardize the USFK-ROK's ability to efficiently respond in the case of North Korean attack. These U.S. forces give the South Koreans a true sense of safety, and should only be removed if complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is achieved.

Key points to remember:

1. A unified, denuclearized Korea is the ultimate goal. Unifying the peninsula under a leader with ties to the North, while also being someone pro-west, is key.
2. A unified Korea as an American ally is of the utmost importance for the U.S. to keep its undisputed control over the world's oceans, especially the Pacific trade routes. China's navy is growing so fast that it threatens to replace the U.S. as the primary governing party of all main trade routes, especially in the SEA region and Middle East. If China brokers the denuclearization/unification deal with North Korea, China's influence, and therefore their power over the seas and world trade, will surpass that of the U.S.
3. The U.S. needs to discuss what would happen if the North Korean regime collapsed or retaliated in any way with China and South Korea. China does not want U.S. troops anywhere near the Chinese/DPRK border, but under catastrophic circumstances, this could happen.
4. A unified Korea will provide the U.S. (and allies) a solid stage to assert influence and strengthen presence on the peninsula and throughout SEA. A strong alliance with the "new" Korea could help the U.S./allies contain China and Japan's influence by deploying naval forces on a more permanent basis.
5. The most prudent way to strike a bargain with the North is through the existent Russian diplomatic ties to the northern regime. If the U.S., South Korea, Japan, and Russia were the main guarantors of this deal, the U.S. could form a relationship with these countries built on the success of this deal which would benefit all allies throughout the 21st century and beyond. Both Russian and U.S. nuclear experts will need to instruct North Korean scientists how to safely and efficiently dismantle their nuclear infrastructure.
6. The key to the success of the June 12, 2018 meeting is to discuss terms broadly. The real details will need to be discussed at a later meeting with more experts present. Articulating general goals and possible concessions at this meeting would make it a success.
7. Creating a realistic timeline is key. Some goals can be met right away, but full denuclearization will take years, possibly decades. First and foremost, the U.S. and Russia will first need to take an inventory of all WMDs (Weapons of Mass Destruction) in the DPRK.

⁷³ Zack Cooper, "Abe is back to talk to Trump," *Washington Post*, June 6, 2018.

⁷⁴ Jesse Johnson, "Divide and Conquer?" *Japan Times*, February 11, 2018.

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