Operation LINEBACKER II: 
A Retrospective

Report of the LSU Shreveport unit 
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2, 2017

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President/Founder
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Every SAM in Hanoi went off—just a fantastic barrage of SAMS!...and then the bombs started to hit...It was a continuous din of noise and shaking of the ground...We had a panoramic view over the courtyard roof of the prison...You could see the flashes of explosions on the overcast...they just keep coming and kept coming!...a constant barrage of sound, flash, and concussion...An awesome display of power...We were just pasting hell out of them for the first time.1

Capt Bob Lilly, Prisoner-of-War (POW), 1965-1973

The first few times I experienced a B-52 attack it seemed, as I strained to press myself into the bunker floor, that I had been caught in the Apocalypse. The terror was complete. One lost control of bodily functions as the mind screamed incomprehensible orders to get out.2

The Viet Cong Minister of Justice Truong Nhu Tang

At the heart of warfare lies doctrine. It represents the central beliefs for waging war in order to achieve victory. Doctrine is of the mind, a network of faith and knowledge reinforced by experience which lays the pattern for the utilization of men, equipment, and tactics. It is the building material for strategy. It is fundamental to sound judgment.

General Curtis Emerson LeMay, 1968

The purpose of surprise is to strike at a time or place or in a manner for which the enemy is unprepared. Surprise can help the commander shift the balance of combat power and thus achieve success well out of proportion to the effort expended...3

Joint Publication 3.0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

We have the power to destroy his war making capacity. The only question is whether we have the will to use that power. What distinguishes me from [former President] Johnson is I have the will in spades.4

Richard Nixon to Henry Kissinger

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1 Luse Shackelford, and Ray, *Eleven Days in December: Linebacker II* (USAF Southeast Asia Monograph Series, Air University, 1977), V.
One more observation needs to be made, which goes to the very heart of the matter. Only the commander who imposes his will can take the enemy by surprise.…

*Carl von Clausewitz*

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and the commander have to make is [rightly to understand] the kind of war on which they are embarking, neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that its alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.

*Carl von Clausewitz*

The bastards have never been bombed like they’re going to be bombed this time.

*President Richard M. Nixon, May 1972*

In any two-week period you mention.

*General Curtis LeMay, July 1986, when asked if the United State could have won in Vietnam.*

I never said we should bomb them back to the Stone Age. I said we had the capability to do it.

*General Curtis LeMay*

In war there is never any chance for a second mistake.

*Lamachus, 465-414 B.C.E.*

---

6 Clausewitz, *On War*, 89.
8 Interview of Curtis LeMay by Manny-Ann Bendel, *USA Today*, July 23, 1986, 9A.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS

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Dr. Gary Joiner received a B.A. in history and geography and a M.A. in history from Louisiana Tech University and a Ph.D. in history from St. Martin’s College, Lancaster University in the United Kingdom. He is a professor of History at Louisiana State University in Shreveport and serves as the Chair of the Department of History and Social Sciences, where he holds the Mary Anne and Leonard Selber Professorship in History. He is the director at the Strategy Alternatives Consortium (SAC) LSUS and the Red River Regional Studies Center.

Dr. Joiner is the principal author of prior SAC LSUS White Papers, including *OPERATION SENIOR SURPRISE: The Secret Squirrels and the opening of Operation DESERT STORM, 9/11: A Brief History and Case Study of America’s Worst Terrorist Attack*, and *Deterrence: A Brief History and a Case Study in Cold War Practice, Part I: 1945-1953*. He is the author and editor of thirty-four books, including: *History Matters, Shiloh and the Western Campaign of 1862, One Damn Blunder from Beginning to End, Through the Howling Wilderness, The Red River Campaign: The Union’s Last Attempt to Invade Texas, No Pardons to Ask or Apologies to Make, Little to Eat and Thin Mud to Drink, Mr. Lincoln’s Brown Water Navy, The Battle of New Orleans: a Bicentennial Tribute, Red River Steamboats, Historic Shreveport-Bossier, Lost Shreveport: Vanishing Scenes from the Red River Valley, Historic Haunts of Shreveport, Historic Oakland Cemetery, Wicked Shreveport, and Legendary Locals of Shreveport*. Dr. Joiner is also the author of numerous articles and technical reports, and has served as a consultant for ABC, the Associated Press, A&E Network, C-SPAN, the Discovery Network, Fox News, HGTV, the History Channel, MSCBC, MTV, SyFy Channel, and Louisiana Public Broadcasting, among others.

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Ashley Dean received her B.A. in history and M.A. in Liberal Arts from Louisiana State University in Shreveport. She was the graduate researcher for SAC LSUS and is now the full time Assistant Director for the Consortium. She has co-authored and edited prior SAC LSUS White Papers, including *OPERATION SENIOR SURPRISE: The Secret Squirrels and the opening of Operation DESERT STORM, 9/11: A Brief History and Case Study of America’s Worst Terrorist Attack*, and *Deterrence: A Brief History and a Case Study in Cold War Practice, Part I: 1945-1953*. She recently published *Victorian to Victorious: Women in the American Civil War* in the 2016 edition of *JANUS*, the journal of historical research published by the Department of History and Social Sciences at LSUS.
The Strategy Alternatives Consortium at Louisiana State University in Shreveport SAC LSUS created a series of essays to commemorate the forty-fifth anniversary of the Operation LINEBACKER II, which, for America, all but ended the Vietnam War. These essays have been combined into a White Paper. All seven essays and the White Paper are available, free of charge, on the SAC LSUS website – www.lsus.edu/sac. The purpose is to assist professors, high school teachers, Air Force Association chapters, and ROTC units understand the campaign and put it in context of the time and the consequence it made in Air Force doctrine and subsequent political/military decisions.

Operation LINEBACKER II marked a seminal point in the Vietnam War. The campaign, sometimes referred to as “The Eleven-Day War,” brought the North Vietnamese, with sincerity, back to the peace talks in Paris and all but destroyed their ability to wage a defensive war against American Airpower. Most historians and strategists agree that LINEBACKER II was a tremendously successful endeavor. There are some dissenters, who point to a lack of significant targets.

This series of essays examines the literature, the role of participants, presidential administrations, and military commanders and planners to provide an overarching examination of LINEBACKER II. They also provide both orthodox and dissenting opinions so that the reader may make up his or her mind concerning the subject.

The chapters cover a brief examination of the campaign, a discussion of the political climate from the end of World War II to through the decisions to execute Operation LINEBACKER and LINEBACKER II, an examination of strategic bombardment theory from World War II to the early years of the Vietnam War, strategic assets and micromanagement of those assets between 1965 and 1972, Operation LINEBACKER I, Operation LINEBACKER II, and, finally, the consequences and change in strategic thought brought forward by the campaigns.

The authors, Gary D. Joiner, Ph.D. and Ashley E. Dean, wish to thank Lane Callaway, the Eighth Air Force Historian, the good folks who handle the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests at Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana and Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, for their often as for requests, and Lieutenant General Robert Elder (USAF retired) for guidance in this project.

Gary D. Joiner
Director, SAC LSUS
Louisiana State University in Shreveport
November 5, 2017
### Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
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<tr>
<td>AAA</td>
<td>Anti-Aircraft Artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAD</td>
<td>Anti-Aircraft Defenses</td>
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<td>AAF</td>
<td>Army Air Force (United States)</td>
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<td>AB</td>
<td>Air Base</td>
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<td>ABM</td>
<td>Anti-ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>ACC</td>
<td>Air Combat Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADC</td>
<td>Air Defense Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>AEC</td>
<td>Atomic Energy Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFA</td>
<td>Air Force Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFB</td>
<td>Air Force Base</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFGSC</td>
<td>Air Force Global Strike Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFM</td>
<td>Air Force Manual</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALCM</td>
<td>Air launched cruise missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>Army of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnamese national army)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BARCAP</td>
<td>Barrier Combat Air Patrols</td>
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<tr>
<td>BDA</td>
<td>Bomb Damage Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>BW</td>
<td>Bomb Wing (USAF)</td>
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<td>CALCM</td>
<td>Conventional air launched cruise missiles</td>
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<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>Central Command (US)</td>
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<td>CH</td>
<td>CORONA HARVEST</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCPAC</td>
<td>Commander US Military Assistance Command Pacific</td>
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<td>COMUSMACV</td>
<td>Commander US Military Assistance Command Vietnam</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEW</td>
<td>Defense Early Warning (radar system)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>DMZ</td>
<td>demilitarized zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>Department of Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRVN</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECM</td>
<td>electronic counter-warfare measures</td>
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<td>ELINT</td>
<td>electronic intelligence</td>
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<td>EW</td>
<td>Electronic Warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>EWO</td>
<td>Electronic Warfare Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAS</td>
<td>Federation of American Scientists</td>
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<tr>
<td>HE</td>
<td>high explosive</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Intercontinental Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>IP</td>
<td>Initial Point</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRBM</td>
<td>Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGM</td>
<td>laser guided munitions</td>
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<td>MACV</td>
<td>Military Assistance Command, Vietnam</td>
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<td>MAD</td>
<td>Mutually Assured Destruction</td>
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<td>MAJCOM</td>
<td>Major Command</td>
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<td>MiG CAP</td>
<td>MiG Combat Air Patrol</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIRVs</td>
<td>multiple independently targeted vehicles</td>
</tr>
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<td>MIT</td>
<td>Massachusetts Institute of Technology</td>
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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

In December 1972, in what was hoped to be the final weeks of the Vietnam War, President Richard M. Nixon ordered a massive bombing campaign against North Vietnam. The military campaign had strictly political origins. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) recommended in 1964 that North Vietnam be bombed and determined 94 targets that would wreck their ability to wage war.1 President Lyndon B. Johnson, Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk balked at the idea, fearing a Chinese invasion as in Korea.2 This set the stage for civilian micromanagement of the military conduct of the war, troop strength, selection of targets, rules of engagement (ROE), and, to many commanders, observers and historians, the primary reason the war descended into the chaos that it became.3 McNamara, in his position since 1961 and never popular with the military, became a pariah to the JCS and the commanders who followed his orders.4

North Vietnam invaded South Vietnam earlier that year using standard military tactics rather than guerrilla warfare. They hoped to take over the South Vietnamese government before U.S. forces, (deep into troop draw-downs) could hold them back. A series of long drawn out negotiations in Paris frustrated the Americans and the South Vietnamese. On December 13, North Vietnam suspended negotiations that attempted to establish a cease-fire agreement and return U.S. prisoners of war.5 At the same time, the U.S. Congress, tired of the political consequences of the war, determined to cut off funding for Southeast Asia military operations when members returned to Washington D.C. from their holiday recess in January 1973.6

The bombing campaign, known as Operation LINEBACKER II, began on December 18 and lasted for 11 days. Air Force Strategic Air Command (SAC) B-52 bombers flew 729 sorties, and U.S. Navy and Air Force Tactical Air Command (TAC) fighter-bombers flew 1,000 sorties.7 The SAC bombers, naval fighter-bombers, and TAC aircraft dropped 20,370 tons of bombs on North Vietnam.8 They destroyed command and control structures, power generating plants, railroad marshalling yards and trackage, and destroyed military airfields, surface to air missile (SAM) assembly and storage facilities. At the end of the

3 Kohn and Harahan, Strategic Air Warfare, 121.
5 Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston, 1979), 717-744.
8 Ibid., 91-167.
campaign, North Vietnam was largely in the dark, very low on ammunition, and had exhausted its supply of SAMs. Although additional missions were planned and preparations made, President Nixon halted the bombing on December 29. North Vietnam, without replenishment from China and the Soviet Union, agreed to return to negotiations in earnest. The results were merely a formality. The cease-fire agreement was signed on January 23, 1973 by Henry Kissinger for the United States and Le Due Tho for North Vietnam.

Operation LINEBACKER II’s strategy and tactics remain the topic of discussion and planning today, forty-five years later. It proved that the Air Force commanders’ concept of ending the war in 1965 would work militarily, but largely due to the threat of Chinese intervention, was nullified. Once the JCS and Air Force commanders could set targets themselves and not answer to the White House staff (within reason), destruction of the North Vietnamese will and capacity to wage became evident. The operation also led to unanticipated consequences. SAC lost much of its prestige due to its inflexibility. Beliefs in bomber stream formation from World War II and Korea for conventional bombing missions proved problematic for SAC crews who were trained to follow orders blindly in their nuclear combat roles. Iron bombs soon gave way to precision guided weapons. The vulnerability of the B-52s to SAMs quickly led to changes in tactics, mission concepts, and a reduction in the numbers of the heavy bombers. More senior commanders were chosen from the ranks of the fighter pilots.

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9 Ibid.
CHAPTER 2

Political Climate Leading up to LINEBACKER II

No study or analysis of Operation LINEBACKER II should be conducted without a discussion of the political climate that preceded it, not only in the months before the missions in December 1972, but the philosophy of why to use heavy strategic bombers in a limited war that had few legitimate targets. This discussion will set the stage for further reading and examination, but will not provide an exhaustive digest of resources to present the topic fully.

The Strategic Air Command as the Ultimate Strategic Deterrent

The political climate of the use of strategic airpower prior to the Vietnam War (or Second Indochina War) is rooted in the months following the end of World War II. The Strategic Air Command (SAC) predated the establishment of the United States Air Force (USAF). SAC was a Major Command (MAJCOM) in the Air Force, but simultaneously a Specified Command under the Department of Defense. It was responsible for the training and billeting of heavy bomber crews and their aircraft, delivery of all atomic weapons in the case of war, and ultimately, the defense of the continental United States (CONUS).

As technology rapidly progressed and over time, SAC also controlled Air Force refueling squadrons, strategic reconnaissance aircraft, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and airborne command posts. Refueling squadrons were later taken out of wings and formed into their own wing structure. It encompassed three numbered air forces, the Second Air Force, the Eighth Air Force, and the Fifteenth Air Force and several air divisions were assigned to these numbered Air Forces. SAC also originally housed fighter-bomber aircraft units, all of which were designed to deliver nuclear weapons.

SAC’s scope of mission, high degree of readiness, and almost cult-like status began on October 19, 1948, when Lieutenant General Curtis LeMay was appointed its commander. At the time of the command change, SAC possessed sixty B-29 nuclear-capable bombers, none of which could strike the Soviet Union from their CONUS bases. LeMay built SAC into an extraordinarily organization. He placed his personal stamp on all activities from training, housing, aircraft development and acquisition, Congressional actions on needs and, above all, budgets. President Harry Truman entrusted LeMay to create the core documents specifying how to wage the next war, which was believed to be nuclear and against the Soviet Union. LeMay’s response was to create the Emergency War Plan 1-49 (EWP 1-49). The plan outlined a sustained attack on the Soviets which would deliver 133 atomic bombs on 70 cities over a 30-day period. This would exhaust the entire atomic bomb inventory, but LeMay was confident that the Soviets would be annihilated. The Soviets had no practical means of deploying their munitions against the United States. LeMay became the arbiter for defense budgets, strategic doctrine, and force composition under four presidents. SAC demanded more and more resources, to the point where the Air Force even questioned the need for the Navy for force projection. The Navy lost the budget battle over whether to build a super aircraft carrier or

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13 SAC was established (stood up) on March 21, 1946. It transferred to the USAF on the same day that this new independent military service on September 18, 1947.
to fund the B-36 intercontinental bomber. The SAC commander was unmoved by public sentiment and political pressure. LeMay’s primary, indeed only, mission was to provide the United States with the largest, best trained and equipped nuclear deterrent force possible. He believed he could prevent a nuclear war before it began.\textsuperscript{19} SAC crews were elite units. They trained constantly and innovation among the air crews was not discouraged, but eliminated. Every aspect of mission preparation, aircraft maintenance, crew performance, bombing results and post mission analysis was done by an extensive set of orders.\textsuperscript{20} Crews functioned together as a team, unless one or more crewmen were deemed unfit. At that point, the individual was demoted to a lower echelon and sometimes in rank.\textsuperscript{21} Spot promotions and demotions were authorized within SAC.\textsuperscript{22}

SAC’s fortunes rose with the rearmament brought on by the Korean War. Although a World War I style war with serious implications of communist intentions, President Harry Truman refused to declare war on North Korea, even after the intervention of Communist China.\textsuperscript{23} The United Nations and United States were guarantors of the South Korean government. The Communists captured the South Korean capital, Seoul, and Truman was forced to send in large numbers of troops as well as air and sea assets.\textsuperscript{24} SAC was the only command that could send bombers and fighters to the Far East, but could also send nuclear capable bombers to the United Kingdom as a forward base if the Russians decided to escalate the war.\textsuperscript{25}

The Korean War placed a tremendous strain on SAC. While supporting United Nations forces in Korea for conventional bombing support, SAC also increased its nuclear-capable units. These were B-50 and B-36 wings. The B-50s were essentially nuclear capable B-29s with jet assist and specialized bomb bays. Due to the very long range and weapons capacity of the B-36, stockpiles of nuclear weapons increased dramatically.\textsuperscript{26} Although the B-36 had tremendous range, its six propellers and four jet engines could not compete with the speed of pure jets. SAC obtained the first all jet bomber in the Air Force inventory with the B-47 and the mainstay B-52 was first delivered in 1955. The Korean War was considered something of an aberration to SAC planners. LeMay did not want to send his bombers to Korea. He suggested that his B-29s should be sent into North Korea and carpet bomb their cities and, if needed, bomb Chinese positions in Manchuria.\textsuperscript{27} When told that he was ordered to send units to support United Nations forces, he sent two units with lower proficiency ratings. He often repeated his belief that his bombers were being used merely as “flying artillery.”\textsuperscript{28} The cardinal mission of SAC remained nuclear and the threat of overwhelming devastation to an enemy anywhere in the world. As intercontinental ballistic missiles entered their infancy, SAC made certain that all delivery vehicles that contained nuclear warheads were under its control. Beginning during the Truman Presidency and continuing through the Eisenhower terms, theorists, particularly with RAND Corporation authored policy and working papers on the problems with nuclear

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{20} Kohn and Harahan, \textit{Strategic Air Warfare}, 84.
\bibitem{21} Ibid., 97.
\bibitem{24} National Security Council (NSC) Consultants Meeting, June 29, 1950, in \textit{Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)}, 1950, I, 327-330.
\bibitem{27} Worden, \textit{Rise of the Fighter Generals}, 63.
\bibitem{28} Ibid.
\end{thebibliography}
warfare. Among the best known of these strategists were Albert Wohlstetter, Bernard Brodie, and Herman Kahn. Their work influenced not only the National Security Council (NSC) and presidents, but also the senior Pentagon planners. SAC particularly benefited from their work.

**Budgets**

The new Eisenhower administration stressed military security, but with the caveat that it must be economically sound and not harm the private sector. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), in 1953, created war plans that overwhelmingly emphasized the Air Force and SAC in particular. The National Security Memorandum (NSM) 162/2 stated “Air power and nuclear weapons should provide the nation’s primary means of defense – plans should be developed to use nuclear weapons whenever desirable militarily.”

The military budget requests during President Eisenhower’s first term sky rocketed. SAC was the primary beneficiary. Eisenhower found that the demands of military needs were precariously balanced on what the country could afford. The President wrote in 1953 that he intended to eliminate “waste and duplication in the armed forces: and that “even in roles and missions-these last always at least [were] self assigned.”

Aggravating this problem was the Soviet Union, which rapidly developed both atomic and hydrogen weapons and the means to deliver them. Knowledge of Soviet defenses was sparse at best, but the general belief was that missile silos and nuclear bomber airfields were thinly spread. SAC’s response to the burgeoning, but as yet immature, threat was to run “Fail Safe” missions. LeMay’s training regimen required every crew on alert status to launch when ordered in the belief that this might be “the Big One,” the onset of all-out thermonuclear war. This kept the crews sharp and a significant percentage of nuclear weapons aboard the ready alert status aircraft. Each bomber had a set of orders that were to be opened in the event that a “go code” was sent to them. If the code was not sent, the crew practiced for a mission in a secondary set of orders. The secret code told their crews their target and their navigation points. Fail-Safe missions typically consisted of six bombers and six tankers. The bombers in CONUS and depending upon

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34 Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 96-108.
36 Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 153-154. The first Soviet atomic bomb was exploded on August 29, 1949. The first hydrogen weapon was exploded on August 12, 1953. The first ICBM launch was on August 26, 1957.
38 The best non-governmental popular sources of these sequences are found in two movies – Fail Safe and Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb. Both opened in 1964.
the location of their home air bases, would typically fly a northern route, each plane separating into different
courses depending upon their targets.\(^{39}\)

The primary results from strategic planning and operations were that SAC air crews moved away
from massed bomber formation tactics that were standard operating procedures in World War II and, to a
lesser extent, Korea and toward single aircraft operations with nuclear weapons. This demanded that crews
adhere to standard rote orders with no room for innovation. The single aircraft training would have mixed
results in the Vietnam War.

The Air Force and various intelligence assets identified possible targets within the Soviet
Union and its allies that required exponentially more warheads and aircraft. Strategic theory moved into
first strike capability, second strike survivability, and mutually assured destruction (MAD).\(^{40}\) The threat of
Soviet ICBM production and weapons of huge magnitude forced the President to increase the number of
U.S. warheads to 18,000 by the end of his administration. SAC’s targeting plans by 1961 projected huge
overkill. Eisenhower was “shocked and angered” about the numbers.\(^{41}\) Eisenhower’s response to the
perceived “missile gap” and “bomber gap,” brought forth by conservatives in the National Security Council,
Congress, and think tanks such as RAND, was to go against the prevailing SAC concept and give the Navy
a third leg in what would be known as the nuclear triad. Polaris missile submarines were built that could
stay at sea for months at a time and run silently near or at their launch points. Their missiles were not
intercontinental, but were intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) with a range of 1,000 nautical
miles, in this case Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs).\(^{42}\) This concept led to land theatre
IRBM’s as well. At the end of the Eisenhower administration, SAC’s strategic bombers were still
considered to be the most reliable and morally effective deterrent. If launched from their bases with orders
to strike targets, the bombers could be recalled enroute should tensions de-escalate. In contrast, ICBMs
once launched could not be recalled.

**The Kennedy Administration**

As ICBM’s matured as a weapon delivery system, the calculus changed. The new John F. Kennedy
presidency decided that a change in defense spending must be made. Kennedy’s Secretary of Defense,
Robert McNamara, was brilliant but short-sighted. The ex-Ford Motor Company executive saw his world
view through the eyes of a pragmatic accountant, not looking ahead to eventualities, but only seeing
immediate cost savings. McNamara advocated ICBMs as a cost-saving alternative. They were relatively
inexpensive and thus were more affordable than manned bombers.\(^{43}\) He told a Senate Subcommittee in
1964: "What is the role of a [strategic] bomber," … "after you place 1,000 to 2,000 missiles on the
Soviet Union? What do you have left to mop up? This is the question. If it is not a mop-up operation,
what is the role of the bomber?"\(^{44}\)

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\(^{39}\) Conversation with Philip Blaufuss, B-52 radar navigator, who participated in both Fail Sate and Vietnam missions including Linebacker II. Interviewed by Gary D. Joiner, Ph.D. and Ashley Dean on September 12, 2017.

\(^{40}\) Herman Kahn, a senior RAND Corporation theorist on nuclear warfare, was the father of the MAD theory. His most important work on the subject was *On Thermonuclear War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960).


\(^{42}\) Federation of American Scientists (FAS) [https://fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/slbm/a-1.htm](https://fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/slbm/a-1.htm) Retrieved September 16, 2017. With the deployment of the Polaris submarines in 1960, the United States had, for the first time, a triad of three redundant delivery platforms of nuclear weapons.

\(^{43}\) Kennett, “Strategic Bombardment,” 630.

The Kennedy administration inherited a problem in Southeast Asia from the Eisenhower presidency, and, indirectly, from the French. The French were forced out of Vietnam after 1954 by Vietnamese nationalists. The leader, Ho Chi Minh, had been somewhat pro-Western, but was rejected and turned to Russia and China for aid. During the Red Scare era of McCarthyism, all communists were thought to be part of a monolithic block. The U.S. sent in military advisors but not massive numbers of ground troops. McNamara wrote in 1995:

Throughout the Kennedy Years, we operated on two premises, that ultimately proved contradictory. One was that the fall of South Vietnam to Communism would threaten the security of the United States and the Western world. The other was that only the South Vietnamese could defend their nation, and that America should limit its role to providing training and logistical support. In line with that latter view, we actually began planning for the phased withdrawal of U.S. forces in 1963, a step adamantly opposed by those who believed it could lead to the loss of South Vietnam and, very likely, all of Asia.\(^{45}\)

McCarthyism stripped the State Department of its best Asia experts. As the new administration looked at the growing problem in Indochina. It possessed few details and no in-region resources that could understand the state of affairs. As McNamara later recounted, “We also totally underestimated the nationalist aspect of Ho Chi Minh’s movement. We saw him first as a Communist and only second as a Vietnamese nationalist.”\(^{46}\)

The Vietcong (South Vietnamese pro-communist guerrillas) intensified attacks on South Vietnam and, at the same time, North Vietnam sent their own guerillas in to the south near the end of 1961. The U.S. responded by sending in more advisors and military materiel into South Vietnam. Troop numbers were low, but this small increase put America on a footing. At this point the United States was confronting communist ploys the Congo, in Berlin, and soon, in Cuba. It appeared that the corrupt president of South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem, was the focus of communist activity. The Kennedy administration attempted to move him toward conciliation, but he rejected all efforts. The U.S. authorized a coup attempt against Diem. Diem was assassinated two weeks before Kennedy was assassinated in November 1963.\(^{47}\)

**The Johnson Administration**

The new president was Lyndon B. Johnson. He kept Kennedy’s team largely intact. McNamara remained Secretary of Defense, Dean Rusk remained Secretary of State, and his national security advisors. The advisors were split on how to handle the volatile situation in SEA. The new President received advise from both hardline anti-communists and moderates who wanted to keep the region as more of a sideshow on the world state. Johnson moved within a few months to send massive amounts of troops to fight the communists. He erred on the side of fear that the Domino Theory would prevail and perhaps all of Asia would go communist.\(^{48}\) The coup leaders against Diem were themselves toppled by another coup.

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\(^{46}\) Ibid.


\(^{48}\) The domino theory was a Cold War policy that believed that a communist government in one nation would inevitably lead to communist takeovers in neighboring states, each falling like a row of dominos. After the Vietnam War, the theory was discredited.
President Johnson received the push he needed to send massive military support to South Vietnam in August 1964, when North Vietnamese patrol boats attacked two U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin. As a result, Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. This document became the chief tool in escalating the war. At the time, no one understood how it would be applied and to the extent to which it was used by the Johnson administration. Johnson won the November elections in a landslide that November. By the following July, the U.S. increased its troop strength in Vietnam from 23,000 to 175,000. The decision was not made in the public arena. Johnson brought former President Dwight Eisenhower to White House for a conference in February 1966, to ask for his opinion. Eisenhower told Johnson and his advisors that it might take eight full U.S. Army divisions to hold and drive out the communists from South Vietnam. He also told them “‘he hoped they would not be needed; but if they were, so be it.’ If the Chinese or Soviets threatened to intervene, he said, ‘We should pass the word back to them to take care lest dire results [i.e., nuclear strikes] occur to them.”

General William Westmoreland, the U.S. commander in Vietnam stated that he needed tens of thousands of additional troops and more later. He also advocated bombing North Vietnam. He got his wishes. McNamara was the principal conduit for these requests and the Secretary of Defense and the President began four-year day-to-day micromanagement of the war. Using conventional forces to fight guerrilla warfare became the new norm. Objectives were calibrated by targets destroyed in North Vietnam and disruption of traffic in the jungles along the main supply route, the Ho Chi Minh trail. Body counts became the primary factor in proving success. McNamara, approved by the President, set the pattern. Johnson often bragged that “Those boys can’t hit an outhouse without my permission.” The bombing missions conducted by the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps were tightly constrained for the remainder of the Johnson Administration.

49 The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution or the Southeast Asia Resolution, Pub. L. 88–408, 78 Stat. 384, enacted August 10, 1964, was a joint resolution that the United States Congress passed on August 7, 1964, in response to the Gulf of Tonkin incident.
50 McNamara, In Retrospect, 105-125 192-94.
51 Ibid., 172-73.
52 McNamara, “We Were Wrong, Terribly Wrong”; McNamara, In Retrospect, 172-73.
CHAPTER 3
Strategic Bombardment Theory Prior to Vietnam

Post Nagasaki

Strategic bombing theory following World War II continued the tenants of the early theorists, particularly the Italian pioneer Giulio Douhet and General William “Billy” Mitchell in the 1920s and 1930s. Both men, and others, theorized that aerial bombardment should be concentrated on major targets of economic and military importance.\(^\text{55}\) This could not be carried out by aerial bombing alone, but it tipped the balance on winning World War II. The post war United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) stated that strategic bombing “was decisive in the war in Western Europe.”\(^\text{56}\) The Pacific Theatre saw, under General Curtis LeMay, the wholesale destruction of Japanese cities, industrial complexes, military complexes, and the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with atomic bombs. This brought about surrender without an invasion by American ground troops. Strategic bombardment became an integral part of military planning and execution.\(^\text{57}\) Airpower advocates saw the atomic bomb, with America being the sole owner and operator, as the ultimate hedge against war. If a war did occur, it was expected to be against the Soviet Union.

General Carl A. Spaatz, who became the Army Air Force (AAF) postwar Commanding General and the first Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force in 1947, summed up this belief: "Air Power is not only our first line of defense, it is the only instrument using the third dimensional medium, the air; it is the only weapon which has the speed, flexibility, and versatility to cope with the cataclysmic forces yet to be released in the Atomic Age."\(^\text{58}\) Post War thinkers like Bernard Brodie brought the complex issues of the use of atomic weapons into sharp focus. He believed the existence of the atomic bomb required a complete reordering of military strategic deterrence doctrine: "Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose."\(^\text{59}\) The American military, in a joint exercise, exploded two atomic bombs near Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands in July 1946. Operation CROSSROADS was to establish the effect of atomic weapons on naval forces. The second test, codenamed “BAKER” used a 23-kiloton weapon suspended 90 feet below the surface of the water and yielded the following results:

The underwater fireball generated by the blast took the form of a rapidly expanding hot gas bubble, which reached the sea floor and the sea surface simultaneously. The result created a shallow crater on the seafloor 30 feet deep and nearly 2,000 feet wide. At the top, water burst through the surface like a geyser, creating a massive "spray dome" containing nearly two million tons of water. The expanding dome stretched into a hollow chimney of spray called the "column," 6000 feet tall and 2000 feet wide with walls 300 feet thick.


The space vacated by the rising gas bubble caused a tsunami which generated a wave 94 feet high. By the time the wave reached Bikini Island beach 3.5 miles away, a series of nine 15-foot waves tossed landing craft onto the beach and filled them with sand. Ten seconds after the detonation, falling water from the column created a 900-foot "base surge" which rolled over many of the target ships, painting them with radioactivity that could not be removed.\(^60\)

![Figure 1](image.png)

**Figure 1.** Operation CROSSROADS in July 1946. Note the capital ships that were destroyed in seconds. Image Source: U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.

Observers from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) reported that the destructive power of atomic weapons was so impressive that if "used in numbers," they could "nullify any nation's military effort" and "demolish its social and economic structures and prevent their reestablishment for long periods of time."\(^61\)


The difficulty in producing enough atomic bombs to meet planning needs took years to solve, and the question of how many nuclear-capable bombers was an added problem. The small numbers of atomic bombs led planners to assume that future conflicts would be fought with a combination of conventional and atomic weapons. President Harry Truman added to the Air Force’s frustration and confusion when he placed custody and control of nuclear weapons with the civilian-run Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), established by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. The Berlin Crisis and the Korean War forced Truman to relinquish some control to the military. He allowed military custody of nuclear weapons, limited initially to nonnuclear components.

SAC – Peace is our Profession

The Strategic Air Command (SAC) became the long-range strike arm of the postwar Air Force. It formed, along with the Tactical Air Command (TAC) and the Air Defense Command (ADC), the three primary major commands (MAJCOMs) that composed the Air Force. SAC was also designated a “Specified Command” meaning that it reported directly to the JCS, making the Air Force their executive agent. This meant that SAC not only possessed a degree of independence from the Air Force, but it also became a separate line item in the Defense budget. As SAC’s needs and perceptions grew, so did its voracious budgets for the next three decades.

When the U.S. Air Force became an independent service, SAC possessed only one atomic weapons capable bomb group. This was the 509th, based at Roswell Field, New Mexico near the Sandia nuclear storage facility. This reflected the complex relationship among the AEC, The DOD, and SAC. The 509th flew Silverplate B-29s, each modified to carry a single atomic bomb weighing approximately 10,000 pounds. The remaining six groups fielded conventionally armed B-29s or B-17s as reconnaissance aircraft. B-29s had an unrefueled range of 3,250 miles. This meant that, in the post-war world, they must operate from forward bases in Europe or the Far East, which caused some serious security and potential political problems. SAC organized its air refueling tankers into squadrons in 1948. These consisted of modified B-29s designated as KB-29Ms. This greatly increased the bombers’ range since the KB-29Ms could be stationed at forward air bases and meet the bombers on their way or returning from missions. SAC received its initially problem-plagued B-36 intercontinental bombers beginning in 1948. This increased the combat range to 8,000 miles.

SAC planners and targeters focused primarily on a war with the Soviet Union almost immediately following World War II and this continued throughout its existence. SAC concentrated targeting on 70

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63 Reardon, “U.S. Bombardment Doctrine,” 387.
65 JCS 1259/27 para 4, subj: Unified Command Plan, Dec II, 1946, and decision on December 12, 1946, RG 341, DCS/Ops, Dir of Plans, PO 323.361 (November 8, 1943), case I, sec 4, NARA.
66 Atomic Heritage Foundation. Project "Silverplate" was the code name that referred to a secret program within the Manhattan Project to produce a special version of the Boeing B-29 Superfortress bomber that could deliver the atomic bomb. http://www.atomicheritage.org/history/project-silverplate
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
urban-industrial centers recognized as crucial to the Soviet war-making economy. These were the most easily-identifiable and easily-targetable sites, as there was no aerial reconnaissance until the U-2 was introduced.\(^71\) The plan established an imperative for a “paralyzing blow delivered within forty-eight hours, mainly against the Soviet Union’s transportation and petroleum production systems, it would incapacitate or at least slow the Soviet war machine while the United States and its allies mobilized.”\(^72\) SAC made its point very clearly during the Berlin Crisis of 1948-1949. It deployed B-29s to Great Britain to show how highly the West prioritized the situation. As a deception, the 509th Silverplate B-29s were moved. The Soviets did not know if the B-29s in Britain were nuclear capable or not.\(^73\)

The Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb in September 1949. The reaction was predictably strong. President Truman announced that the United States would begin research and deployment of new weapon of mass destruction (WMD) using thermonuclear (hydrogen) it its design.\(^74\) President Truman asked his advisors to take a hard look at the state of the military following the detonation of the Soviet bomb. The result was National Security Council (NSC) 68, which estimated that by 1954, the Soviets would have both the atomic weapons and delivery systems to threaten the continental United States.\(^75\) When the Korean War began, President Truman began lifting the ceiling on defense spending.

SAC was the great beneficiary. SAC’s personnel and equipment in January 1951 consisted of 85,000 personnel and 1,000 aircraft. By the end of 1951, SAC expanded to 145,000 personnel and 1,200 aircraft, including 98 B-36s, 340 B-29s, and 219 B-50s, a longer-distance version of the B-29 with jet assist.\(^76\) SAC and the Air Force both requested far larger forces. The Air Force wanted 95 wings of both tactical and strategic aircraft. Congress mulled over increasing the force size to between 126 and 150 wings with one-third dedicated to SAC.\(^77\) This increase in Air Force strategic units was accompanied by a rapidly increase in the production of nuclear weapons. The AEC counted 299 atomic weapons at the beginning of the Korean War. By 1961, the total arsenal totaled 22,229.\(^78\)

The Dwight D. Eisenhower administration’s “New Look” policy saw a tremendous increase in strategic deterrence assets. These included not only offensive weapons such as bombers, but defensive early warning systems such as the Defense Early Warning radar system (DEW Line), dedicated nuclear missile armed fighter-interceptor squadrons, and air defense missile systems protecting cities and major military bases.\(^79\)

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\(^{74}\) Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1956), 309.


Guiding all of this was General Curtis E. LeMay, SAC’s commander from 1948-1957. His personal stamp covered everything from airmen’s daily lives to targeting and aircraft procurement. He placed gifted men loyal to him and his theories of air warfare in high positions and many succeeded him as his career rose. He stressed excellence at level of his command: “In my opinion, SAC’s deterrent influence on USSR aggressive intentions can only be maintained by an effective force in being, properly manned, equipped and trained, at the proper time period, and whose combat capability is universally recognized and unquestioned.” LeMay led SAC to be the greatest deterrent force in history, with 200,000 personnel operating at 55 air bases in CONUS and overseas.

Figure 2. B-52 D with SAC livery with anti-radiation white on lower surfaces and twin Hound Dog missiles on external pylons. Image Source: United States Air Force.

SAC found that its piston engine propeller driven bombers could not keep up with the rapid advances in fighter jets. The result was a new medium bomber, the B-47 Stratojet. The six-jet engine swept wing jet entered service in 1951. This allowed for the replacement of the B-29s and B-50s, and the changeover to all jet bombers was complete by 1950. At that time SAC had 1,300 B-47s. The B-52 Stratofortress, an eight-engine jet bomber, entered service the same year, replacing the B-36s. The early A through D models, carrying four gravity-fall hydrogen weapons, had an approximate range of 6,000

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80 Cable, LeMay to Twining, subject: SAC Capabilities, May 15, 1953, LeMay Papers, box B-203, B-27106 folder, Library of Congress.
81 Hopkins and Goldberg, Development of SAC, 58.
82 Reardon, “U.S. Bombardment Doctrine,” 405.
miles, while the G and H models traveled 10,000 miles carrying eight H-Bombs. This included carrying Quail decoys and twin Hound Dog missiles with their own nuclear warheads. KC-135 jet tankers replaced the KB-50s and allowed the B-52s to have unlimited range.

SAC occasionally tested Soviet Air Defenses by flying parallel to their air space. Fifty aircraft flew over the port city of Vladivostok during daylight, unopposed, at least once. The implementation of the Lockheed U-2 high altitude reconnaissance plane allowed SAC to obtain real time intelligence for targeting. U-2s operated out of Beale Air Force Base and also forward bases in Europe and Asia with impunity until one was lost over Sverdlovsk and the pilot, Francis Gary Powers was captured in 1960. The CIA and the Air Force jointly operated the U-2 program.

Figure 3. Lockheed U-2 Dragon Lady. An early example. Image Source: United States Air Force.

The U-2s gave SAC much needed information on potential targets. SAC planners allocated their primary target status to military-industrial targets, and as the tradition of World War II and Korea demanded, major population centers were kept on the list. Even though the number of nuclear weapons and bombers were ever increasing, targets out matched deliverability. Targets were often chosen by selecting multiple targets in clusters with higher yield weapons and multiple thermonuclear bombs dedicated to them if needed. SAC identified 1,700 targets within the Soviet Union in 1954. Of these 409 were airfields. A full attack on 118 of the Soviet Union’s 134 most populous cities would yield annihilation of between 75 and 84 percent of the Soviet population.

The Soviets made significant gains in the early 1950s toward jet bombers that could threaten SAC’s overseas air bases, NATO facilities and troop concentrations, and perhaps CONUS. The mainstay of the Soviet long-range bomber force was the Tupolev 95 Bear bomber. They also made rapid gains in IRBM and ICBM weapons. RAND Corporation performed research projects for the Air Force that described the vulnerability of the U.S. Mainland from a Soviet strike. This prompted SAC to withdraw many of its forward based bombers back to U.S. and increased its bases it currently used and added many more. Foreign bases typically retained KC-135 tankers.

This rapid increase in the technology of Soviet bombers and ICBM technology led President Eisenhower to ask the president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), James R. Killian, to form a panel to investigate America’s vulnerabilities in case of attack. The panel presented their findings in 1955 to the NSC and Eisenhower in what is called the Killian Report. They believed that if the United States did not increase its strategic forces and home defenses that “For the first time in history a striking force could have such power that the first battle could be the final battle, the first punch a knockout.” The Killian Report stated that strategic offensive capabilities must be vastly upgraded and the United States homeland defenses must be upgraded to include early warning and air defense systems, more SAC base dispersal, particularly away from major population areas, and an increased emphasis on “high-technology intelligence gathering and on weapons such as ICBMs and land-and sea-based intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) that could respond swiftly and effectively in an emergency with minimal prior warning.” SAC pushed for ICBMs and IRBMS, and an increase in the number of operational bases. Air Force, Department of Defense, and NSC planners and researchers began to fear of both bomber and missile gaps relative to the Soviets. Specifically, Trevor Gardner, at that time Special Assistant for Research and

89 Ibid., 18.
91 Special Staff Report: The Selection of Strategic Air Bases (RAND R-244-S, Mar I, 1953) and A. J. Wohlstetter et al., Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases (RAND R-266, April 1954).
92 Hopkins and Goldberg, Development of SAC, pp 72-73.
95 Ibid.; Reardon, “U.S. Bombardment Doctrine,” 413.
Development to the Secretary of the Air Force, urged for a rapid increase in the ICBM program.\(^97\) Although SAC rightly placed great significance in its bomber and tanker force, it embraced ballistic missiles if they were under its control.

Some in the administration believed that ICBMs were the answer to cost overruns. Missiles were relatively cheap, especially regarding the cost of SAC bombes and tankers, as well as tremendous infrastructure of bases.\(^98\) Eisenhower’s response was that “We must remember that we have a great number of bombardment aircraft programmed, and great numbers of tankers that are now being built, and we must consider how to use them.”\(^99\)

Late in 1957, the Soviets launched *Sputnik 1*, the Earth’s first artificial satellite. The delivery vehicle was, of course, an ICBM. This set of a frenzy off activity among American and NATO planners. SAC might be rendered obsolete. RAND Corporation’s Albert Wohlstetter and Fred Hoffman authored a report just prior to the Sputnik launch, which laid the basis for this argument.\(^100\) The authors stated: “Our SAC presents soft, relatively few, relatively undefended targets.”\(^101\) Wohlstetter again recommended greatly improving early warning systems and hardening of bomber shelters. President Eisenhower asked H. Rowan Gaither, Jr. to chair an inquiry into the “various active and passive measures to protect the civil population in case of nuclear attack and its aftermath.”\(^102\) The Gaither Committee tendered its report, *Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age*, to President Eisenhower in November 1957.\(^103\) It warned that “By 1959, the USSR may be able to launch an attack with its ICBMs carrying megaton warheads, against which SAC will be almost completely vulnerable under present programs.”\(^104\) The committee followed Albert Wohlstetter’s recent suggestions, but privately told the President that if forced to make a choice, they believed it “would be more cost-effective to stress improvements in offensive capabilities rather than defensive measures.”\(^105\) Eisenhower agreed with the report, but slowed the suggested implementation schedule.\(^106\) Improving offensive capabilities was Eisenhower’s foremost goal. By 1959, SAC deployed the first Atlas D ICBMs. They also equipped the rapidly increasing B-52 bomber fleet with Quails and Hound

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\(^{98}\) Col A. J. Goodpaster, Meeting of Nov 8, 1956, on Policy Questions Affecting Department of Defense, November 9, 1956, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman file, DOE Diary Series, box 19, November 1956 Staff Memos folder, DDEL.

\(^{99}\) Goodpaster, Meeting of December 19, 1956, on DoD Budget, Dec 20, 1956, DOE Diary Series, box 20, December 1956 Staff Memos folder, DDEL.


\(^{104}\) Ibid.

\(^{105}\) Memo, Goodpaster, Conference with the President on November 4, 1957, November 6, 1957, Eisenhower Presidential Papers, Whitman file, DOE Diary Series, box 28, November 1957 Staff Notes folder, DDEL.

\(^{106}\) JCS 2101/284, December 4, 1957, RG 218, Modern Military Division, NARA.
Dogs and low-level penetration aids. This marked a change in strategy for the B-52s to travel at low altitudes to reach their targets. By the end of the Eisenhower presidency, SAC conducted major redeployment of its bomber assets to CONUS and placed them at sixty-six bases in the United States and Canada. It also set criteria for one-third of its bombers and tankers to be on fifteen-minute ground alert.

SAC believed that it needed a replacement for the B-52. What they desired was an aircraft that could outrun any known enemy fighter, either in existence or on the drawing board. The answer was the Mach 3 high altitude B-70 Valkyrie. It was also considered to be a counter weapon to the Navy’s Polaris SLBM. The Navy deployed the Polaris submarines before the B-70s finished testing, but SAC forged ahead with the program. SAC then requested that all Polaris missiles be placed under SAC’s control. The Navy responded with a request for more Polaris submarines and a reduction of SAC.

Shortly after John F. Kennedy’s election and before he took office in January 1961, The JCS approved its initial single integrated operational plan (SIOP) for 1961. It was a near copy of SAC operational doctrine.

**The Kennedy-McNamara Era**

SAC’s doctrine hinged on its massive ability for overkill and to survive a Soviet first strike in a full out thermonuclear war. The new B-70 was in final engineering and early flight stages, and, as General LeMay stated: “to provide a decisive counterforce potential” in the coming decade and thereafter. John Kennedy was critical of the Eisenhower administration’s defense policy as a Congressman and Senator. He believed that the “missile gap” would be America’s undoing. He was suspicious of a world in which the United States had only one military option, that being massive nuclear counterstrike capabilities. He wanted wider options and the ability to fight conventional wars that might stop a thermonuclear conflagration. He stated: “We have been driving ourselves into a corner where the only choice is all or nothing at all, world devastation or submission – a choice that necessarily causes us to hesitate on the brink and leaves the initiative in the hands of our enemies.”

Kennedy handpicked a team of bright intellectuals to carry out his beliefs and campaign promises. Among these was Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. McNamara left the post of President of the Ford Motor Company to work in Kennedy’s cabinet. His specialty was data and statistical analysis. McNamara thought like an accountant, not like the civilian head of the United States military. To somewhat counter McNamara, the President brought General Maxwell Taylor, Eisenhower’s Army Chief of Staff, back to active duty and appointed him the Chairman of the JCS. McNamara and his team, known as the

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109 Letter, General Power to General Twining: Command and Control of Polaris, Mar 6, 1959, Thomas D. White Papers, box 27, Command SAC folder, LC.
111 Reardon, “U.S. Bombardment Doctrine,” 422.
114 Ibid.
“Whiz Kids,” began auditing the United States’ defense policy. He reviewed SIOP from the standpoint of economic efficiency, not survivability or practicality. SAC pushed back stating that it did not want to be pushed backwards into a state of weakened deterrence and “perhaps make a thermonuclear war impossibly difficult to fight.” Kennedy’s NSC revised SIOP to focus on retaliation, not preemption, and to select second strike targets rather than preemptive targets with emphasis on reexamining aim points and timing rather than one massive assault. The theory was that if the Soviets did not kill the United States entirely in a first strike, U.S. retaliation might convince them to halt their aggression by not attacking in a single giant response. SAC’s commander, General Thomas A. Power, believed abandoning first strike options were foolhardy at best.

After being in office for four months, McNamara told the North Atlantic Council in a secret meeting in Athens, Greece on May 5, 1962:

The U.S. has come to the conclusion that to the extent feasible, basic military strategy in a possible general nuclear war should be approached in much the same way that more conventional military operations have been regarded in the past. That is to say, principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the Alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces, not his civilian population. In other words, we are giving a possible opponent the strongest imaginable incentive to refrain from striking our own cities.

McNamara, with the President’s blessing, began cost cutting measures. He increased the number of ICBMs to be built, increased the number of B-52s and KC-135s standing alert from one-third to one-half, accelerated the decommissioning of the B-47 fleet, and killed the Skybolt missile and B-70 programs. Air Force Chief of Staff, General LeMay told a Senate committee, “I do not think you can maintain superiority in this field with that sort of a program.” New online and launched CORONA satellites showed that the missile gap did not exist and that the Soviets had perhaps seventy SS-6 and SS-7 ICBMs.

McNamara controlled the SIOP. He retained several counterforce options, but limited them. He met heavy resistance from SAC. McGeorge Bundy, the President’s National Security Advisor, admitted “it

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116 Goodpaster, Conference with the President, Kistiakowsky, et al., November 25, 1960, December 1, 1960, Eisenhower Papers, DDEL.
would be much easier to control strategic procurement if he [McNamara] did not at the same time challenge SAC’s targeting doctrines.”

McNamara refused to consider any hint of an American first-strike option under any circumstances. “Because we have a sure second-strike capability, there is no pressure on us whatsoever to preempt … our second strike is so sure that there would be no rational basis on which to launch a preemptive strike.”

Author Steven Reardon sums up McNamara’s not so altruistic decision:

A number of considerations doubtless played a part in his thinking, but it seems clear that the crucial factor in McNamara's decision to abandon counterforce was his dawning realization that the costs would be enormous, entailing ever-increasing new expenditures. As more weapons were made available, still more targets could be added to the SIOP, which in turn would require more weapons, not to mention more active and passive American defenses. Although Kennedy and McNamara both supported a more vigorous civil defense program, it never caught on either with a Congress that was lukewarm toward the idea or with an indifferent American public.

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**Figure 4.** North American B-70 Valkyrie Mach 3 bomber. Images Source: United States Air Force and NASA.

125 Bundy, *Danger and Survival*, 355.
The Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 seemed to have solidified his views that neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union would commit to thermonuclear war because it was a path to suicide.\footnote{Robert S. McNamara, \emph{Blundering into Disaster: Surviving the First Century of the Nuclear Age} (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 8-9, 44-46.} He introduced the theory of assured destruction, or mutual assured destruction (MAD) into SIOP and the defense budgets throughout his tenure in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.\footnote{For MAD, see Herman Kahn, \emph{On Thermonuclear War}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed. (New York: Free Press, 1960), passim; U.S. Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, \emph{Appendix}.}

After President Kennedy’s assassination, his vice-president Lyndon B. Johnson became president. Johnson retained all of Kennedy’s top aids and cabinet. McNamara convinced the new president to hold U.S. strategic assets to 41 SLBM submarines and 1,000 Minuteman ICBM launchers.\footnote{Hopkins and Goldberg, \emph{Development of SAC}, 110, 126; McNamara, \emph{Essence of Security}, 63-64; Enthoven and Smith, \emph{How Much Is Enough?} pp 251-262; McNamara, \emph{Essence of Security}, 63-64.} McNamara also promised the Pentagon that the next year’s budget would include weapon refinements including hardened caps for warheads, multiple independently targeted vehicles (MIRVs), sea launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and some anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense systems. The Pentagon, particularly SAC, realized that the bomber alert force, indeed the manned bomber program was marginalized.\footnote{Alton H. Quanbeck and Archie L. Wood, \emph{Modernizing the Strategic Bomber Force} (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1976), 2.}
Table 1. Comprehensive list of all SAC bases, from 1946-1992, units attached by year, and whether the units were Host (H), Tenant (T), or Provisional (P).

Strategic Air Command Bases - 1946 – 1992


For ease of use, if the name of the installation changed, both the old and new name are listed:

Present name (Future name and date of name change), Location. (T) = Tenant, (H) = Host.

(Previous name) Present name and date of name change. Location. (T) = Tenant, (H) = Host.

United States

Abilene AFB, TX (Dyess AFB, 15 Dec 1956) (H)

- 341st Bomb Wing 1955–1956

Altus AFB, Altus, OK (H)

  - 96th Bomb Wing 1953–1957.

Amarillo AFB, Amarillo, TX (H)

- 461st Bomb Wing 1963–1968

Andrews AFB, Camp Spring, MD (T)

- Namesake: Lt Gen Frank Maxwell Andrews
  - Strategic Air Command HQ 1946–1948.
    - 311th Reconnaissance Group 1946–1948

Barksdale AFB, Bossier City, LA (H)

- Namesake: Lt Eugene Hoy Barksdale.
Beale AFB, Marysville, CA (H)

- Namesake: Brig Gen Edward Fitzgerald Beale.
  - Second Air Force 1991–1992,
    - 14th Air Division 1960–1962,
      - 9th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing 1966–1991,
      - 9th Wing 1991–1992,
      - 17th Bomb Wing 1975–1976,
    - 100th Air Refueling Wing 1976–1983,
    - 456th Bomb Wing 1972–1975,
    - 456th Strategic Aerospace Wing 1962–1971,
    - 4126th Strategic Wing 1959–1963,
    - 4200th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing 1965–1966,

Bergstrom AFB, Austin, TX (H)

- Namesake: Capt John August Bergstrom.
  - 12th Fighter Day Wing 1957–1958
  - 12th Fighter Escort Wing 1950–1953
  - 12th Strategic Fighter Wing 1953–1957
  - 27th Fighter Escort Wing 1950–1953
  - 27th Fighter Wing 1949–1950
  - 27th Strategic Fighter Wing 1953–1958
  - 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing 1971-1993
  - 131st Fighter – Bomber Wing 1951
  - 340th Bomb Wing 1963–1966
  - 4130th Strategic Wing 1958–1963
Biggs AFB, El Paso, TX (H)

- Namesake: Lt James B. Biggs.
  - 810th Air Division 1952–1962
    - 95th Bomb Wing 1952–1966
    - 97th Bomb Wing 1948–1959

Blytheville AFB, Blytheville, AR (Eaker AFB 26 May 1988) (H)

- 42d Air Division 1973–1988
- 42d Strategic Aerospace Division 1963
  - 97th Bomb Wing 1959–1988

Bolling AFB, Washington, DC (T)

- Namesake: Col Raynal Cawthorne Bolling.
  - District of Columbia
    - Strategic Air Commands HQ 1946

Buckley Field, Aurora, CO. (T)

- 311th Reconnaissance Wing 1946–1948

Bunker Hill AFB (Grisson AFB, 12 May 1968), Peru, IN (H)


Camp Carson, Colorado Springs, CO (T)

- Namesake: Brig. Gen. Christopher "Kit" Carson

Campbell AFB, KY (T)

  - SAC Special Activities Center
(Fort Worth AFB) Carswell AFB, 27 Feb 1948, Fort Worth, TX (H)

- 8th Air Force 1948–1955
  - 7th Bomb Wing 1948–1991
    - 19th Air Division 1951–1988
      - 7th Wing 1991–1992
      - 11th Bomb Wing 1951–1957
      - 43d Bomb Wing 1960–1964
      - 4123d Strategic Wing 1957–1959

Castle AFB, Merced County, CA (H)

  - 47th Air Division 1959–1962
    - 93d Bombardment Group 1946.
    - 93d Bomb Wing 1947–1991
    - 93d Wing 1991–1992

Chatham AFB, Savannah, GA (H)

- 22nd Bomb Wing 1949–1950

(Lake Charles AFB) Chennault AFB, LA 14 Nov 1958 (H)

- 806th Air Division 1958–1960
  - 44th Bomb Wing 1958–1960
  - 68th Bomb Wing 1958–1963

Clinton County AFB, Wilmington, OH (T)

- 22nd Air Division 1959–1960
  - 4090th Air Refueling Wing 1958–1960

Clinton–Sherman AFB, Clinton, OK (H)

- Namesake: City of Clinton and the Sherman Iron Works.
• 4090th Air Refueling Wing 1958–1960
• 70th Bomb Wing 1962–1969.
• 4123d Strategic Wing 1959–1963

Columbus AFB, Columbus, MS (H)
• 454th Bomb Wing 1962–1969
• 4228th Strategic Wing 1958–1963

Cooke AFB (Vandenberg AFB, 4 Oct 1958), Lompoc, CA (T)
• Namesake: Gen. Philip St. George Cooke.
  • 1st Missile Division 1957–1958
    • 704th Strategic Missile Wing 1957–1958

Davis–Monthan AFB, Tucson, AZ (H)
• Namesake: 1st Lt. Samuel H. Davis and 2d Lt. Oscar Monthan
  • 12th Air Division 1962–1971
  • 12th Strategic Aerospace Division 1962–1971
  • 12th Strategic Missile Division 1971–1973
  • 36th Air Division 1951–1960
    • 2d Bomb Wing 1947–1949
    • 40th Bombardment Group 1946
    • 43rd Bomb Wing 1947–1960
    • 100th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing 1966–1976
    • 303d Bomb Wing 1951–1964
    • 390th Bomb Wing 1953–1961
    • 390th Strategic Missile Wing 1962–1984
    • 444th Bombardment Group 1946
    • 4080th Strategic Wing 1969–1966

Dow AFB, Bangor, ME (H)
• Namesake: Lt. James F. Dow.
  • 6th Air Division 1961–1966
    • 101st Air Refueling Wing 1976–1992
    • 132d Fighter Bomber Wing 1951
    • 397th Bomb Wing 1962–1968
    • 506th Strategic Fighter Wing 1952–1955
    • 4038th Strategic Wing 1958–1963
    • 4060th Air Refueling Wing 1955–1963
(Abilene AFB) Dyess AFB 15 Dec 1956, Abilene, TX (H)

- 12th Air Division 1973–1988
- 819th Air Division 1956–1962
- 819th Strategic Aerospace Division 1962–1966
  - 7th Wing 1993–current
  - 96th Bomb Wing 1957–1962
  - 96th Bomb Wing 1972–1991
  - 96th Strategic Aerospace Wing 1962–1972
  - 96th Wing 1991–1992
  - 341st Bomb Wing 1956–1961

(Blytheville AFB) Eaker AFB 26 May 1988, Blytheville, AR (H)

- Namesake: Gen. Ira C. Eaker
  - 97th Wing 1991–1992

Eglin AFB, Ft. Walton Beach, FL (T)

  - 39th Bomb Wing 1963–1965
  - 4135th Strategic Wing 1958–1963

(Mile 26) Eielson AFB, Fairbanks 4 Feb 1948, AK 20 Jul 1957 (T)

- Namesake: Col. Carl Benjamin Eielson
  - 6th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing 1988–1992
  - 6th Strategic Wing 1967–1988
  - 168th Air Refueling Wing 1986–1992
  - 4157th Strategic Wing 1962–1967
  - 97th Bomb Wing 1947–1948

(Rapid City AFB) Ellsworth AFB, 13 Jun 1953, Rapid City, SD (H)

  - 12th Air Division 1988–1990
  - 821st Air Division 1959–1962
  - 821st Strategic Aerospace Division 1962–1971
    - 28th Bomb Wing 1955–1991
    - 28th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing 1953–1955
- 28th Wing 1991–1992
- 44th Missile Wing 1991–1992
- 44th Strategic Missile Wing 1962–1991

**Elmendorf AFB, Anchorage, AK (T)**

  - 4158th Strategic Wing 1963–1966

**Ent AFB, Colorado Springs, CO (T)**

  - Fifteenth Air Force 1946–1949

**(Spokane AFB) Fairchild AFB 20 Jul 1951, Spokane, WA. (H)**

  - 18th Air Division 1959–1962
  - 18th Strategic Aerospace Division 1962–1968
  - 47th Air Division 1971–1987
  - 57th Air Division 1951–1956
  - 92d Bomb Wing 1951–1962
  - 92d Bomb Wing 1972–1991
  - 92d Strategic Aerospace Wing 1962–1972
  - 98th Bomb Wing 1947–1948
  - 99th Bomb Wing 1955–1956
  - 99th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing 1953–1955
  - 141st Air Refueling Wing 1976–1992

**Fairfield–Suisun AFB (Travis AFB 21 Apr 1951), Fairfield, CA (H)**

- 5th Bomb Wing 1955–1968
- 5th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing 1949–1955
- 9th Bomb Wing 1950–1953
- 9th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing 1949–1950

**(Topeka AFB) Forbes AFB 1 Jul 1948, Topeka, KS (H)**
  • 21st Air Division 1951–1962
  • 21st Strategic Aerospace Division 1962–1964
  • 311th Air Division, Reconnaissance 1948–1949
    • 40th Bomb Wing 1960–1964
    • 40th Strategic Aerospace Wing 1964
    • 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing 1948–1949
    • 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing 1952–1966
    • 90th Bomb Wing 1951–1956
    • 90th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing 1956–1960
    • 190th Air Refueling Wing 1978–1992
    • 308th Bomb Wing 1951
    • 310th Bomb Wing 1952
    • 376th Bomb Wing 1951

Fort Worth AFB (Carswell AFB, 27 Feb 1948), Fort Worth, TX (H)

• 8th Air Force 1946–1948
  • 7th Bomb Wing 1947–1948
  • 43rd Bomb Wing 1960-1964
  • 58th Bombardment Group 1946
  • 448th Bombardment Group 1946

Francis E. Warren AFB, Cheyenne, WY (H)

• Namesake: Gov. Francis Emroy Warren
  • 4th Air Division 1973–1988
  • 4th Strategic Aerospace Division 1971–1988
  • 4th Strategic Missile Division 1971–1973
  • 13th Air Division 1963
  • 13th Strategic Missile Division 1963–1966
    • 90th Missile Wing 1991–1992
    • 90th Strategic Missile Wing 1963–1991
    • 389th Strategic Missile Wing 1961–1965
    • 706th Strategic Missile Wing 1958–1961
    • 4320th Strategic Wing (Missile) 1958

Geiger Field, WA

• Namesake: Maj. Harold C. Geiger.
  • 141st Air Refueling Wing 1976
General Billy Mitch ANGB, WI

  - 128th Air Refueling Wing 1976–1992

Glasgow AFB, Glasgow, MT (H)

- 91st Bomb Wing 1962–1968
- 4141st Strategic Wing 1958–1963

Grand Forks AFB, Grand Forks, ND (H)

- 4th Air Division 1964–1971
- 4th Strategic Aerospace Division 1971
- 42d Air Division 1988–1991
  - 319th Bomb Wing 1962–1991
  - 319th Wing 1991–1992
  - 321st Strategic Missile Wing 1964–1992
  - 449th Bombardment Group 1946
  - 4133d Strategic Wing 1958–1963

Grand Island AFB, Grand Island, NE

- 449th Bombardment Group 1946

Great Falls AFB (Malmstrom AFB 15 Jun 1956), Great Falls, MT (H)

- 407th Strategic Fighter Wing 1953–1956

Grenier AFB, Manchester, NH (T)

- Namesake: Lt. James D. Grenier
  - 82d Fighter Wing 1947–1949

Griffiss AFB 20 September 1948, Rome, NY (H)

- Namesake: Lt Col Townsend E. Griffiss
  - 416th Bomb Wing 1962–1991
  - 4039th Strategic Wing 1958–1963
(Bunker Hill AFB) Grissom AFB, 12 May 1968, Peru, IN (H)

- Namesake: Lt Col Virgil Ivan "Gus" Grissom
  - 305th Air Refueling Wing 1970–1992
    - 434th Air Refueling Wing 1987–1992

Hill AFB, Ogden, UT (T)

- Namesake: Maj Plover Peter Hill
  - 4062d Strategic Wing (Missile) 1960–1962

Homestead AFB, Homestead, FL (H)

- 823d Air Division 1956–1968
  - 19th Bomb Wing 1956–1968
  - 379th Bomb Wing 1953–1961

Hunter AFB, Savannah, GA (H)

- Namesake: Maj Gen Frank O'D. Hunter.
  - 38th Air Division 1951–1959
    - 2d Bomb Wing 1950–1963
    - 308th Bomb Wing 1951–1959

K. I. Sawyer AFB, Marquette, MI (H)

- Namesake: Kenneth Ingalls Sawyer.
  - 410th Bomb Wing 1962–91
  - 410th Wing 1991–92
  - 4042d Strategic Wing 1958 – 63

Kearney AFB, Kearney, NE

- 27th Fighter Wing 1947–1949

Key Field ANGB, Meridian, MS

- Namesake: Al and Fred Key
• 186th Air Refueling Wing 1992

(Kinross AFB) Kincheloe AFB 25 Sep 1959, Kinross, MI (H)

• Namesake: Capt Iven Carl Kincheloe, Jr.
  • 416th Wing 1991–1992
  • 449th Bomb Wing 1962–1977
  • 4239th Strategic Wing 1959–1963

Lake Charles AFB (Chennault AFB, 14 Nov 1958), Lake Charles, LA (H)

• 806th Air Division 1952–1958
  • 44th Bomb Wing 1951–1958
  • 68th Bomb Wing 1952–1958
  • 68th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing 1951–1952

Ladd Field, AK (T)

• Namesake: Maj Arthur K. Ladd.

Larson AFB, Moses Lake, WA (H)

• Namesake: Maj Donald A. Larson.
  • 71st Strategic Reconnaissance Wing Fighter 1955–1957
  • 462d Strategic Aerospace Wing 1962–1966
  • 4170th Strategic Wing 1959–1963

Laughlin AFB, Del Rio, TX (H)

• Namesake: 1st Lt. Jack Thomas Laughlin.
  • 4080th Strategic Wing 1960–1966

Loring AFB 1 Oct 1954), Limestone, ME

• Namesake: Maj Charles Joseph Loring Jr.
  • 45th Air Division 1954–1971
  • 42d Bomb Wing 1953–1954.
  • 42d Wing 1991–1992
Lincoln AFB, Lincoln, NE (H)

- 818th Air Division 1954–1962
- 818th Strategic Aerospace Division 1962–1965
  - 98th Bomb Wing 1954–1964
  - 98th Strategic Aerospace Wing 1964–1966
  - 307th Bomb Wing

Little Rock AFB, Jacksonville, AR (H)

- 825th Air Division 1955–1962
- 825th Strategic Aerospace Division 1962–1970
  - 70th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing 1955–1962
  - 308th Strategic Missile Wing 1961–1987
  - 384th Bomb Wing 1953–1964
  - 43rd Bomb Wing 1964–1970

Lockbourne AFB (Rickenbacker AFB 18 May 1974), Columbus, OH (H)

- 37th Air Division 1951–1952
- 801st Air Division 1952–1965
  - 26th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing 1952–1958
  - 70th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing 1955
  - 91st Strategic Reconnaissance Wing 1957
  - 301st Air Refueling Wing 1964–1974
  - 301st Bomb Wing 1958–1964
  - 376th Bomb Wing 1957–1965

Lowry AFB, Denver, CO (H)

- Namesake: A2c Wade Paul J Jr.
- 1st Lt. Francis Brown Lowry
  - 451st Strategic Missile Wing 1961–1965
  - 703d Strategic Missile Wing 1958–1961

MacDill AFB, Tampa, FL (H)

- Namesake: Col Leslie MacDill.
- 8th Air Force 1946
  - 6th Air Division 1951–1961
    - 305th Bomb Wing 1950–1959
- 306th Bomb Wing 1948–1963
- 307th Bomb Wing 1947–1965
- 311th Reconnaissance Group 1946
- 311th Reconnaissance Wing 1946–1948
- 498th Bombardment Group 1946

(Great Falls AFB) Malmstrom AFB 15 Jun 1956, Great Falls, MT (H)

- Namesake: Col Einar Axel Malmstrom,
  - 22d Air Division 1960–1962
  - 40th Strategic Aerospace Division 1989–1991
  - 813th Air Division 1959–1962
  - 813th Strategic Aerospace Division 1962–1966
    - 301st Air Refueling Wing 1988–1992
    - 341st Missile Wing 1991–1992
    - 341st Strategic Missile Wing 1961–1991
    - 407th Strategic Fighter Wing 1956–1957
    - 4061st Air Refueling Wing 1956–1961

March AFB, Riverside, CA (H)

- Namesake: 2nd Lt Peyton Conway March.
  - Fifteenth Air Force 1949–1992
    - 12th Air Division 1951–1962
      - 1st Fighter Interceptor Wing 1950
      - 1st Fighter Wing 1949–1950
      - 22d Air Refueling Wing 1982–1992
      - 22d Bomb Wing 1949–1982
      - 44th Bombardment Group 1947–1950
      - 44th Bomb Wing 1950–1951
      - 106th Bomb Wing 1951–1952
      - 320th Bomb Wing 1952–1963
      - 330th Bomb Wing 1949–1951
      - 452d Air Refueling Wing 1978–1992

Mather AFB, Sacramento, CA (T)

- Namesake: 2nd Lt Carl Spencer Mather.
  - 320th Bomb Wing 1963–1989
  - 4134th Strategic Wing 1958–1963
McConnell AFB, Wichita, KS (H)
- Namesake: Capt Fred McConnell and 2nd Lt Thomas Laverne McConnell.
  - 42d Air Division 1959–1962
  - 42d Strategic Aerospace Division 1962–1963
    - 381st Strategic Missile Wing 1961–1986
    - 384th Air Refueling Wing 1972–1987
      - 384th Wing 1991–1992
      - 4347th Combat Crew Training Wing 1958–1963

(Pinecastle AFB) McCoy AFB 7 May 1958, Orlando, FL (H)
- Namesake: Col Michael Norman Wright McCoy.
  - 42d Air Division 1971–1973
  - 823d Air Division 1968–1971
    - 306th Bomb Wing 1963–1974
    - 321st Bomb Wing 1958–1961
    - 4047th Strategic Wing 1961–1963

McGhee Tyson ANGB, Knoxville, TN
- Namesake: Charles McGee Tyson (USNR)
  - 134th Air Refueling Wing 1976–1992

McGuire AFB, Wrightstown, NJ (T)
- Namesake: Maj Thomas Buchannan McGuire Jr.
  - 91st Strategic Reconnaissance Wing 1948–1949
  - 170th Air Refueling Wing 1977–1992

Merced County Airport, Merced CA (H)
- 444th Bombardment Group 1946.

Miami International Airport, Miami FL (T)
- 456th Troop Carrier Wing (Reserves) 1952–1972
Minot AFB, Minot, ND (H)

- 57th Air Division 1975–1991
- 810th Air Division 1962
- 810th Strategic Aerospace Division 1962–1971
  - 5th Bomb Wing 1968–1991
  - 5th Wing 1991–1992
  - 906th Air Refueling Squadron 1959-1991
  - 91st Strategic Missile Wing 1968–1992
  - 450th Bomb Wing 1962–1968
  - 455th Strategic Missile Wing 1962–1968
  - 4136th Strategic Wing 1958–1963

Moody AFB, Valdosta, GA (T)

- Namesake: Maj George P. Moody
  - 146th Fighter – Bomber Wing 1951

Mountain Home AFB, Mountain Home, ID (H)

- 5th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing 1949
- 9th Bomb Wing 1953–1962
- 9th Strategic Aerospace Wing 1962–1966

Naval Air Station, Dallas TX


O’Hare International Airport, Chicago, IL (T)

- Namesake: LCDR Edward "Butch" O’Hare.
  - 126th Air Refueling Wing 1976–1992

Offutt AFB, Bellevue, NE (H)

- Namesake: 1st Lt Jarvis Offutt.
  - Strategic Air Command HQ 1948–1992
    - 1st Air Division (Meteorological Survey) 1955–1956
    - 5th Air Division 1951
      - 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing 1966–1991
      - 55th Wing 1991–1992
- 385th Strategic Aerospace Wing 1962–1964
- 544th Aerospace Reconnaissance Tech. Wing 1963–1979
- 544th Intelligence Wing 1991–1992
- 544th Strategic Intelligence Wing 1979–1991
- 3902d Air Base Wing 1979–1986
- 4231st Strategic Wing 1959–1962
- 4321st Strategic Wing 1959–1962
- 32nd Comm SQ Scribner air force 1964-1965<stationed there><site gone 1990

(Portsmouth AFB) Pease AFB 7 Sep 1956, Portsmouth, NH (H)

- Namesake: Capt Harl Pease Jr.
  - 45th Air Division 1971–1989
  - 817th Air Division 1956–1971
    - 100th Bomb Wing 1956–1966
    - 157th Air Refueling Wing 1975–1992
    - 509th Bomb Wing 1958–1992

Peterson AFB CO. (T)

- Namesake: 1st Lt Edward J. Peterson.

Phoenix Sky Harbor IAP, Phoenix, AZ

- 161st Air Refueling Wing 1976–1992

Pinecastle AFB (McCoy AFB 7 May 1958), Orlando, FL (H)

- 813th Air Division 1954–1956
  - 19th Bomb Wing 1954–1956
  - 321st Bomb Wing 1953–1958
  - 4047th Strategic Wing 1958–1963
  - 306th Bomb Wing 1963–1974

Pittsburgh ANGB, Pittsburgh IAP, Pittsburgh, PA

Plattsburgh AFB, Plattsburgh, NY (H)

- 820th Air Division 1956–1962
- 820th Strategic Aerospace Division 1962–1965
  - 308th Bomb Wing 1959–1961
  - 380th Bomb Wing 1953–1964
  - 380th Bomb Wing 1972–1991
  - 380th Strategic Aerospace Wing 1964–1972
  - 497th Air Refueling Wing 1963–1964
  - 4180th Air Refueling Wing 1960–1963

Portsmouth AFB (Pease AFB 7 Sep 1956), Portsmouth, NH (H)

- 100th Bomb Wing 1953–1956

Presque Isle AFB, Presque Isle, ME (T)

- 702d Strategic Missile Wing 1958–1961

Randolph AFB, San Antonio, TX (T)

- Namesake: Capt William Millican Randolph.
  - 4397th Air Refueling Training Wing 1958–1962

Rapid City AFB (Ellsworth AFB, 13 Jun 1953), Rapid City, SD (H)

- 28th Bomb Wing 1947–1950
- 28th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing 1950–1953

(Lockbourne AFB) Rickenbacker AFB 18 May 1974, Columbus, OH (H)

- Namesake: Capt Edward "Eddie" V. Rickenbacker.
  - 301st Air Refueling Wing 1974–1979

Robins AFB, Warner Robins, GA (H)
• Namesake: Brig Gen Augustine Warner Robins.
  • 19th Air Refueling Wing 1983–1992
  • 19th Bomb Wing 1968–1983
  • 465th Bomb Wing 1962–1968
  • 4137th Strategic Wing 1959–1963

Roswell AFB (Walker AFB 19 Jun 1949), Roswell, NM (H)

• 33d Fighter Wing 1947–1948
• 509th Composite Group 1946–1947
• 509th Bomb Wing 1947–1949

Salt Lake City IAP, Salt Lake City, UT


Savannah AFB, Savannah, GA (H)

• 380th Bombardment Group 1947–1949

(Smoky Hill AFB) Schilling AFB 16 Mar 1957, Salina, KS. (H)

• Namesake: Col David C. Schilling.
  • 22d Air Division 1962–1963
  • 802d Air Division 1957–1960
    • 40th Bomb Wing 1957–1960
    • 310th Bomb Wing 1957–1962
    • 310th Strategic Aerospace Wing 1962–1965
    • 485th Bombardment Group 1946.

Sedalia AFB (Whiteman AFB 3 Dec 1955), Knob Noster, MO (H)

• 340th Bomb Wing 1952–1955

Selfridge AFB, Mt. Clemens, MI (H)

• Namesake: 1st Lt Thomas E. Selfridge
  • 56th Fighter Wing 1946–1948
  • 500th Air Refueling Wing 1963–1964
  • 4045th Air Refueling Wing 1959–1963
Seymour Johnson AFB, Goldsboro, NC (H)

- Namesake: LT Seymour Johnson, USN
  - 68th Air Refueling Wing 1986–1991
  - 68th Bomb Wing 1963–1986
  - 4241st Strategic Wing 1958–1963
  - 911th Air Refueling Wing 1958–1986

Sheppard AFB, Wichita Falls, TX (H)

  - 494th Bomb Wing 1963–1966
  - 4245th Strategic Wing 1959–1963

Smoky Hill AFB (Schilling AFB, 16 Mar 1957), Salina, KS (H)

- 802d Air Division 1952–1957
  - 22d Bomb Wing 1948–1949
  - 40th Bomb Wing 1952–1957
  - 97th Bomb Wing 1948
  - 301st Bomb Wing 1947–1949
  - 485th Bombardment Group 1946

Spokane AFB (Fairchild AFB 20 Jul 1951, Spokane, WA (H)

- 92d Bomb Wing 1947–1951
- 90th Bomb Wing 1950–1951
- 111th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing 1951

Stead AFB, Reno, NV (T)

- Namesake: Lt Croston K. Stead
  - 3904th Composite Wing 1952–1954

Tinker AFB, Oklahoma City, OK (T)

- Namesake: Brig Gen Clarence L. Tinker
  - 506th Strategic Fighter Wing 1955–1957
Topeka AFB (Forbes AFB 1 Jul 1948), Topeka, KS (H)

- 311th Air Division, Reconnaissance 1948–1949
  - 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing 1948–1949

(Fairfield–Suisun AFB) Travis AFB 21 Apr 1951, Fairfield, CA (H)

- Namesake; Brig Gen Robert Falligant Travis.
  - 14th Air Division 1951–1960
    - 5th Bomb Wing 1951–1968
    - 5th Bomb Wing 1955–1968

Turner AFB, Albany, GA (H)

- Namesake: Lt S. Preston Turner.
  - 40th Air Division 1951–1957
  - 82d Air Division 1959–1966
    - 12th Fighter Escort Wing 1950
    - 31st Fighter Escort Wing 1950–1953
    - 31st Strategic Fighter Wing 1953–1957
    - 108th Fighter Bomber Wing 1951
    - 484th Bomb Wing 1962–1967
    - 508th Fighter Escort Wing 1952
    - 508th Strategic Fighter Wing 1952–1956
    - 4080th Strategic Recon. Wing 1956–1957
    - 4138th Strategic Wing 1959–1963

(Cooke AFB) Vandenberg AFB, Lompoc, CA 4 Oct 1958 (T)

- Namesake: Gen Hoyt Sanford Vandenberg.
    - 1st Missile Division 1958–1961
    - 1st Strategic Aerospace Division 1961–1991
      - 392d Strategic Missile Wing 1961
      - 704th Strategic Missile Wing 1958–1959
      - 4392d Aerospace Support Wing 1961

(Roswell AFB) Walker AFB 19 Jun 1949, Roswell, NM (H)

• 47th Air Division 1951–1959
  • 6th Bomb Wing 1950–1962
  • 6th Strategic Aerospace Wing 1962–1967
  • 509th Bomb Wing 1949–1958

**Westover AFB, Chicopee, MA (H)**

• Namesake: Maj Gen Oscar Westover
  • Eighth Air Force 1955–1970
    • 1st Air Division 1954–1955
    • 57th Air Division 1956–1969
      • 99th Bomb Wing 1956–1974
      • 499th Air Refueling Wing 1963–1966
      • 4050th Air Refueling Wing 1955–1963

**(Sedalia AFB) Whiteman AFB 3 Dec 1955, Sedalia, MO (H)**

• Namesake: 2nd Lt George Allison Whiteman.
  • 17th Air Division 1959–1962
  • 17th Strategic Aerospace Division 1962–1963
  • 17th Strategic Aerospace Division 1965–1971
  • 17th Strategic Missile Division 1963–1965
  • 100th Air Division 1990–1991
    • 340th Bomb Wing 1955–1963
    • 340th Bomb Wing 1958–1970
    • 351st Missile Wing 1991–1992
    • 351st Strategic Missile Wing 1962–1991

**Wright–Patterson AFB, Dayton, OH (T)**

• Namesake: Orville & Wilbur Wright and 1st Lt Frank Patterson.
  • 17th Bomb Wing 1963–1975
  • 4043d Strategic Wing 1959–1963

**Wurtsmith AFB, Oscoda, MI (H)**

• Namesake: Maj Gen Paul Bernard Wurtsmith.
  • 40th Air Division 1959–1988
    • 379th Bomb Wing 1961–1991
    • 379th Wing 1991–1992
    • 4026th Strategic Wing 1958–1961
U.S. Overseas (Outside CONUS)

Andersen AFB, Agana, Guam

- Namesake: Brig Gen James Roy Andersen.
    - 3d Air Division 1954–1970
    - 3d Air Division 1975–1992
      - 43d Bomb Wing 1986–1990
      - 43d Strategic Wing 1970–1986
      - 72d Strategic Wing (P) 1972–1973
      - 92d Bomb Wing 1954–1955
      - 92d Bomb Wing 1956
      - 99th Bomb Wing 1956
      - 303d Bomb Wing 1956
      - 320th Bomb Wing 1956–1957
      - 509th Bomb Wing 1954
      - 1500th Strategic Wing (P) 1990–1991
      - 3960th Air Base Wing 1955–1956
      - 3960th Strategic Wing 1965–1970
      - 4133d Bomb Wing (P) 1966–1970

Hickam AFB, Honolulu, HI (T)

- Namesake: Lt Col Horace Meek Hickam.
  - 3d Air Division 1988–1992

Ramey AFB, Aguadilla, Puerto Rico

- Namesake: Gen Howard Knox Ramey
  - 55th Strategic Recon. Wing 1950–1952
  - 72d Bomb Wing 1955–1971
  - 72d Strategic Recon. Wing 1952–1955
Foreign Bases

Canada

Ernest Harmon AB, Newfoundland

- Namesake: Captain Ernest Emery Harmon
  - 4081st Strategic Wing 1957–1966

Goose AB, Labrador

- 95th Strategic Wing 1966–1976

United Kingdom

Diego Garcia, Indian Ocean

- 17th Recon. Wing 1982–1992
- 4300th Bomb Wing (P) 1990

RAF Alconbury

- 17th Reconnaissance Wing 1982–1991

RAF Bassingbourn, Royston

- 2d Bomb Group 1951
- 55th Strategic Recon. Wing 1951
- 97th Bomb Group 1950–1951
- 301st Bomb Group 1950–1951

RAF Burtonwood, Warrington

- 5th Strategic Recon. Wing 1950
RAF Brize Norton

- 11th Bomb Wing 1952
- 43rd Bomb Wing 1953
- 68th Bomb Wing 1958
- 92d Bomb Wing 1958
- 97th Bomb Group 1950–1951
- 301st Bomb Group 1950–1951
- 301st Bomb Wing 1952–1953
- 305th Bomb Wing 1953
- 320th Bomb Wing 1954
- 380th Bomb Wing 1957
- 384th Bomb Wing 1957
- 3920th Strategic Wing 1964–1965
- SAC REFLEX Base 1959–1964

RAF Fairford

- 5th Strategic Recon. Wing 1954
- 7th Bomb Wing 1952–1953
- 11th Bomb Wing 1952–1953
- 43d Bomb Wing 1954
- 55th Strategic Recon. Wing 1954
- 303d Bomb Wing 1954
- 306th Bomb Wing 1953
- 806th Bomb Wing (P) 1991
- SAC REFLEX base 1959–1964
11th Strategic Group 1979-1990

RAF Greenham Common

- 40th Bomb Wing 1957
- 100th Bomb Wing 1957–1958
- 303d Bomb Wing 1954
- 310th Bomb Wing 1956–1957
- 320th Bomb Wing 1956

RAF High Wycombe

- 7th Air Division 1958–1965
RAF Lakenheath

- 2d Bomb Group 1948
- 2d Bomb Group 1950
- 7th Bomb Wing 1951
- 22d Bomb Group 1948–1949
- 22d Bomb Group 1949–1950
- 22d Bomb Wing 1951
- 40th Bomb Wing 1955
- 42d Bomb Wing 1955
- 43d Bomb Group 1949
- 55th Strategic Recon. Wing 1954
- 68th Bomb Wing 1954
- 93d Bomb Wing 1952
- 97th Bomb Wing 1952
- 98th Bomb Wing 1955–1956
- 301st Bomb Group/Bomb Wing 1950–1951
- 307th Bomb Group 1948–1949
- 307th Bomb Wing 1956
- 321st Bomb Wing 1954–1955
- 340th Bomb Wing 1955
- 384th Bomb Wing 1957
- 509th Bomb Group 1949
- 509th Bomb Wing 1951
- 509th Bomb Wing 1952
- 705th Strategic Missile Wing 1958
- SAC REFLEX base 1959–1964

RAF Manston

- 12th Fighter Escort Wing 1951
- 31st Fighter Escort Wing 1951
- 91st Strategic Recon, Wing 1951

RAF Marham

- 2d Bomb Group 1950
- (22d Bomb Group 1949–1950
- 43d Bomb Group 1949
- 93d Bomb Group 1950–1951
- 97th Bomb Group 1948–1949
- 307th Bomb Group 1948
- 307th Bomb Group 1949–1950
- 509th Bomb Group 1949
RAF Mildenhall

- 2d Bomb Group 1950
- 2d Bomb Wing 1951
- 22d Bomb Wing 1951
- 55th Strategic Recon. Wing 1953
- 55th Strategic Recon. Wing 1954
- 93d Bomb Group 1950–1951
- 93d Bomb Group 1951–1952
- 97th Bomb Wing 1952
- 100th Air Refueling Wing 1992
- 306th Strategic Wing 1978–1992
- 509th Bomb Wing 1951
- 509th Bomb Wing 1952

RAF Scampton

- 28th Bomb Group 1948
- 301st Bomb Group 1948–1949

RAF Sculthorpe

- 2d Bomb Group 1950
- 5th Bomb Group 1950
- 5th Strategic Recon. Wing 1950
- 22d Bomb Group 1949–1950
- 22d Bomb Wing 1951
- 43d Bomb Group 1949
- 91st Strategic Recon. Wing 1951
- 92d Bomb Group 1949
- 97th Bomb Group 1950–1951
- 98th Bomb Group 1949
- 301st Bomb Group 1950–1951

RAF South Ruislip

- 7th Air Division 1951–1958
  - 705th Strategic Missile Wing 1958–1960
RAF Upper Heyford

- 2d Bomb Wing 1952
- 22d Bomb Wing 1953–1954
- 42d Bomb Wing 1955
- 97th Bomb Wing 1956
- 303d Bomb Wing 1954
- 310th Bomb Wing 1955
- 376th Bomb Wing 1955
- 509th Bomb Wing 1956
- 3918th Strategic Wing 1964–1965
- SAC REFLEX base 1959–1964

RAF Waddington

- 97th Bomb Group 1948–1949
- 97th Bomb Group 1950–1951

RAF Wyton

- 2d Bomb Wing 1951
- 97th Bomb Group 1950–1951
- 509th Bomb Wing 1951
- SAC Dispersal Base

Egypt

Cairo

- 1706th Air Refueling Wing (P) 1990

French Morocco

Nouasseur AB

- 4310th Air Division 1958–1963
Rabat

- 5th Air Division 1951–1954

Sidi Slimane AB

- 5th Air Division 1954–1958
  - 4310th Air Division 1958

Ben Guerir AB

Greece

Hellinikon AB

- 803rd Air Refueling Wing (P)

Denmark

Thule AFB, Thule, Greenland

- 4083d Air Base Wing 1959–1960
- 4083d Strategic Wing 1957–1959

Japan

Kadena AB, Okinawa

- 307th Bomb Wing 1952–1954
- 376th Strategic Wing 1970–1991
- 4252d Strategic Wing 1965–1970
Misawa AB, Misawa
- 12th Strategic Fighter Wing 1954
- 27th Fighter Escort Wing/Strategic Fighter Wing 1952–1953
- 31st Strategic Fighter Wing 1953–1954

Yokota AB, Tokyo
- 98th Bomb Wing 1953–1954

Oman
Seeb
- 1702d Air Refueling Wing (P) 1990–1991

Portugal
Lajes/Terceira Island
- 802d Air Refueling Wing (P) 1990

Saudi Arabia
King Khalid International Airport
- 1703d Air Refueling Wing (P) 1990–1991

King Abdulaziz International Airport, Jeddah
- 1701st Air Refueling Wing (P) 1991
- 1701st Strategic Wing (P) 1990
- 1708th Bomb Wing (P) 1990
• 1709th Air Refueling Wing (P) 1990

Riyadh

• 17th Air Division (P) Provisional 24 Aug 1990.
  • 1700th Strategic Wing (P) 1990–1991
  • 1711th Air Refueling Wing (P)

Spain

Madrid

• Sixteenth Air Force 1957–1958
  • 65th Air Division 1957
    • 7602d Support Wing 1957
    • 3977th Support Wing 1957–1958

Moron AB, Seville

• 801st Air Refueling Wing (P) 1990
• 801st Bomb Wing (P) 1991
• 3973d Strategic Wing 1964–1966

Torrejon AB, Madrid

• Sixteenth Air Force 1958–1966
  • 65th Air Division 1957–1960
    • 98th Strategic Wing 1966–1976
    • 3970th Strategic Wing 1964–1966

Zaragoza AB, Zaragoza

50
Thailand

U-Tapao Royal Thailand Navy Air Force Base (RTNAFB)

- 17th Air Division 1972
  - 307th Strategic Wing 1970–1975
  - 310th Strategic Wing (P) 1972–1974
  - 4258th Strategic Wing 1966–1970

Turkey

Incirlik

- 804th Air Refueling Wing (P) 1990
- 810th Air Refueling Wing (P) 1990–1991
- 807th Air Refueling Wing (P) 1990

United Arab Emirates

Abu Dhabi

- 1712th Air Refueling Wing (P) 1990

Dubai

- 1713 Air Refueling Wing (P) 1990

West Germany

Ramstein AB, Kaiserslautern

- 7th Air Division 1978–1992
  306th Strategic Wing 1976–1978
CHAPTER 4

Strategic Assets and Micromanagement - Vietnam 1965 – 1972

The Lyndon B. Johnson administration took over the John F. Kennedy administration’s aims and goals following President Kennedy’s assassination on November 22, 1963. The new president retained all the cabinet members and senior advisors from the previous administration. Among the most important of these were Dean Rusk as Secretary of State and Robert McNamara as Secretary of Defense. President Kennedy’s agenda held two great tenants – first, keep America safe from a perceived monolithic communist plan to control the free world and, second, to spread civil rights to all disenfranchised races and ethnicities in the United States. The new president adopted both. President Johnson’s first two years in office were consumed by challenges at home and abroad. His centerpiece legislation was the Civil Rights Act of 1964 followed by the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In foreign affairs, he was befuddled by an ever-increasing problem in Southeast Asia (SEA). Johnson inherited a rapidly deteriorating civil war in South Vietnam. American advisors, at the time of Kennedy’s death, numbered less than 25,000 men. The corrupt president of South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem, was assassinated two weeks prior to Kennedy’s assassination. The succeeding eight administrations fell to coups. The United States guaranteed the existence of South Vietnam. In so doing, it failed to perceive that the struggle in Vietnam was essentially a war of unification that was backed by North Vietnam, China, and the Soviet Union, rather than a conquest that would trigger the Domino Theory. This Cold War theory, now discredited, held that a communist government in one nation would inevitably lead to communist takeovers in neighboring states, each falling like a row of dominos.

President Johnson’s chief advisor for SEA was his Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara. McNamara was brilliant but flawed. He believed that every conceivable problem could be reduced to reading statistical data. McNamara had misguided and mismanaged the SEA issue under President Kennedy and he geometrically complicated matters under President Johnson. Johnson was certainly anti-communist, but had a tremendous fear of Russian and/or Chinese intervention if the United States put its full effort in ending the war. It colored his actions during the next five years. McNamara later confessed that his actions, and those of Kennedy and Johnson were misguided. President Johnson allowed McNamara to manage the defense budget, examine and reconstruct the nation’s nuclear strategy, and do all of this while trimming to budget. The Secretary of Defense ignored the Pentagon and particularly the Air Force’s requests. The Air Force saw reductions in bomber wing men and materiel in favor of vastly increasing cheaper ICBMs. McNamara could not see the consequences of his actions until several years later. The war escalated from a civil war in South Vietnam with North Vietnam aiding the Viet Cong and the United States aiding South Vietnam, to a direct confrontation between North Vietnam and the United States with the two original combatants playing secondary roles. Between 1964 and 1968 body counts became the primary factor in proving success. McNamara, approved by the President, set the pattern. Johnson often bragged that “Those boys can’t hit an outhouse without my permission.”

Lyndon Johnson and Robert McNamara forced rules of engagement (ROE) that were at times almost impossible to follow. They created their own

132 McNamara, “We Were Wrong, Terribly Wrong”; McNamara, In Retrospect, 172-73.
133 McNamara, In Retrospect, 48; For a thorough analysis of the problems created by President Johnson, Robert McNamara, and their associates, see H. R. Mc McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam (New York: HarperCollins, 1997).
targeting lists that were seemingly incomprehensible. Johnson’s main aim was to reduce the flow of supplies and men coming south along the jungle supply line called the Ho Chi Minh Trail. McNamara judged success only in one manner – did we kill more of their people than they killed of ours?


The difference between strategic doctrine and tactical doctrine diverged during the early months of the Johnson Administration. Air campaign strategy quickly faced a divide with the president and his secretary of defense on one side and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Strategic Air Command (SAC) on the other. The long-term consequences of this difference in views still reverberate today.

Air Force commanders did not want to see SAC committed to the war in Vietnam. SAC’s mission was, and remained, to be the chief nuclear deterrent holding back the Soviets and the Chinese. General Carl A. Spaatz, the commanding general of the United States Army Air Force (USAAF), stated in 1946 that the Air Force’s primary mission as the long-range striking power could destroy any enemy’s industrial and war-making capacity anywhere on the globe.135 Spaatz “gave first priority to ‘the backbone of our Air Force – the long-range bomber groups and their protective long-range fighter groups organized in our Strategic Air Force.’”136 This was to be accomplished by a force that decreased from 2.2 million people to 303,000 following the end of World War II.137 SAC’s doctrine followed this principle and, during the 1950s, consumed the lion’s share of the defense budget. Tactical Air Command (TAC) received a miniscule share

of the operations budget. Under General Curtis LeMay, SAC became the premier defender of the United States and the West.

In January 1964, Chairman of the Joints Chief of Staff Army General Maxwell D. Taylor told Robert McNamara that it was time for the United to States to take “bolder actions” in Vietnam and that the Air Force and Navy should bomb North Vietnam.\textsuperscript{138} Johnson did nothing until North Vietnamese patrol boats attacked the destroyer USS Maddox in August 1964 in the Gulf of Tonkin, which allowed Congress to pass the Tonkin Gulf Resolution.\textsuperscript{139} Viet Cong units attacked U.S. military forces bases and facilities in South Vietnam almost immediately. The president refused all requests to bomb North Vietnam until February 24, 1965. On that day Operation ROLLING THUNDER commenced. This major aerial interdiction campaign gradually increased pressure against North Vietnam. It continued nearly four years.\textsuperscript{140}

Army General William C. Westmoreland, the theatre commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), asked that his ground force contingent be tripled to halt the gains of the Viet Cong. The United States had to decide whether to withdraw and simply support the South or put boots on the ground in major concentrations. Robert McNamara drafted a memorandum to President Johnson which gave General Westmoreland all his demands. Additionally, it ordered the Navy to mine Haiphong harbor and smaller ports, and for the Air Force to destroy the railyards and trackage between Hanoi, Haiphong and China and to bomb MiG air bases and SAM sites.\textsuperscript{141} After spending a week in South Vietnam in August, McNamara rescinded the order to bomb the harbors and placed heavy restrictions on ROLLING THUNDER to prevent the Chinese from having an excuse to intervene.\textsuperscript{142}

Air Force leaders, particularly General Curtis LeMay, did not believe that the war in Vietnam would remain limited. In January 1965, the JCS authorized Boeing to reconfigure the bomb bays of B-52 D and F models into so-called “Big Bellies.” This changed the capability of the B-52s to only carry nuclear weapons, but to carry approximately 70,000 pounds of 500- and 750-lb bombs. The following month, the JCS order SAC to dispatch thirty B-52s to the Eighth Air Force at Andersen AFB, Guam.\textsuperscript{143} The SAC commander, General Thomas S. Power opposed any modifications to the B-52s, citing the SIOP requirements. He was overruled.\textsuperscript{144} B-52s began running bombing operations from Andersen Air Force Base in June 1965. An angry General LeMay wrote the next month, “The military task confronting us is to make it so expensive for the North Vietnamese that they will stop their aggression against South Vietnam and Laos. If we make it too expensive for them, they will stop. They don’t want to lose everything they have.”\textsuperscript{145} General Power

\textsuperscript{139} The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution or the Southeast Asia Resolution, Pub. L. 88–408, 78 Stat. 384, enacted August 10, 1964, was a joint resolution that the United States Congress passed on August 7, 1964, in response to the Gulf of Tonkin incident.
\textsuperscript{140} Operation ROLLING THUNDER was aerial bombing operation that ran from February 24, 1965 to the end of October 1968. It was the longest aerial bombing campaign in history, although it was not continuous, with frequent halts imposed by President Johnson. It was conducted by the U.S. 2nd Air division, the U.S. Navy and the Republic of Vietnam Air Force. The primary targets of the campaign were sites along the triple canopy jungle that hid much of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. For a detailed analysis of ROLLING THUNDER, see Col. Dennis M. Drew, “Rolling Thunder 1965: Anatomy of a Failure” (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air and Command Staff College, Air University, 1986.)
\textsuperscript{142} Hall, Case Studies, 496.
\textsuperscript{143} Drew, “Vietnam: Wars of the Third Kind,” 22-23.
\textsuperscript{144} Futrell, 2:257–58.
\textsuperscript{145} Curtis E. LeMay with MacKinlay Kantor, Mission With LeMay (Garden City, NY: Doubleday 1965), 564.
continued his comments internally. Power told the Air Staff not to “talk to me about that; that’s not our life. That’s not our business. We don’t want to get in the business of dropping any conventional bombs. We are in the nuclear business, and we want to stay there.”

Air Force Major General Howard Davis remarked just after deploying B-52s to Guam in 1965 that, “he would have put anyone in a strait jacket who told him a few weeks before that he would be using B-52s to drop iron bombs on guerrillas in Vietnam.” SAC, as an organization, did not want to risk its primary nuclear mission and its valuable bombers “in what was essentially a civil war halfway around the world.”

“Conventional ‘little wars’ were unimportant compared with keeping SAC strong.” SAC brought forth three major objections about sending B-52s to Guam to be used in a counterinsurgency war: “First, it would detract from its SIOP and alert commitment; second, it would take too much time to reconfigure the aircraft and resume control for strategic operations, if needed; and third, the B-52’s systems could be compromised in Southeast Asia, which would reduce its deterrent credibility in general war.”

A fourth reason, which SAC would not admit to was that its aircrews

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146 Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals, 173.
147 Ibid., 174.
150 Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals, 174
were not “fully prepared to employ conventionally given the inflexibility of the missions they practiced.”

“B-52 crews had a two-week course on conventional operations, then they went on a six-month rotation to Guam. They went ‘with only the barest introduction to conventional tactics’ and used modified nuclear bombing procedures. They lacked institutional innovation.”

President Johnson refused to listen. He also refused to allow the B-52s to go after a list of 99 targets identified by the JCS within the industrial and military centers in North Vietnam. This list reduced to 94 targets within one year. Instead he found himself involved in “a piddling pissant little country” with the

Table 2. The original 99 target menu created by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JCS Working Group 99-Target List for North Vietnam, 22 May 1964</th>
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<tbody>
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<td><strong>Target Sets</strong></td>
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<td>Airfields</td>
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<td>Road Line of Communications</td>
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<td>Military Barracks</td>
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<td>Ammunition Dumps</td>
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<td>Supply Dumps</td>
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<td>Military Training Center</td>
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<td>Storage Areas</td>
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<td>Ports</td>
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<td>Storage Depot</td>
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<tr>
<td>Railroad/Highway Bridges</td>
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<td>Railroad Yard/Shop Complexes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chemical Plant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iron/Steel Plant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Radio Broadcast Facilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thermal Power Plant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Machine Tool Factory</td>
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<tr>
<td>Industrial Plant (other)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>


The above table outlines the targets selected by the JCS joint working group tasked to develop target options for execution against North Vietnam. It was presented to CINCPAC for comment and further development on 22 May 1964. Targets were grouped into three categories:

Category A — “Included those targets the destruction of which was expected to bring an immediate reduction of DRV support to PL [Pathet Lao] and VC forces. These targets were near the national boundary (NVN/SVN and Laos/NVN), or on a key logistical route.”

Category B — “Included targets the destruction of which would reduce the DRV military capability to take action against Laos and SVN. These targets were somewhat more remote from the national boundaries, and key logistical routes.”

Category C — “Included selected industrial targets. Eight specific targets were listed;”


152 Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals, 174.
President and his Secretary of Defense falling into a vicious cycle of gradual force buildup and limited use of strategic and tactical air power. Airpower was used as a cheap alternative to deploying massive numbers of ground troops. President Johnson’s plan ignored the need to stabilize South Vietnam socially, politically, and economically. It was a policy, coupled with the resilience of the enemy that—in retrospect—could not secure South Vietnam or defeat the VC Southern Communist guerrillas or the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN). US airpower became a compromise weapon for Johnson. It limited the commitment of ground forces, especially reserves, and caused spectacular numbers and pictures of destruction.154

General John D. Ryan ascended to SAC command in December 1964. He was less concerned about using SAC B-52s in SEA as long as they were under SAC’s control. The first 30 B-52Fs deployed to Andersen Air Force Base on Guam in February 1965.155

**ARC LIGHT – B-52 Raids, 1965 – 1968**

ARC LIGHT was the first concerted effort to use B-52s in ground support missions from high altitude over South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Like ROLLING THUNDER missions, some of which used B-52s, the primary target was the Ho Chi Minh Trail. They attempted to interdict North Vietnamese

![Figure 7. ARC LIGHT Route Packages. Source: Lee Brimmicombe-Wood, airbattle.co.uk.](image)

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155 Ibid., 18.
and Viet Cong from bringing troops and supplies from the north and support ground troops. The B-52s in the first three years of ARC LIGHT were based at Andersen Air Force Base on Guam, Kadena Air Force Base on Okinawa and from U-Tapao Royal Navy/ Air Force Base Thailand. During the period through 1968, most ARC LIGHT sorties flew below the demilitarized zone (DMZ) on either side of the international boundary. Only 141 sorties flew between the DMZ at the 17th parallel and the 20th parallel.

Air Force planners realized from the beginning that using BUFFs as high-altitude artillery in SEA contained many heretofore unseen problems. The most important was the fact that the dense triple canopy jungle offered few, if any, offset aiming points or specific ground references to bomb accuracy. All prior missions for the BUFF’s were for industrial or major urban areas. Secondarily, any B-52s used in counterinsurgency sorties would remove them from their primary task of being part of the nuclear umbrella of the SIOP. General Westmoreland, commanding MACV, made his case before the JCS that B-52s were more ideally suited for the job of carpet bombing jungles than fighters and fighter-bombers, because they could efficiently deliver a wide, even pattern over a large area [bombing target boxes]. The Air Force planners countered that:

the concept of operational bombing procedures for large scale non-nuclear strikes was inconsistent with existing SAC materiel concepts, since B-52 crew training and doctrine were designed for strategic nuclear conflict. The basic Arc Light task of area bombing . . . required only a narrow spectrum of the available conventional weapons inventory,” which included M-117 750 lb. bombs, MK-82 500 lb., BLU-3B and BLU-26B antipersonnel bomblets, and AN-M65A1 general purpose and AN-M59A1 semiamor-piercing 1,000 lb. bombs.

From 1965 through 1968, ARC LIGHT assigned B-52s dropped high explosive (HE) bombs, which accounted for 97.2 percent of the total bomb loads. General Westmoreland got his wish and SAC pilots

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158 BUFF is the most common affection nickname for the B-52. Depending upon how politically correct the speaker or writer is, the acronym stands for “Big Ugly Fat Fucker” (or Fellow).
159 The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam, 1960–1968, pt. 2, 24-1, 2; History, SAC, January–June, 1965, 198; and Schlight, 49.
162 Head, War From Above the Clouds, 18-19.
dutifully obeyed. The bomber pilots immediately realized that the SAC objections were correct. From high altitude, the jungle looked green and flat. There were few, if any landmarks, initial points, or visible targets along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.\(^{164}\) For many of the crews, the daily routine became one of “bombing monkeys.”\(^{165}\) The B-52s that bore the brunt of the heavy bombing missions were, in all cases, strategic weapons taken out of their primary mission and converted to air support for ground troops. This was a hard lesson for SAC and its aircrews to learn.

The first bombing mission for the B-52s was conducted on June 18, 1965. The JCS demanded that no civilians in the target area, ten miles north of Saigon, be harmed.\(^{166}\) This would be a difficult test of coordination of the air crews, a switchover from the nuclear mission protocols, and pinpoint bombing with multiple cells of three aircraft each saturating a defined small target. The target box was a one- by two-mile

![Image](image.jpg)

Figure 8. A typical B-52 three ship cell dropping bombs during an ARC LIGHT sortie. Image Source: United States Air Force.

\(^{164}\) Schlight, 50; and History, SAC, July–December 1965, 2:267.

\(^{165}\) Conversation with Philip Blaufuss, B-52 radar navigator, who participated in both Fail Sate and Vietnam missions including Linebacker II. Interviewed by Gary D. Joiner, Ph.D. and Ashley Dean on September 12, 2017.

The mission planning was logistically complex. The mission plan called for 30 B-52F models flying in ten three-ship cells flying from Andersen Air Force Base. Ordinance was mixed, with twenty-four BUFF’s carrying fifty-one 750 lb. bombs and six carrying 1,000 lb. armor-piercing bombs. The planes were scheduled to launch from Guam at 0100 hours (1 a.m. local time), meet KC-135 tankers over the island of Luzon in the Philippines, and then join up over the target. Then, the complexity of the mission plans came into sharp focus:

Things began as planned, but tailwinds from a typhoon in the eastern Pacific pushed the bombers ahead of schedule. When the first cell banked 360 degrees to slow for the arrival of the refuellers, they ran into the path of the second cell in the dark skies over the South China Sea. Two planes collided and crashed into the sea. Eight crew members perished, while the four survivors and one body were recovered. Only 27 of the bombers refueled. The 28th bomber, with a broken hydraulic pump and radar, landed in Okinawa. The remaining bombers crossed the Vietnamese coast at 0630 hours and dropped their first bombs 15 minutes later from about 20,000 feet. Guiding off a beacon placed in the area the night before, they bombed a one-by-two-mile target box with 1,300 bombs. Half the bombs hit inside the box. They then flew south to avoid the Cambodian border, and near Saigon they turned east toward Guam. One bomber was forced to land at Clark AB (formerly AFB), Philippines, because of electrical problems. The last bomber landed exactly 13 hours after the first one had departed.

Figure 9. KC-135 refueling a B-52D during early an early ARC LIGHT mission c. 1965. Note that the B-52 does not yet have SEA camouflage. Image Source: United States Air Force.

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167 Schlight, 51–52
168 Ibid.
169 Ibid.
170 Head, War From Above the Clouds, 19-20.
Post bombing ground survey discovered no Viet Cong dead and very little damage to their camp. The enemy was tipped off from a traitor in an Army of Vietnam (ARVN) unit.\textsuperscript{171} The mission made worldwide news. The coverage was uncharacteristically negative. Most of the stories denounced the B-52 mission as “using a sledgehammer to kill gnats” or “using a sledgehammer to kill fleas.”\textsuperscript{172} The Air Staff understood that B-52 operations against the Viet Cong must be reconsidered to type and place. Flying BUFFs from Guam or Thailand left little in the formula for quick response.\textsuperscript{173} As a result, more ARC LIGHT raids were conducted in the following months using fewer aircraft flying more missions. Missions were allowed to be staged with constant approval from senior leadership at MACV or the JCS for relatively short timed needs.\textsuperscript{174} MACV and SAC created five “bomb free zones” for this (semi) rapid response. Each of the zones had pre-planned target folders. All were considered to be Viet Cong infested areas with limited chance of destroying “friendlies.” Two zones were close to and north of Saigon. Two were in the Mekong Delta, near the southern tip of South Vietnam. The fifth, southeast and near Da Nang.\textsuperscript{175} The JCS controlled final target approval and MACV was brought in when U.S. ground forces were in or near the target area.\textsuperscript{176}

![Figure 10](image-source.jpg)

**Figure 10.** ARC LIGHT sortie bomb detonations. Image Source: United States Air Force.

\textsuperscript{171} Ibid., 20.
\textsuperscript{172} Hopkins and Goldberg, 131; Corona Harvest (CH), A *Chronology of Important Airpower Events in Southeast Asia, 1950–1968* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Aerospace Studies Institute, Air University, May 1, 1969), 103.
\textsuperscript{173} CH, *A Chronology of Important Airpower Events in Southeast Asia*, 104.
\textsuperscript{174} Ibid., 114; History, SAC, July–December 1965, 2:270–71.
\textsuperscript{175} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{176} Ibid.
The first B-52 mission to directly support U.S. troops took place on November 14, 1965 and continued through the remainder of that month. U.S. 1st Cavalry Division troops routed a Viet Cong and North Vietnamese attack after an attack on a Special Forces (Green Beret) camp at Plei Me in the Central Highlands. The 1st Cav chased the enemy near Pleiku and found two North Vietnamese regiments in the Ia Drang Valley adjacent to the border with Cambodia. Fighting was fierce and the enemy forces came close to destroying the American units. The Cavalry officers called in for air strikes to allow them to slip out of the valley. Two days after the initial engagement, eighteen B-52s dropped 344 tons of bombs on the North Vietnamese troop concentrations. During the two weeks that followed, the SAC bombers flew ninety-six sorties and dropped 1,795 tons of bombs.177

B-52s ran most of the ARC LIGHT missions because TAC aircraft were tied up in ROLLING THUNDER missions. TAC was tasked to specifically “work in coordination with the Army Developments Command to develop mutually agreeable joint doctrinal manuals for submission to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”178 This created friction among the Air Staff, MACV, the Navy Carrier Task Force 77, and the air crews. Fighters were in short supply since Air Force budgets were constantly tilted toward nuclear missions, aircraft and crews. The result was a confusing reassignment of tasks and missions by SAC and TAC. Robert Futrell wrote: “It was tragic irony that the air war in SEA would necessitate an agonizing relearning process and a hurried adaptation of weapon systems back into an arena thought to have been eliminated [conventional tactical fighter operations].”179

Figure 11. Munitions prepared for loading on a B-52D “Big Belly” prior to an ARC LIGHT sortie. Image Source: United States Air Force.

179 Futrell, 2:288.
The Air Force found that to carry out the missions in Indochina it must increase the bomb capacity in some of its B-52s. It chose to keep, if it could, G and H models for use in “more significant SIOP role.” The older D models were chosen for reconfiguration and fitted for all-weather operations. This need was recognized in a RAND Corporation report in 1966: “The Air Force has no (conventional weapon) capability for all-weather bombing in SEA.” All 155 D model BUFFs were reconfigured to carry eighty-four rather than twenty-seven 500 lb. bombs or forty-two instead of twenty-seven 750 lb. bombs internally. Including bombs fixed to the wing pylons of the bombers, the maximum bomb load increased from 38,000 to 60,000 lbs. These became the “Big Bellies.” In 1967, the B-52Ds began operating out of U-Tapao RTNAB in Thailand. Of the 155 converted B-52Ds, twenty-two were lost in the Vietnam War. The numbers of sorties increased with the capabilities of the B-52s. This led to bomb shortages, particularly in MK-82 bombs. This in turn caused shortages in ROLLING THUNDER missions.


In the words of Major General Theodore R. Milton, “the Army became over-dependent on air support, and air support of a kind highly vulnerable against a modern force.” The B-52 became the ultimate

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183 Ibid., 2:10–11.
184 Ibid.
weapon of last resort during ARC LIGHT. As interdiction sorties became the norm along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, it became obvious that the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and the Viet Cong feared what the big bombers could do. The Ho Chi Minh Trail became the scene of one of the first interdiction sorties in April 1966. The Mu Gia Pass was a portion of the trail between North Vietnam and Laos that supported truck convoys. It contained road repair compounds and had its own anti-aircraft batteries. The BUFFs plastered the sites from April 12 through 26, 1966. Immediately after the bombing, North Vietnamese work crews repaired the damage and the flow of supplies continued. Air Force and SAC commanders grew concerned when the NVA placed Russian Surface to Air Missiles, model 2 (SAM-2) along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Reaction time decreased for some missions beginning in July 1966 with the implantation of the Combat Skyspot rapid-response alert system. Six B-52s from Guam and six KC-135s from Kadena Air Base on Okinawa used a modified alert system, which reduced their response time to nine hours. Most of the D models were based in U-Tapao. This brought several advantages. Because air crews could fly missions in two to five hours they did not need refueling. BUFFs flying from Guam required twelve to fifteen-hour missions and at least one refueling, usually at night over the Pacific Ocean. The last of the Big Belly D’s arrived on Guam in September 1967. By the end of the year, the amount of ARC LIGHT bomb tonnage doubled. Operation JUNCTION CITY was executed between February to May 1967. B-52s flew 126 sorties and dropped 4,723 tons of bombs. Seventy-five percent of the NVA and Viet Cong casualties were credited to B-52s.

![Combat Skyspot installation at Da Lat, South Vietnam.](image)


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189 Schlight, 152–53.
193 Ibid., 221.
195 Berger, 151–56; Schlight, 250–58.
ARC LIGHT missions contributed greatly to the fighting during the latter months of 1967. B-52s flew 228 sorties against thirty-two targets during battles between the US 4th Infantry Division and the NVA 1st Division near the Special Forces camp at Dak To. They flew thirty-six more sorties in late November in support of US and ARVN forces fighting VC main force units near Loc Ninh. They attacked storage areas and truck traffic 102 miles northwest of Con Thien. Despite this, the Secretary of Defense convened what he called the “Jason Division” of Institute for Defense Analyses, which consisted of eighty-seven hand-picked scholars and scientists that would agree with him. They based their reports Central Intelligence Agency data. Their report stated: “the Jasons categorically reject bombing as an effective tool.” Rather than having been degraded, they determined that enemy transportation “actually had been improved because of added redundancy. Where one road had existed previously, several had been built.” Citing this evidence, they judged, “we are unable to devise a bombing campaign in the North to reduce the flow of infiltrating personnel into [South Vietnam] SVN.”

The JCS countered this report by making ten recommendations to remove all restrictions from potential targets, to mine all North Vietnamese ports, and to increase the number of B-52s in theater. President Johnson feared that war would spill over into China and that Russians might intervene. He wanted the JCS to bring him a conventional strategy that would work to thwart North Vietnamese intentions. The JCS responded with even more requests. Johnson wrote that their next request would be to “bomb targets in China.” He all but screamed to several senior officers at this time, “bomb, bomb, bomb, that’s all you know.”

Figure 14. Damage from a three-ship cell of B-52s along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Image Source: United States Air Force.

198 Ibid.
199 Ibid.
202 Ibid.
203 Tilford, 96–97; and Lawrence J. Korb, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First Twenty-Five Years* (Bloomington, Ind.: University of Indiana Press, 1976), 181; Col Herbert Y. Schandler, “The President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Political Direction of the War,” paper presented to the 1996 Vietnam Symposium, Texas Tech University, April 18, 1996.
204 Korb, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 176.
205 Tilford, 96–97.
The siege of the Marine Base at Khe Sanh, from January 14 to March 31, 1968 illustrated how using strategic bombers for interdiction missions should work. The Marines were encircled on a hilltop surrounded by valleys, draws, and an outer ring of higher elevations. The situation could have easily become a repeat of the French defeat of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. Khe Sanh was supplied by aircraft using its airstrip until it became untenable. The North Vietnamese had large amounts of both infantry, artillery, and anti-aircraft artillery. TAC airstrikes kept the base from being overrun, but weather, available munitions, and command and control issues hampered their assistance. B-52s became the go-to response. During the siege, the BUFFs flew 2,707 sorties and dropped 75,631 tons of bombs. Ground controllers and their radars used a technique known as “Bugle Note,” to keep a constant stream of three to six B-52s near Khe Sanh, rotating in and out every three hours. The three aircraft cells hit enemy positions every three hours. The B-52s navigated to predetermined points where they picked up by the Skyspot ground radar which guided them to a specific set of targets. Rather than five to nine-hour planning and flight schedule, targets could be changed as needed within two hours. By increasing the frequency of inbound and outbound flights, the B-52s could, and sometimes did, pound the NVA without interlude. Initially, the BUFFs bombed rear staging areas, supply dumps and artillery positions at least 3,300 yards outside the Marines’ outer perimeter. Reconnaissance units discovered the NVA had constructed underground bunkers within the

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207 CH, Command and Control, bk. 1, pt. 2, 25.
208 Ibid.
209 CH, A Chronology of Important Airpower Events in Southeast Asia, 261–63, 268; Berger, 156–57.
211 CH, A Chronology of Important Airpower Events in Southeast Asia, 273–74.
buffer zone. B-52s and TAC fighter-bombers both pounded a new buffer zone, slightly less than 300 yards from the outer perimeter.\textsuperscript{212} The bomb was exceptionally accurate. The BUFFs conducted 589 close-in sorties with no damage to the Marines or their fortifications.\textsuperscript{213} President Johnson stated that the Khe Sanh campaign was “the most overwhelming, intelligent, and effective use of airpower in the history of warfare.”\textsuperscript{214} General Westmoreland concurred, “The thing that broke their back basically was the fire of the B-52s.”\textsuperscript{215} A captured NVA officer, when interrogated, estimated that seventy-five percent of his 1,800-man regiment had been killed by a single ARC LIGHT strike.\textsuperscript{216} As violent as the siege of Khe Sanh was, it was a precursor to the Tet Offensive of 1968.

\textsuperscript{212} History, Seventh Air Force, 1 January–30 June 1968, xxii.
\textsuperscript{214} Schlight, 292
\textsuperscript{215} Berger, 157.
\textsuperscript{216} Ibid.
Figure 17. Craters from B-52 strikes in and near the Au Shau Valley. Image Source: United States Air Force.

From April to mid-summer, the B-52 supported a series of operations to interfere with massive troop convoys heading south on the Ho Chi Minh trail and in the Au Shau Valley in the Central Highlands west of Da Nang. These were followed by the major bombing of truck parks and storage areas along the Laotian border. The B-52 raids forced traffic backups and secondary raids hit the stalled convoys.\textsuperscript{217} The air

Air Force aircraft destroyed these trucks on the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Figure 18. Image Source: United States Air Force.

\textsuperscript{217} CH, \textit{A Chronology of Important Airpower Events in Southeast Asia}, 276; History, Seventh Air Force 1 January–30 June 1968, xxiv; and Berger, 157, 160.
raids combined with Army and Marine attacks thwarted the massive NVA ground attacks during the Tet Offensive. The NVA took massive casualties and the supply columns down the Ho Chi Minh trail were either destroyed or substantially slowed. In spite of these gains, President Johnson called for a bombing halt on October 31, 1968 of North Vietnam in an effort to bring the North Vietnamese to the bargaining table and begin peace negotiations. This gave the NVA time to regroup and resupply. Micromanagement from the President, his Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and their staffs cost tens of thousands of American and South Vietnamese lives. All of this in an effort to persuade Chinese not to interfere and to allow the North Vietnamese to end the struggle that they wholeheartedly believed they could win.

The bombing halt had little effect in South Vietnam. ARC LIGHT missions continued until 1973 and, when Johnson decided not to run for an additional term, President Richard M. Nixon expanded secret bombing (MENU) into Cambodia during 1969 and 1970 and seven Operation COMMANDO HUNT interdiction missions into Laos between 1968 and 1972.218

**MENU Bombing**

The Johnson Administration’s air campaigns in the Vietnam War centered on ROLLING THUNDER and the B-52 ARC LIGHT missions. From 1965 to 1973, one million tons of munitions (twelve percent) were dropped on North Vietnam. Most of this was dropped south of the 20th parallel to exclude Hanoi and Haiphong. Four million tons were dropped on South Vietnam, three million tons on Laos, and 500,000 on Cambodia.219 In 1968, President Nixon was elected on a platform of ending the Vietnam War. Any expansion of ground or air campaigns would not be funded by Congress. 1968 was the year that America almost tore itself apart with race and draft riots. Anti-War protests were seen all across the Western world. Nixon’s bombing missions were publicly announced as “one-time protective reaction strikes” in the Panhandle southern regions of North Vietnam.220 The secret air war shifted to Cambodia and Laos, as well as South Vietnam beginning in 1969.221

Nixon’s new Secretary of the Air Force, Robert C. Seams, Jr., spoke to the Air Force Association (AFA) on March 19, 1969. He described what would later be called “Vietnamization” and placed U.S. foreign policy in a global context: “There seems to be a trend toward viewing all national questions in the context of the frustrating struggle against aggression in Vietnam...But there is no doubt that, however frustrated we are with the conflict in Vietnam, the cost of failure to provide adequate forces for our security could be infinitely higher than the cost of Southeast Asia.”222

President Nixon began a new strategy to curtail North Vietnam’s supply routes that continually moved westward as the U.S. bombed the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The secret bombing of neutral Cambodia was known as “the Menu Operations.”223 Johnson’s bombing halt allowed North Vietnam to regroup, send tens of thousands of soldiers and tens of millions of tons of supply south through Cambodia to the area closest

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218 CH, A Chronology of Important Airpower Events in Southeast Asia, 276 ff.
220 CH, A Chronology of Important Airpower Events in Southeast Asia, 276 ff.
Figure 20. ARC LIGHT target box showing damage from B-52 ordnance. Image Source: United States Air Force.

Figure 21. Extent of bombing in Cambodia during the Vietnam War. Bomb damage is in RED. Image Source: LANDSAT satellite image, United States Department of Defense.
to Saigon. The raids began on March 18, 1969 under the code name BREAKFAST, and dropped ordnance only three miles into Cambodia. Those three miles effectively killed Cambodian neutrality, although the North Vietnamese had effectively done so earlier by using Cambodian lands for extensions of their supply trails. Nixon ordered additional raids in May, code named (SUPPER, LUNCH, DESSERT and SNACK), thus the term MENU bombing. Nixon kept the operations secret from high level Air Force officials, the Air Force Chief of Staff, and the Secretary of the Air Force. Operational documents were falsified and required personnel were ordered to deceive their superiors under orders from the President. The MENU raids were halted after they were exposed by the New York Times on May 26, 1970. At the same time, the Cambodian Prime Minister, Norodom Sihanouk was overthrown. The Cambodian government then openly supported the United States. Cambodia joined in the war and the MENU operations became ARC LIGHT missions. Hindsight shows that the MENU operations possibly prevented a large-scale NVA attack.

**COMMANDO HUNT**

President Johnson called his bombing halt of North Vietnam on October 31, 1968 and two weeks later on November 15, the first of seven COMMANDO HUNT operations began. All targeted the Ho Chi Minh Trail segments. Each of the operations lasted six months and alternated from the winter/spring dry season (November–April) to summer/fall monsoon/wet season (May–September). The sorties were based upon the strengths of three types of aircraft. Truck convoys on the trail network were attacked by AC-119 and AC-130 gunships. Truck parks, river fords, bridges, and anti-aircraft and SAM sites were dedicated to TAC fighter-bombers using new laser-guided bombs. The B-52s were most effective against stationary targets, particularly mountain passes and choke points filled with trucks waiting to head south.

The Seventh Air Force created one-square-mile target boxes as a norm for these missions. The B-52s averaged twenty-seven sorties per day, in three-ship cells. During COMMANDO HUNT V, the sortie rate increased to 125 sorties per day. All sorties used the “Igloo White” sensor system, which monitored movement on the ground. During 1968, B-52s supported COMMANDO HUNT with 838 sorties in Laos, and 156 sorties to support STEEL TIGER SOUTH with twenty-one sorties per day below 16° 30' north latitude. During May 1969, the BUFFs dropped 500 lb. and 750. Iron bombs, which caused massive mud slides in the mountain passes during the wet season.

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228 Kissinger, 240; Tilford, *Crosswinds*, 128.
235 Ibid.
238 Ibid.
The major obstacle to success in these operations was the thousands of NVA engineering troops placed at strategic points to repair the bomb damage within hours. While they negotiated in Paris during bombing halts, they massed troops for campaigns in both 1970 and 1972. COMMANDO HUNT VII (November 1, 1971 to March 31, 1972) used the greatest use of B-52s and also employed the latest airborne technology and weaponry.

COMMANDO HUNT operations ceased on March 31, 1972, after North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap launched the Easter Offensive by invading South Vietnam as he did during the Tet Offensive in 1968. SAC, TAC, and the Navy simply did not have enough aircraft and crews to keep the enemy at bay in Laos and Cambodia while stemming the tide in South Vietnam.

Table 3. The JCS 94 Target List. Source: Kamps, “The JCS Target List, 73-76.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Number</th>
<th>Target Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Na San airfield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Dien Bien Phu airfield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>(B) Hanoi/Gia Lam airfield [limited jet-capable] (plus petroleum, oil, lubricants [POL] storage 1965)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>(R) Dong Hoi airfield [limited jet-capable] (airfield closest to South Vietnam)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>(R) Vinh airfield [limited jet-capable]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>(B) Phuc Yen airfield Uet-capable] (plus NNE POL storage 1966)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Hanoi/Bae Mai airfield [limited jet-capable]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>(B) Haiphong/Cat Bi airfield Uet-capable] (plus POL storage 1965)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Haiphong/Kien An airfield [limited jet-capable] (plus POL storage 1965)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Ninh Binh railroad/highway bridge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Hai Duong railroad/highway bridge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Hanoi railroad/highway bridge (Red River)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Hanoi railroad/highway bridge (canal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Thanh Hoa railroad/highway bridge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Viet Tri railroad/highway bridge (on Route 2: Hanoi-Lao Cai-Kunming, China)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Dap Cau railroad/highway bridge (on route from Hanoi to Chinese border)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Haiphong highway bridge (on Route 10: Haiphong to NE ORV and China)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Lang Son railroad/highway bridge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Yen Vien railroad yard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Hanoi railroad repair shops (Gia Lam)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Hanoi railroad yard/shops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Xuan Mai barracks SSW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Xuan Mai barracks NNW and headquarters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

241 Ibid.
242 Head, War From Above the Clouds, 49.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>(R) Chanh Hoa barracks SE and division headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Son La barracks/supply depot/military region headquarters NW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Dien Bien Phu barracks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(27)</td>
<td>(Although in the &quot;barracks&quot; group, a target numbered 27 did not appear in any sources consulted.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Ban Xom Lorn barracks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Quang Suoi barracks NE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Hanoi military headquarters; North Vietnam air defense headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Ha Dong barracks/supply depot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>(R) Vu Con barracks and supply depot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>(R) Vu Con barracks and supply depot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Vinh Yen barracks /training area N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Son Tav barracks SW and supply depot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>(B)(R) Vit Thu Lu barracks/storage area (guerrilla staging area)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Moc Chau barracks</td>
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<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Vinh barracks and headquarters military region IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Vinh barracks and headquarters military region IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Phu Qui ammunition depot SW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>(R) Phu Van ammunition depot E (major depot)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>(R) Phu Van POL storage and ammunition depot NE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Qui Hau ammunition depot W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Yen Bai ordnance depot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Haiphong ammunition depot SW (Kien An)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Ban Phien Hay ammunition depot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Yen Son ordnance and ammunition depot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>(B) Haiphong POL storage[+] (largest POL storage facility in North Vietnam)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>(B) Hanoi POL storage[+]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Vinh POL storage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Nguyen Khe POL storage[+] (Thach Loi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>(R) Vinh supply depot E</td>
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<td>53</td>
<td>(R) Phu Van supply depot SE</td>
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<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Thien Linh Dong supply depot S</td>
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<td>55</td>
<td>(R) Vinh Son supply depot SW/SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Phu Qui barracks/supply depot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Hanoi Ministry of National Defense/MZ Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>Hanoi supply depot S/barracks</td>
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<td>Hanoi supply depot N/barracks</td>
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<td>Thai Nguyen supply depot N</td>
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<td>Xom Chang barracks S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>Van Dien supply depot/barracks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>Thuan Chau barracks/supply depot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>(R) Xom Bang ammunition depot (supports Pathet Lao in Laotian panhandle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(65)</td>
<td>(Although in the &quot;depot&quot; group, a target numbered 65 did not appear in any sources consulted. In a later edition of the list, the number 65.8 was reserved for the Hanoi SAM support facility.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>Hanoi international radio communications transmitter facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>Hanoi international radio communications receiver facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Location and Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>Cam Pha Port (mine laying and bombing targets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>Hon Gai Port (mine laying and bombing targets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>Haiphong Port (mine laying and bombing targets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>(R) Ben Thuy port facilities/transshipment center (mine laying and bombing targets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>Port Wallut naval base (mine laying and bombing targets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>Hanoi port facilities/Red River (mine laying and bombing targets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>Quang Khe Port approaches (mine laying area)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>Viet Tri chemical plant (explosives)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>Thai Nguyen iron and steel complex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>Hanoi machine tool and engineering equipment plant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>Haiphong phosphatic fertilizer plant (explosives)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>Bae Giang chemical fertilizer plant (explosives)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>Haiphong West thermal power plant(++)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>Hanoi thermal power plant(++)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>Uong Bi thermal power plant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83/84</td>
<td>Road/Rail Route 1 (Hamrong to Hanoi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85/86</td>
<td>Road/Rail Route 1 (Vinh to Hamrong)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87/88</td>
<td>Road/Rail Route 5 (Hanoi to Haiphong)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>Route 7 (Laos/North Vietnam border)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>Route 8 (vicinity Nape, Laos to Roa Qua) (main supply route to Central Laos)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>Route 12 (Laos/North Vietnam border to Xom Ma Na) (main supply route into southern Laos and South Vietnam)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>Route 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>Route 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94</td>
<td>Route alternate to Route 6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4. Target Complexes.** Source: Kamps, “The JCS Target List, 73-76.”

**Target Complexes**

| 2 jet-capable airfields | 7 ports and port approaches |
| 5 limited jet-capable airfields | 2 railroad repair facilities |
| 2 non-jet-capable airfields | 2 railroad yards |
| 2 communications facilities | 8 railroad/highway bridges |
| 9 headquarters | 1 highway bridge |
| 22 barracks | 3 railroad armed-reconnaissance routes |
| 1 training area | 9 highway armed-reconnaissance routes |
| 2 ordnance depots | 1 iron and steel plant |
| 8 ammunition depots | 1 machine tool plant |
| 5 POL storage facilities | 3 chemical/fertilizer plants (explosives) |
| 1 storage area | 3 thermal power plants |
| 14 supply depots |  |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1954-70</td>
<td>3rd Air Div</td>
<td>Hq for B-52 units at Andersen, U'Tapao, and Kadena</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-75</td>
<td>8th Air Force</td>
<td>Replaced 3rd Air Div as hq for Arc Light</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-70</td>
<td>3960th Strategic Wg</td>
<td>SAC unit from pre-Vietnam period. Replaced by 43rd SW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-70</td>
<td>4133rd Bomb Wg (P)</td>
<td>Formed to receive rotational crews, inactivated 1970 when 43rd SW formed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-79</td>
<td>43rd Strategic Wg</td>
<td>Replaced 3960th SW when B-52 missions from Guam resumed in 1972, reported to 57th Air Div (P), continued as operating unit at Andersen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>57th Air Div (P)</td>
<td>Controlled both B-52 Arc Light wings on Guam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>72nd Strategic Wg (P)</td>
<td>Reported to 57th AD (P)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>303rd Consolidated Aircraft Maint Wg (P)</td>
<td>Reported to 57th AD (P)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966-70</td>
<td>4258th Strategic Wg</td>
<td>Reported to 3rd Air Div on Guam; in 1970, redesignated as</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-74</td>
<td>307th Strategic Wg</td>
<td>For last part of war, reported to 17th AD (P)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-74</td>
<td>17th Air Div (P)</td>
<td>Reported to 8th AF on Guam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-74</td>
<td>310th Strategic Wg</td>
<td>Reported to 17th AD (P)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-74</td>
<td>340th Consolidated</td>
<td>Reported to 17th AD (P)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965-70</td>
<td>4252nd Strategic Wg</td>
<td>Replaced 4252nd SW; did not fly Arc Light combat missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-74</td>
<td>376th Strategic Wg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 5
LINEBACKER I

The United States believed it was making progress in stemming the flow of the infiltration of men and supplies down the Ho Chi Minh Trail during the spring of 1972. The Air Force’s COMMANDO HUNT operations ceased on March 31, 1972. On that date, the North Vietnamese launched a conventional armed attack on South Vietnam. The American policy of “Vietnamization,” turning the war over to South Vietnam’s army (ARVN), seemed to be going well. As American troop strength dwindled, American air power proved to be “guardian angel” of the ARVN. But this new combined arms attack appeared to be a second version of the Tet Offensive of 1968. The new attacks would be known as the “Easter Offensive.” This time SAC, TAC, and the Navy simply did not have enough aircraft and crews to keep the enemy at bay in Laos and Cambodia while stemming the tide in South Vietnam.244


The Johnson administration was constantly plagued by the fear of either Soviet or Chinese intervention in the Vietnam War, or perhaps both. The intermittent bombing halts at each point when success was at hand were gestures to the North Vietnamese to negotiate and to convince the two great communist powers that the United States was not threatening either of them nor did it wish to utterly destroy North Vietnam. The Nixon administration offered a different set of criteria. Richard Nixon promised prior to his first term in office to end the war. He was unsuccessful. However, Nixon, among the forefront of Cold Warriors, surprised everyone by seeking a détente with the Russians and even to the hardline Chinese with what later was termed “ping-pong diplomacy.” The Chinese allowed American competitive ping-pong players to come to China to play against the Chinese national team. The United States reciprocated. President Nixon saw this potential thaw in Sino-American relations as a way to end America’s involvement in Vietnam. The November elections were coming later that year. The President’s National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, secretly visited Beijing and soon after, Nixon went to China in February 1972.245 The Easter Offensive by the North Vietnamese was a ploy to derail these overtures and to remove the Americans once and for all from the complex equation that was the Vietnam War.

During Operation COMMANDO HUNT, in December 1971, U.S. Intelligence services picked up information that an offensive may be happening soon. The Air Force tasked TAC to fly approximately 1,000 sorties into the southern portion of North Vietnam between the 17th and 20th parallels.246 The President ordered an additional 207 F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers into theatre and 161 additional B-52s were ordered to Andersen Air Force Base on Guam and to U-Tapao Royal Thai Navy/ Air Force Base (RTNAFB), bringing the total force of BUFFs to 210. This was more than half of all of SAC’s B-52s.247 This placed a tremendous strain on Fail-Safe Missions. The first thirty B-52s were sent to Guam under Operation BULLET SHOT in February.248 The increase in airpower proved fortunate. Between April and July 1972, Air Force bomber and attack aircraft increased from 375 to 900, the Marines deployed 40 F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers to Da Nang, two squadrons of A-1 Sky Raider ground attack aircraft to Ben Hoa, and the Navy operated six carrier groups in the Gulf of Tonkin. Each aircraft carrier carried 60 attack aircraft.249 Strike aircraft increased from 495 to 1,380 in the first three months of the offensive.250

President Nixon later described the timing “to go for broke and bring the enemy to his knees.”251 The President, having created stronger ties with Russia and China, believed he could force North Vietnam to negotiate. He intended to resume the bombing of North Vietnam and mining Haiphong Harbor.252

250 Ibid.
Air attacks began on April 2 with pinpoint strikes against anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) and surface to air (SAM) sites within 25 miles of the DMZ. These were followed by attacks within 60 miles of the DMZ as part of Operation FREEDOM TRAIN. The NVA streamed supplies south through multiple routes and the air attacks did not greatly diminish their delivery. President Nixon then expanded the area of operations to parallel 20° 25' or 231 miles north. B-52s flew their first sorties on April 16, with eighteen BUFFs from the 307th Strategic Wing stationed at U-Tapao targeting oil storage facilities near Haiphong. Nixon, after consultations with Henry Kissinger and the president’s military assistant, Major General Alexander Haig, used TAC, Navy, and Marine aircraft in North Vietnam and utilized B-52s in South Vietnam under the codename Operation LINEBACKER. President Nixon viewed LINEBACKER as the beginning of the end for America’s presence in Vietnam. He intended to inflict direct pain on the North, explaining that “the bastards have never been bombed like they’re going to be bombed this time.” The new effort began on May 10 and lasted until October 15, 1972.

Pentagon planners designed LINEBACKER to have three specific goals: 1) restrict resupply of North Vietnam from external sources; 2) destroy internal stockpiles of military supplies and equipment; and 3) restrict flow of forces and supplies to the battlefield. These were to be achieved in four distinct

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258 PACAF, CH, Command and Control, bk. 1, 1-24.
phases. First, destroy major railroad depots and rolling stock in and near Hanoi and the primary trunk line toward China. Second, demolish railroad marshalling yards and storage areas surrounding Hanoi. Third, destroy provisional storage and transshipment points created as a response to the first two phases. Fourth, destroy enemy defenses, particularly ground control intercept radar sites, command and control, MiG airfields, SAM and AAA sites, and associated logistics depots and support facilities.²⁵⁹

Part Two of the operation, Operation POCKET MONEY, mined North Vietnamese ports. Following mine seeding, the mines had a 36-hour delay in arming. All international ocean traffic was notified. From the day the mines came alive through September, no vessels entered or left any North Vietnamese ports.²⁶⁰ Supply vessels were forced to remain outside the twelve mile limit from shore to the edge of the minefield. At the same time, North Vietnamese small vessels attempted to ferry off loaded supplies to shore. They were attacked by TAC, Navy and Marine aircraft.²⁶¹

Operation FREEDOM TRAIN was active from April to June 1972. US forces flew 27,745 attack and support sorties, 1,000 of which were flown with B-52s.²⁶² The United States lost 52 planes—17 to SAMs, 11 to AAA, three to small arms, 14 to MiGs, and seven to unknown causes.²⁶³ The enemy fired 777

![Figure 24](image-url)  

²⁶¹ Ibid.
²⁶³ Ibid.
SAMs in April, 429 in May, and 366 in June. The Air Force countered with a new type of hunter-killer team to ferret out SAM radars. F-105 Wild Weasels found the sites and F-4 Phantoms destroyed them with cluster bombs or High Explosive ordnance.

North Vietnam possessed 4,000 23mm to 100mm AAA guns, of which half were located in and near Hanoi and Haiphong. They also had more than 200 MiGs, 70 of which were newer MiG 21s. The MiGs used a tactic that involved following heavy-laden attack aircraft and firing on them as they slowed airspeed to prepare for attacks or before they could use evasive maneuvers. From March through July, the U.S. lost twenty-six aircraft while the North Vietnamese lost thirty-two. The Air Force countered with a new system called “Teaball,” a weapons control center in Thailand that linked data from Laos and the Gulf of Tonkin to triangulate aircraft movements, both friendly and enemy. From August 1st through October 1st, the number of kills dropped to five for the U.S. and nineteen for North Vietnam. PACAF announced in June that “the enemy has shown no signs of response to the interdiction . . . ; therefore it is estimated that only a small amount of material is entering NVN [North Vietnam] via the highway system.”

B-52 strikes were concentrated on supporting ground operations in South Vietnam to help stem the tide of the North Vietnamese invasion. These included massive strikes on either side of the DMZ against supply cantonments, road choke points, and staging areas. Of particular importance, the BUFF’s averaged thirty sorties every day against bridges on Route Package 1 (RP1).

President Nixon removed many of the restrictions that plagued ROLLING THUNDER. Pentagon planners changed the target priority list, moving some targets to the top of the list. Among them were rail trunk lines between Hanoi and the Chinese border and those between Haiphong and the DMZ, oil and gas processing plants (Petroleum Oil and Lubricants [POL]), power stations, and rolling stock and storage areas. At the same time, restrictions were placed on a thirty-mile buffer south of the Chinese border, dams, dikes, civilian watercraft, civilian population centers, and non-Vietnamese seaborne shipping.

TAC F-4s focused on destroying bridges as quickly as the North Vietnamese could rebuild them, sometimes in a matter of hours. B-52s flew sortie missions to An Loc, laying bombs within 1,000 meters of the defenders and neutralizing North Vietnamese attackers. The B-52 raids in South Vietnam were

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264 Ibid.
265 Ibid.
267 Ibid.
269 Ibid.
270 Ibid.
271 Ibid.
273 Mark, 382.
274 Ibid.
278 Ibid.
credited with slowing down the NVA timetable, forcing them spend needed time in taking Quang Tri City before losing it back to the ARVN troops and not taking Hue.279

LINEBACKER dropped, between April 5 and October 23, 1972, 155,548 tons of bombs on North Vietnam, or, approximately twenty-five percent of the total dropped during ROLLING THUNDER.280 The net effect on the North Vietnamese was the loss of seventy percent of electricity generating capacity and severe damage to their road and rail networks.281 However, the NVA still occupied most of the rural areas of South Vietnam, and they planned to use this as a bargaining chip in the Paris negotiations.282 There is no

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279 Ibid.
280 Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power, 173
281 Ibid.
doubt that American air power halted the collapse of the South Vietnamese regime during the Easter Offensive.  

An unintended consequence of LINEBACKER was that the sheer amount of effort needed to stem the tide of the North Vietnamese forces within South Vietnam left the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos and Cambodia largely untouched for several months. Even with the tremendous buildup of air assets by the United States, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) estimated that the North Vietnamese had 14,000 trucks that were untouched and available for use. They also reported that despite the harbor mining and rail interdiction, between 55,000 and 75,000 tons of supplies crossed the Chinese border into North Vietnam each month.

International political considerations altered the continuation of LINEBACKER. President Nixon went to Moscow in mid-summer and curtailed some bombing sorties. Henry Kissinger believed the timing was right to reopen the Paris peace talks. Hanoi accepted, but the President, with recent diplomatic triumphs in Beijing and Moscow, and the November election nearing, decided he could use more airpower to push the North Vietnamese even harder. Kissinger counseled against using more B-52s because it “would cause a domestic outcry and that in any case such attacks were unnecessary.” Nixon did not fully adhere to Kissinger’s suggestions. He authorized a continuation of bombing sorties by B-52s and ground

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283 Ibid.
285 Ibid.
287 Kissinger, 1102; and History, Headquarters Eighth Air Force, vol. 1, narrative, 148–49.
attack fighters averaging thirty per day throughout October. This round of missions was concentrated near the DMZ and targeted command and control and storage facilities.

![Map of Vietnam showing Route Package System](image)


The North Vietnamese were not motivated to enter into serious negotiations. The Paris Peace Talks began in late July, but it was evident that they wanted to wait until the November elections. Nixon cabled Admiral John McCain on August 8, to “notify his subordinate commanders that Linebacker would begin to hit the North harder.” Target planners created new lists and increased sorties to forty-eight per day in RP 5 and RP 6. The Navy was responsible for RP B and the Air Force worked on RP 6 A and RP 5. The B-52s were held

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289 Ibid.


291 Ibid.
back in deference to the presidential election and Kissinger’ wishes. The vast majority of the bombing was conducted by TAC, the Navy, and the Marines. A new weapon was added to the Air Force arsenal at the end of September when 48 F-111 Aardvarks deployed to Takhli Royal Thai Air Force Base (RTAFB).

The Aardvarks flew in all weather, day and night, at very low altitudes and at supersonic speed. By the middle of October, the F-111s conducted an average of twenty-four sorties per night, half of all missions. North Vietnamese combat forces within South Vietnam reached between 150,000 and 200,000 troops in October 1972. Their negotiating strategy was to ask for a ceasefire. Nixon did not halt or lessen the bombing. By early summer 1972 the NVA inserted fourteen new divisions into South Vietnam and this placed a heavy burden on the South Vietnamese government. Despite American airpower, Saigon would probably be forced to concede by the end of the year. Nixon crushed South Dakota Senator George McGovern in the election, but failed to reach a Republican majority in Congress. When Congress resumed session in January 1973, it promised to invoke the War Powers Act, which would end all funding for the

Figure 28. F-111s in formation. Image Source: United States Air Force.

295 Tilford, Crosswinds, 153.
296 Ibid.
297 Ibid., 148.
Vietnam War. The President knew that if could end the war on his terms, he must do it before January 1973.

298 The War Powers Resolution (also known as the War Powers Resolution of 1973 or the War Powers Act) (50 U.S.C. 1541–1548) limits United States to an armed conflict without the consent of the U.S. Congress.

CHAPTER 6
LINEBACKER II

Peace talks between the United States and North Vietnam began on February 21, 1970, with President Richard Nixon’s National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger negotiating for the Americans and Le Duc Tho, for the North Vietnamese. The three-year intermittent dialogue was largely frustrating for the Americans. The North Vietnamese relentlessly argued over minutiae such as the shape of the table, and if the South Vietnamese and the Viet Cong would be allowed to sit at the table. Each time the American air offensives pressured the North Vietnamese into asking for concessions, the United States backed away from forcing an end to the war. The concept that a completely devastated North Vietnam might entice the Chinese to occupy it loomed large.

During the Lyndon Johnson presidency, micromanagement of military operations created an unmanageable environment to conduct the war. During most of his five years in office, President Johnson believed he could win the war with enough men and materiel. He failed. His consummate fear was a new version of the Korean War in which China sent in enormous numbers of troops. In the end, the Vietnam War broke him. He left a quagmire that completely overshadowed his great strides in domestic policy.

American foreign policy took a new shift in 1972, when President Nixon went to both Moscow and Beijing and a new sense of détente filled the air. Henry Kissinger believed the timing was right to reopen the Paris peace talks. Hanoi accepted, but Nixon, with recent diplomatic triumphs in Beijing and Moscow, and the November election nearing, decided he could use more airpower to push the North Vietnamese even harder. Kissinger was enthusiastic that the process might be nearing its end. Too soon, on October 26, 1972, he announced in a press conference in Paris and in three White House telephone conversations with the President that “We believe that peace is at hand. What remains to be done can be settled in one more negotiating session with the North Vietnamese negotiators, lasting, I would think, no more than three or four days.”

North Vietnam had reason to believe otherwise. North Vietnam Army (NVA) troop levels reached between 150,000 and 200,000 within South Vietnam that same month. Although the Soviet Union and China were weary of the war, Le Duc Tho believed that if the Easter Offensive, launched earlier that year, could be sustained, the American presidential election might help their cause. They did not get their wish, but neither did President Nixon. Nixon handily won the November election, but the Republicans failed to carry Congress. According to several reports, the new Congress would invoke the War Powers Act, which would end all funding for the Vietnam War.

Kissinger was surprised on December 13 when Le Duc Tho halted the peace talks and returned to Hanoi for additional consultations. He was furious at this tactic, stating “There was no intractable, substantive issue separating the two sides, but rather an apparent North Vietnamese determination not to

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301 Ibid.
305 Ibid. 148.
306 The War Powers Resolution (also known as the War Powers Resolution of 1973 or the War Powers Act) (50 U.S.C. 1541–1548) limits United States to an armed conflict without the consent of the U.S. Congress.
allow the agreement to be completed.” Simultaneously, the South Vietnamese government, opposed to the proposed terms of the ceasefire that was offered, began to make demands that the United States could not and would not meet. North Vietnam made a grievous error in interpreting Nixon’s resolve. Henry Kissinger wrote in his memoirs, that Nixon was never more dangerous than when he was left with no remaining options. If the President were to end the war on his own terms, he must do so before Congress returned in January 1973.

President Nixon took these myriad issues and used them to his advantage. He saw a limited set of goals ahead. First, he must bring the North Vietnamese back to Paris. In order to end the war before January “on our terms” and achieve a “peace with honor,” Kissinger assessed the situation in his memoirs: “We had only two choices, taking a massive, shocking step to impose our will on events and end the war quickly, or letting matters drift into another round of inconclusive negotiations, prolonged warfare, bitter national divisions, and mounting casualties.” There was only one weapon in the U.S. Air Force arsenal that could deliver the desired results, SAC’s B-52s. Adequate numbers of the big bombers were already in theatre. They were highly accurate, could fly day or night in all kinds of weather, and carried immense bomb loads. They terrified the North Vietnamese. The issue was whether the President would allow them to attack the lucrative targets in and around the capital of Hanoi and the principal port of Haiphong.

The plan that became Operation LINEBACKER II was conceived as a winter continuation of Operation LINEBACKER, which was halted in October. LINEBACKER II operated with significantly less restrictive Rules of Engagement (ROE). The only major constraint was to avoid civilian casualties whenever possible. Nixon gave Hanoi an ultimatum on December 15 to return to the peace talks within seventy-two hours “or else.” Prior to this message, the President ordered Admiral Thomas Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to prepare massive air strikes targeting major infrastructure in and around Hanoi, as well as docks and shipyards in Haiphong. Nixon told Admiral Moorer, “I don’t want any more of this crap about the fact that we couldn’t hit this target or that one. This is your chance to use military power effectively to win this war, and if you don’t, I’ll consider you personally responsible.”

The Joint Chiefs of Staff originally planned for a three-day campaign with possible extensions. The aims were not as grandiose as those of the Johnson administration. This operation was to halt the fighting and allow the United States to exit gracefully. The operation placed massive pressure upon North Vietnam north of the 20th parallel. This plan included attacking both Hanoi and Haiphong. Seventy-two hours after Hanoi rejected Nixon’s demand, Operation LINEBACKER II began. The President made overtures to

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315 Tilford, *SETUP*, 254.
316 Ibid.
318 Ibid.
Hanoi offering meetings any day after the 26th of December, hoping to bring Hanoi back to the table and to soothe the South Vietnamese.\textsuperscript{321}

Strategic Air Command planners had several issues to consider. Not all of them had precedents during the Vietnam War. The decision to use B-52 was logical, as they were the largest bomb carriers in the U.S. inventory. They had been used in Vietnam since 1965, albeit on targets that were in jungles and in ground support roles. This mission necessitated a harkening back to the saturation bombing of World War II and, to a lesser extent, Korea. Dr. Futrell, one of the foremost intellectuals of Air Force doctrine, wrote “Although B-52 strategic bombers had long been committed to single-integrated operational plan (SIOP), general war strikes against route and terminal air defenses in the Soviet Union, the problem confronting them in the Linebacker II strikes . . . was immensely more complex.”\textsuperscript{322} Lone bombers on nuclear missions did not have the same training on formation sorties. All SAC crews were extensively trained in nuclear missions, not World War II style missions. Lieutenant General Gerald W. Johnson, the commander of the Eighth Air Force, sent concept plan to SAC headquarters in November to conduct the more traditional bomber missions. The plan was designed to conduct “extensive attacks against Hanoi and Haiphong using multiple-bomber formations simultaneously attacking from different directions.”\textsuperscript{323}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{Lt_Gen_Gerald_W._Johnson_Commander_of_the_Eighth_Air_Force_during_Linebacker_II.jpg}
\end{figure}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{321} Nixon, \textit{RN}, 242–46.
\end{flushright}
Air Force Vice Chief of Staff John C. Meyer was concerned about civilian casualties and the President’s mandate not to create them. Rather than using Johnson’s plan, Meyer had his staff create a variation. History would prove Johnson’s plan to be superior and Meyer’s plan to be far too constricting. Meyer’s planners turned the new concept around in three days. The crews would fly in their three-ship cells as usual, but each cell must follow the planned course precisely and fly in a trail formation. To make the bombing more accurate, the cells must stabilize the flight path for four full minutes to avoid collisions. This was a direct reflection of World War II bombing missions over Germany and Japan. It sounded good on paper, but in practice ground defenses would potentially have a field day with bombers flying straight and level for four minutes. When the Eighth Air Force planners saw the changes, they estimated B-52 losses in the sixteen to eighteen percentile realms. Meyers used the SIOP plan estimated losses at three percent. Meyers used single aircraft sortie plans rather than formations of three-aircraft cells flying in trail formation over the same point on the ground at a predetermined and inflexible altitude. Both Johnson’s and Meyer’s plans targeted major “rail yards, storage areas, power plants, communications centers, and airfields located on Hanoi’s periphery.”

The B-52s stayed at least ten miles from Hanoi to reduce the potential of civilian casualties. Many targets were in urban areas. The precision needed to destroy the intended targets fell to the Seventh Air Force Navy and Marine tactical aircraft using “smart bombs” that would fall or glide to their destination with high degrees of accuracy. Most tactical strikes were launched during daylight hours and the B-52s hammered at night. There was to be no rest for the North Vietnamese.

LINEBACKER II was the campaign the Air Force generals wanted since 1965. It differed from LINEBACKER I significantly: “Where LINEBACKER I had been an interdiction campaign directed against supply routes throughout NVN, LINEBACKER II was a sustained maximum effort using airpower to destroy all major target complexes located in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas.” Tactical, political, and strategic considerations changed the plans into three separate parts chronologically. “The first lasted from 18 to 20 December and featured 314 nighttime B-52 sorties against rail and supply assets around Hanoi. The second lasted from 21 to 24 December and focused 120 B-52 sorties against targets near Haiphong. The third phase followed the Christmas bombing pause and lasted from 26 to 29 December. These attacks marked an increased effort during which 295 B-52 sorties attacked 13 targets and five SAM sites around Hanoi.”

325 Futrell, Ideas, 2:296–97.
326 Ibid.
327 Clodfelter, “Nixon and the Air Weapon,” 178
329 Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power, 184–85.
330 Ibid.
332 Head, War From Above the Clouds, 79.
North Vietnam had seven years to build up its defenses. It became, by 1972, “the most extensive and strongest integrated air defense system in the world.”

North Vietnam had amassed a defense that included 145 MiG fighters, 26 SA-2 Guideline surface-to-air missile sites (21 in the Hanoi–Haiphong area), a heavy concentration of anti-aircraft artillery, and a complex, overlapping radar network that served an efficient and many-times-redundant command-and-control system. In addition, the radar network secretly had been improved in recent times by introduction of a new fire-control radar that improved the accuracy of the SA-2 weapons.

Prior to the first day’s launch, Andersen Air Force Base on Guam was crowded with 99 B-52Gs and 53 B-52Ds. U-Tapao RTNAFB in Thailand was home to another 54 B-52Ds.

Figure 32. An “elephant walk,” as B-52Ds prepare for take-off in LINEBACKER II mission at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam. Image Source: United States Air Force.

334 Ibid.
335 Ibid., 54.
336 Ibid.
Figure 33. B-52Ds on the ramp at U-Tapao Royal Thai Navy Air Force Base during LINEBACKER II. Image courtesy of Bill Fauth and United States Air Force.

Figure 34. B-52Ds at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam. Image Source: United States Air Force.
Day 1 – December 18, 1972

On the morning of December 17, which was the morning of December 18 on Guam, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent the following attack message:

You are directed to commence at approximately 1200Z,\textsuperscript{337} 18 December 1972, a three day maximum effort, repeat, maximum effort, of B-52/TACAIR strikes in the Hanoi/Haiphong area . . . Objective is maximum destruction of selected targets in the vicinity of Hanoi/Haiphong. Be prepared to extend beyond three days, if necessary.\textsuperscript{338}

Colonel James R. McCarthy, commander of the 43rd Strategic Wing, gave the pre-mission briefing at Andersen Air Force Base. His first words were “Gentlemen, your target for tonight is HANOI.”\textsuperscript{339} The crews excited. They hadn’t been “Downtown” thus far in the conflict.\textsuperscript{340} The missions were to be conducted using “press-on” rules, meaning that aircraft would press-on to their targets regardless of enemy SAM, AAA, or MiG activities.\textsuperscript{341} Formation flying was controlled at specified altitudes and a four-minute straight line flight before bomb drop. The first mission flew at night, at high altitude, using radar bombing and in three waves. Each wave arrived on target varying between four and five hours apart.\textsuperscript{342} Each wave consisted of three ship cell components (several comprising the wave), each at ten-minute intervals. Air-to-air intervals within each cell were from one to two miles with lateral spacing and 500 feet vertically.

Figure 35. B-52 cell diagram. Source: Teixeira, “Linebacker II,” 11.

\textsuperscript{337} 1200Z or “Zulu” time is the universal time based on the Greenwich (England) Observatory. All time zones are east and west of the longitude of Greenwich. It allows for commanders anywhere on earth to coordinate time.
\textsuperscript{339} McCarthy, \textit{View From the Rock}, 50.
\textsuperscript{340} Leonard D.G. Teixeira, “Linebacker II: A Strategic and Tactical Case Study,” (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air War College, Air University, 1990), 17.
\textsuperscript{341} Ibid., 46-47.
The mission planners selected a route coming from the northwest to allow the radar aiming points to be positively identified and to have minimal exposure to SAMs. Following the bomb drop, the cells made a post target turn (PTT) that circled the aircraft over the target again. Every cell of every wave attacked the same target, all along the same navigation track at the same altitudes. They used the same initial point (IP) to begin their final four-minute turn and the same point for their PTT. No aircraft could perform evasive maneuvers. This was for an overwhelming concern over possible air-to-air collisions. The plan also allowed for a maximum of forward electronic countermeasure jamming of enemy radars.


The B-52s could not conduct these missions alone. Numerous tactical air support (TACAIR) aided. They flew SAM suppression, swept enemy airfields, discharged clouds of chaff to confuse enemy raiders, and provided close support to sweep the area of MiGs. F-4, F-111, and A-7 aircraft attacked enemy airfields

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343 McCarthy, View From the Rock, 41.
345 See McCarthy, View From the Rock, 46-47 and Teixeira, “Linebacker II,” 11, for the technical aspects of material in this paragraph.
346 Chaff is composed of metallic or coated fiberglass ribbons that are dispensed and then free fall very slowly. This degrades enemy radar into believe that the return could be rain squalls, large flights of birds, or a hidden stream of bombers. Chaff worked best when there was no wind. If blown free of the entry or target zone, it became all but useless.
and SAM sites with cluster bombs to damage the runways, interfere with radar equipment, and damage roads used for resupplying ordnance.347

Electronic surveillance aircraft gathered electronic intelligence (ELINT) data from enemy transmissions while others jammed enemy radars. Typically, F-4s would precede the BUFFs and lay clouds of chaff. Next in flight order were EB-66, EA-3, and EA-6 aircraft, used to create a wall of electronic noise in front of the bombers. They would orbit outside the flight paths of the bomber stream and provide constant electronic countermeasures (ECM) jamming. Hunter-Killer teams of pairs of F-4s and F-105 “Wild Weasels” swept nearby airfields and watched for SAM “Fan Song” radars to eliminate them before the batteries could fire. The Hunter-Killers would sweep ahead and to each side of the bomber stream. Lastly, other F-4s flew with and behind the bombers to provide MiG Combat Air Patrol (MiG CAP) duties, just as their forbearers had done in the skies over Germany and Japan.348

Figure 37. Routes to and from targets during LINEBACKER II sorties from Andersen Air Force Base, Guam and U-Tapao, RTNAFB, Thailand. Red lines are routes to targets. Blue lines are routes from targets. Yellow lines are KC-135 tanker routes and compression boxes (refueling tracks). Source: geocities.ws.

The targets for the first night included the Kinh No storage complex, the Yen Vien rail yard, the principal Hanoi radio station and three airfields on Hanoi’s outskirts (Hua Lac, Kep, and Phuc Yen).349 The first wave of 129 B-52s included 54 G and 33 D models from Andersen Air Force Base and 42 D models from U-Tapao.350 The Wave I bombers from Andersen completed their prestrike refueling near the island of Luzon in the Philippines. Following this, they reported they had 20,000 pounds less fuel than they should have.351 This was the same amount needed as a reserve to return to Andersen. The Air Force responded by

349 Headquarters SAC/History Office, Chronology of SAC Participation in Linebacker II (Lincoln, NE: Offutt Air Force Base: SAC/History Office, August 12, 1973), 95–96; Boyne, LINEBACKER II, 55.
350 Ibid.
351 McCarthy, View From the Rock, 55-56.
ordering KC-135s from Kadena Air Base on Okinawa to conduct post target refueling. The same post target refueling missions were order for the second and third waves. The problem was the result of stronger than anticipated headwinds that increased the amount of fuel burned. Following this mission, all subsequent Andersen sorties carried orders for additional fuel for inbound waves.

Figure 38. B-52D cell during LINEBACKER II. Note that the B-52s have not yet spread to 500-foot vertical separation. Image Source: United States Air Force.

352 Ibid.
354 McCarthy, View From the Rock, 56.
The first wave hit at 7:45 p.m. local time. The second hit the same complexes at midnight and the third wave struck at 5 a.m. Fifteen minutes prior to the arrival of each wave, the ground attack and ECM aircraft swept in, attacking the MiG airfields, operating radars, SAM sites and jammed all of the enemy’s radio frequencies. Staff Sergeant Samuel Turner, a tail gunner on Brown 03 became the first tail gunner in B-52 history to down a MiG-21.

Figure 39. Gunner’s station on a B-52 D. Image source: United States Air Force.

355 Chronology of SAC Participation, 95-96.
356 Ibid.
358 Boyne, “LINEBACKER II,” 55.
All three waves plastered their targets. The NVA fired 200 SAMs, but there was no observed AAA fire and MiGs. Although AAA fire and MiGs were present, they made no serious attempts to attack these bombers. The first night’s attacks scored ninety-four percent hits on their targets. Three B-52s and one F-111 completely lost, with two more B-52s severely damaged. The loss rates were 2.3 percent, less than the anticipated loss of three percent.

Crew debriefings brought strong criticism toward the stringent use of World War II bomber formation tactics. The bomber stream stretched for seventy miles at the same altitudes over the same track. The crews also complained that although all cells used the same ingress and egress IPs and constant speed and altitudes, the PTT was the most dangerous part of the mission. By design, the BUFFs made a one hundred degree turn back over the target. This allowed the ground radars to get good images of the huge wing area and belly of the bombers because their internal ECM gear faced forward. Mission planners for the following day ignored the crews.

Figure 40. Briefing crews early in LINEBACKER II. Image Source: United States Air Force.

Day 2 – December 19, 1972

The mission for December 19 was the Thai Nguyen thermal power plant and Yen Vien rail yard complex using 93 B-52s. Time compression between missions from Andersen were tight. Changes could not be cleared for the first two days. As the Day 1 crews were debriefed, the Day 2 crews headed to their

359 McCarthy, View From the Rock, 65.
360 Tilford, Crosswinds, 165–66; Clodfelter, Limits of Air Power, 186; McCarthy, View From the Rock 50–64; Chronology of SAC Participation, 95-96.
361 McCarthy, View From the Rock, 65.
362 Ibid.
364 Ibid.
365 Ibid.
The crews had different targets, but every other facet remained the same except for the increase in inbound refueling amounts. The crews expressed concern of the identical mission tracks and altitudes. They were told under no circumstances were they to fly evasive maneuvers despite the SAM and AAA threat. The targets were very near the previous day’s locations and the PTT was identical. Colonel [later General] McCarthy told them that level flight for four minutes was necessary for accuracy and that evasive maneuvering would destroy the forward ECM jamming from each cell. "He [McCarthy] issued an unpopular warning that any 43rd Strategic Wing aircraft commander who disrupted cell integrity to evade SAMs would be considered for court martial." 

Figure 41. Day 2 mission target data, course, jamming, and WAVE tracks. Source: commons.wikimedia.org.

No changes in the plan were permitted until the first wave dropped their bombs on target. Then, and only then, were minor changes instituted. The cells still had to remain as a cohesive unit without evading SAMs. Every aspect of SAC training told these crews that if the bomb bay doors were to be opened a certain number of seconds before target, then that was gospel. The crews, now using conventional ordnance and flying in formation over SAM rich territory, squabbled over how early to open bomb bay doors before release. They were concerned that in the line up to target and the PTT, SAM missileers would have an

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367 McCarthy, View From the Rock, 67.
368 Ibid.
370 McCarthy, View From the Rock, 68.
easier time aiming at the massive wings and bellies of the BUFFs. This was especially true when the bomb bay doors were open and the cavernous bay filled with irregularly shaped bombs would offer enhanced returns on the SAM ground radar screens.\textsuperscript{371}

The NVA again fired about 200 SAMs at the bombers. Many of these were in volleys in hopes of hitting multiple aircraft and destroying cohesion within the formations.\textsuperscript{372} Two more BUFFs were damaged but none were lost. With no losses on the second night, CINCSAC decided to keep with the successful model of the first two days, rather than creating a new attack plan.\textsuperscript{373} Mission planners believed that the North Vietnamese ground defenders had not recognized or defined the routing sequence for the raids and, knowing that change orders took valuable time, they prepared for the third day of raids using the same routes.\textsuperscript{374} This was a ghastly mistake and the aircrews would pay dearly for it.

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\textbf{Figure 42.} SAM fragment damage on the pilot’s “cheek” window during LINEBACKER II. Image Source: United States Air Force.
\end{center}

\textbf{Day 3 – December 20, 1972}

Day three missions were composites of the first two days. The bombers were to strike the Kinh No petroleum oil and lubricant (POL) storage complex, the Yen Vien rail yard, the Thai Nguyen thermal power plant, and the Yen Vien rail yard complex. The planes approached from a narrow corridor from the northwest toward Hanoi.\textsuperscript{375} During the prestrike briefing, some of the crews suggested making a slight PTT

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{371} McCarthy, \textit{View From the Rock}, 74.
\item \textsuperscript{372} Teixeira, “Linebacker II,” 14.
\item \textsuperscript{373} McCarthy, \textit{View From the Rock}, 77.
\item \textsuperscript{374} Clodfelter, “Nixon and the Air Weapon,” 179.
\item \textsuperscript{375} Teixeira, “Linebacker II,” 14.
\end{itemize}
and head straight for the Gulf of Tonkin to the safety of the Navy Task Force 77. According to Colonel McCarthy, the mission orders arrived late, coming from SAC headquarters at Offutt Air Force Bases. This created problems with the tactical support aircraft orders while SAC, TAC, Navy, and Marine commanders sorted out last minute changes.

Figure 43. Soviet built Surface to Air Missile (SAM)-2 in 1968. Image Source; Marc Riboud.

The North Vietnamese gunners learned their lessons from the two previous days. Although some sources disagree, the SAM crews tended to let the first cell pass overhead or nearby and concentrate on Cells Two and Three, and later waves. MiGs seemed timid. Rather than attacking the B-52s, they

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376 McCarthy, View From the Rock, 79.
377 Ibid.
378 Ibid.
Figure 44. The classic “Star of David” pattern of a SAM site. Note the missiles loaded in each of the six launch sites. Image Source: National Museum of the United States Air Force.

Figure 45. Detail of a SAM battery showing one of the launch sites and the ground radar installation. Image Source: United States Air Force and Air Power Australia.
shadowed them, providing airspeed and altitude information. The AAA and SAM gunner could then estimate where to fire their weapons, as the BUFSs had to fly straight and level for four long minutes or when and where they would execute their PTT. The ground defenses claimed four B-52G models and two B-52 D models destroyed and another B-52D seriously damaged.

President Nixon became livid when he heard of the losses on Day 3. He “raised holy hell about the fact that [B-52s] kept going over the same targets at the same times.” General Meyer, too late, recognized the errors of his ways. The B-52s were the highest profile nuclear bombers in the arsenal. New orders were cut on December 22 for the December 24th and 26th missions.

All the B-52Gs lost on Day 3 had not been modified or upgraded with new ECM systems. Four of the downed bombers and one heavily-damaged BUFF were hit following bomb release. Despite the great damage they inflicted upon their targets, a new plan must be formulated quickly. The B-52s could not continue with these tactics. Day 3 ended the first phase of LINEBACKER II. The next phase would bring different results.

Post-strike reconnaissance photos clearly showed that none of the SAM sites engaged had spare missiles. General Meyer had his planners target SAM sites and their storage areas in and near the inbound and outbound corridors. General Meyer also moved mission planning to Guam under General Johnson. SAM sites and storage dumps became the new primary targets. The missions beginning the day after would avoid Hanoi and its environs and target the Port of Haiphong, but that was two days away.

Day 4 – December 21, 1972

General Meyer listened to the crews’ concerns after the aircraft losses of Day 3. Changes were made operations and tactics. Gone were bomber streams seventy miles long with cells flying lock-step to those ahead of them. Gone too were 90 to 100 plane raids. World War II tactics did not work in the modern environment of SAM missiles, sophisticated ground radar, and MiG interceptors.

Meyer and his planners reduced the number of B-52s engaged to thirty. While they worked on the complicated logistics, thirty U-Tapao BUFSs conducted the missions that day. No complicated air-to-air refueling was necessary and the mission length was four hours. Crew briefings and debriefings garnered valuable input for the Day 4 missions:

There was finally unanimous agreement that tactics and routes should be varied so that the enemy defenders could not establish a pattern and predict routes of flight or altitudes. Several suggested changes were already in effect for the Day 4 strikes. Release time

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381 McCarthy, View From the Rock, 63
383 Clodfelter, “Nixon and the Air Weapon,” 179; and McCarthy, Allison, and Rayfield, 121.
388 Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power, 187; Chronology of SAC Participation in Linebacker II, 153–59, 185–86
389 Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power, 187:
390 Supplemental History on Linebacker II (18-29), iv. ff.
intervals between cells were compressed from ten to four minutes and then again to 90 seconds. Base altitude and altitude between cells were changed. Also, for the first time, the cells attacking Hanoi were to fly on across the high threat area without making the PTT, thereby flying “feet wet” to the Gulf of Tonkin for egress routing. Target selection for the bombing campaign was initially focused on maximum psychological and logistic impact. Now, with greater concern for the losses of Day 3, something had to be done about the SAMs. SAM storage sites finally became a prime target. 391

**Figure 46.** A KC-135 Tanker sits at the end of the runway at U-Tapao while a B-52D returns from a LINEBACKER II mission. Image Source: United States Air Force.

The thirty B-52Ds from U-Tapao were assigned three targets near Hanoi, six to Quang Te airfield, twelve to the Ven Dien supply depot, and twelve to the Bac Mai airfield/storage area. 392 The Quang Te and Ven Dien sorties dropped their bombs with many SAMfirings, but no damage to the aircraft. However, the Bac Mai BUFFs had equipment problems with the lead aircraft’s bombing radar failing, necessitating a reordering of the cell. 393 Scarlet One (the call sign for the lead aircraft) switched positions with Scarlet Two and moved back to trail Scarlet Three. Scarlet Three suffered another malfunction when its critical jammer overloaded and failed. 394 The plane was then perfectly visible to the ground radars. The SAM batteries near the airfield launched four missiles – the first two missed and the second pair hit the bomber. 395

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393 Ibid.
394 Ibid.
395 Ibid.
The next cell’s leader, Blue One, was hit by a salvo of six SAMs with only thirty seconds before bomb release. Remarkably, the crew was able to eject. Although most of the crew were wounded, they all lived to survive the war. All targets were struck within 15 minutes, a significant change from previous missions, with excellent bombing results. During Day 4, seventy-five tactical aircraft were in support.

On a tragic note, one of the downed B-52’s bombs fell on the Bac Mai hospital, causing extensive damage. Twenty-five staff members were killed, including fifteen nurses. The patients had been evacuated just prior to the Hanoi raids. The North Vietnamese made the damage into a huge public relations bonanza.

![Maintainers work the outboard engines of a B-52D at Guam during LINEBACKER II. Image Source: United States Air Force.](image)

**Figure 47.** Maintainers work the outboard engines of a B-52D at Guam during LINEBACKER II. Image Source: United States Air Force.

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396 Harder, *Flying from the Black Hole*, 229.
397 Ibid.
399 Boyne, “LINEBACKER II,” 55.
**Figure 48.** Post-strike reconnaissance bomb damage assessment (BDA) image of the Day 4 strike taken the following day. Image Source: United States Air Force.
Day 5 – December 22, 1972

General Meyer gave orders concerning tactical changes to his planners on December 22nd for implementation on December 26. The Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Air Forces) sent a message to the Seventh Air Force that “Events of the past four days produced significant B-52 losses which obviously are not acceptable on a continuing basis... Vary B-52 flight altitudes with the chaff corridor on ingress. Change release altitudes and the ingress/egress headings on a daily basis.” The plans for next three days were to target rail yards and POL storage facilities.

Again, thirty B-52s from U-Tapao carried out the missions. The cells feinted attacks against Hanoi and then turning, diverted on Haiphong. Each route and altitude was different. All thirty B-52 approached and egressed over water at Haiphong, entering from the south but split into three tracks to approach their targets. Each of the three aircraft components split again, then finally approach six separate targets, “staggered in time, distance, and altitude.”

The SAM gunners were further confused due to F-4s spreading extensive chaff corridors and Navy aircraft using smart bombs on the SAM complexes to keep their Fan Song radars down. The F-4s used a different technique than that employed in LINEBACKER I. During LINEBACKER I, an F-4 would begin dispense chaff on a run-in to the Radar site, then turn roughly one hundred degrees away from the radar while the aircraft was directly overhead. The chaff stream continued through the entire maneuver. This was thought to spread more chaff unevenly to confuse the gunners. The F-4s used a different technique during sorties in LINEBACKER II. The chaff cloud was concentrated directly over the Fan Song radar unit, making it thicker and more difficult to “burn through.” As long as the winds were calm, the chaff gave the bombers a greater chance of attacking the target unless the ground gunners fired wildly, which they often did. The NVA launched forty-three SAMs, much less than one-quarter of the previous days’ efforts. The attack plan overwhelmed the Haiphong defenders. The plan worked. Only one B-52 damaged, one destroyed, and an F-111 was shot down over the Kinh No Railroad complex.

403 Message (U), 221935Z DEC 72, AFSSO PACAF, to Seventh Air Force, December 22, 1972; Message (U), 222020Z DEC 72, CINCSAC, to CINCPACAF, December 22, 1972.
404 Harder, Flying from the Black Hole, 230.
407 Ibid.
408 Ibid.
410 Momyer, Air Power in Three Wars, 147.
411 George R. Jackson, Linebacker II – An Examination of Strategic Use of Airpower (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air War College, n.d.), 41-42.

Day 6 – December 23, 1972

The mission planners had another surprise in store for the North Vietnamese. Rather than striking targets in and around Hanoi and Haiphong, the mission for night of December 23 attacked the Lang Dang railyards north of Haiphong and three SAM sites close to the Chinese border near the Chinese buffer zone established by the Johnson Administration.413

Figure 51. Hanoi’s principal railyard north of Hanoi. Image Source: United States Air Force.

413 Harder, Flying from the Black Hole, 230.
The force mix for Day 6 included eighteen B-52Ds from U-Tapao and twelve from Andersen. Most Seventh Air Force tactical aircraft raids were canceled by inclement weather. Using B-52s against SAM sites offered different problems than the crews had experienced so far during LINEBACKER II. The bombers had to fly directly over the SAM sites to hit them. Their normal three-ship cell using ECM protection was dramatically reduced. For this strike only, the bomber cells split up into separate aircraft. The first aircraft of each cell would strike the same targets, and the same with the second and third aircraft. Enemy gunners were holding back and ‘going to school’ on the first cells so that they could zero in on follow-on cells. Hopefully,

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414 Harder, *Flying from the Black Hole*, 230.
415 Head, *War From Above the Clouds*, 80; Eschmann, *The Role of Tactical Air Support*, 81-82.
by the time the SAM sites realized they were the targets, it would be raining bombs. After bombs away, the cells intermingled at various altitudes and maneuvered using small changes in heading. The combination of no pre-strike activity, a feint attack on Hanoi and last minute turn toward their targets caught the North Vietnamese gunners off-guard.\textsuperscript{417} The North Vietnamese gunners only fired five SAMs and the B-52s received no damage.\textsuperscript{418}

\textbf{Day 7 – December 24, 1972}

The U-Tapao B-52Ds conducted all sorties on Day 7 and, again, for the fourth consecutive day, thirty BUFFs were launched.\textsuperscript{419} The North Vietnamese had no idea from where the bombers would come; they simply knew that they would. The mission planners decided to return to the routes used on the first three days, flying northwest out of Laos.\textsuperscript{420} The targets were the Thai Nguyen and Kep Rail yards and the Haiphong Thermal Power Plant West.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{north_vietnamese_major_rail_system.png}
\end{figure}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[417] Teixeira, “Linebacker II,” 19.
\item[418] McCarthy, \textit{View From the Rock}, 107-111.
\item[419] Harder, \textit{Flying from the Black Hole}, 231.
\item[420] Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
Figure 54. Bomb damage assessment of Haiphong Thermal Power Plant West following the raid on December 24, 1972. Image Source: United States Air Force.
The bombers arrived from the northwest, splitting into two waves on a southerly track. The B-52s then used multiple vectors to approach the targets. This maneuver allowed all of the aircraft to complete their bombing runs within ten minutes. Both waves split into two formations again as they executed the PTT and then vectored in different headings. No bombers were lost during this mission; however, flak from AAA hit one BUFF, the only occurrence of hit of this kind during LINEBACKER II. Two cells were engaged by MiGs during this mission. Airman First Class Moore shot down a MiG when he crossed too close behind one of the BUFFs. This was the second and final confirmed kill by a tail gunner.

Following yet another successful mission with no bomber losses, politics came back into play. President Nixon sent a message to Hanoi requesting a meeting on January 3. If they accepted, he promised to halt bombing north of the 20th parallel on December 31 and continue this commitment while talks continued. As a goodwill gesture, the President announced a 36-hour bombing halt during Christmas. Hanoi refused any response, but used the respite to reposition and resupply. President Nixon resumed the bombing on December 26.

**Day 8 – December 26, 1972**

December 26 saw a return to the massive raid structure of the first days of LINEBACKER II. In an early version of what would be called “Shock and Awe,” 120 B-52s struck ten targets, all within fifteen minutes. Four waves comprised of 72 BUFFs hit four targets in and near Hanoi from four different directions. Additionally, another eighteen B-52s plastered the Thai Nguyen again. At the same time two other waves, each of fifteen bombers, attacked Haiphong simultaneously from the east and west. Accompanying the big bombers were 114 tactical aircraft. F-4s flew MiGCap and dispensed clouds of chaff, while F-105 Wild Weasels hit SAM sites when they turned on their Fran Song Radars. F-111s and Navy Vought A-7s pummeled airfields while Navy and Marine F-4s flew MiGCAP and BARCAP (Barrier Combat Air Patrols to protect the fleet).

The North Vietnamese fired volleys of SAMs, downing two B-52s. Day 8 was the largest effort in LINEBACKER II. It was evident that Hanoi could not withstand much more of this pounding. Shortly after the aircraft were recovered, the North Vietnamese told Washington that they were ready to resume talks between Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho on January 2. The agreed not to reopen any positions already discussed and resolved. President Nixon agreed not to bomb north of the 20th parallel once the BNorth followed through on these promises.

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421 Teixeira, “Linebacker II,” 20
422 Ibid.
423 Harder, *Flying from the Black Hole*, 231.
424 Ibid.
426 Head, *War From Above the Clouds*, 83.
427 Ibid.
428 Ibid.
429 Ibid.
430 Boyne, “LINEBACKER II,” 56.
431 Ibid.
433 Ibid.
Figure 55. A B-52D Big Belly being re-armed at Andersen Air Force Base on Guam during LINEBACKER II. Image Source: United States Air Force.

Figure 56. Loading bombs on one of the wing pylons of a B-52D during LINEBACKER II. Image Source: United States Air Force.
Figure 57. A Republic F-15 Wild Weasel configuration. Note WW designation on the tail. These elite crews were the deadly mongoose to the SAM cobras. Image Source: United States Air Force.

Figure 58. A General Dynamics F-111 and a Vought A-7 during LINEBACKER II. Image Source: Boyne, LINBACKER II, 56. Photo credit: Ed Skowron via Warren Thompson.

Figure 60. Mission profiles of the December 26 raids illustrating specific mission components. Source: commons.wikimedia.org.
Day 9 – December 27, 1972

Day 9 featured thirty B-52s from Andersen and thirty from U-Tapao. Twenty-one were G models and thirty-nine were D models.435 The targets were three SAM sites near Hanoi, the Van Dien supply depot and the Lang Dang, Duc Noi, and Trung Quang rail yards.436 “General Meyer [still stinging from the rebuke from the President], CINCSAC, wanted to ensure that the SAM sites were destroyed as quickly as possible, even if it meant using Stratofortresses to do it. He was still feeling pressure associated with the loss of our strategic bombers, and was being pressed into what was, to him, a violation of basic air doctrine.”437 SAC planners, headed by General Meyer, violated this doctrine during the first three days of LINEBACKER II at great cost from inappropriate use of B-52s and the loss of their crews.

Figure 61. Bomb damage assessment, from the raid of December 27, of the Gia Lam Railyard from F-4 and F-105F Hunter-Killer teams destroyed a SAM site near the yard in Hanoi. B-52s hit rail targets further from the city center. Image Source: United States Air Force.

435 Harder, Flying from the Black Hole, 237.
436 Ibid.
437 McCarthy, View From the Rock, 150.
One of the first commandments for the employment of strategic air power is to initially destroy enemy air defenses and gain air superiority. Military and industrial targets can then be struck with little loss to the attacker.\footnote{McCarthy, \textit{View From the Rock}, 145; Teixeira, “Linebacker II,” 23.}

The North Vietnamese decided one more attempt at firing volleys of SAMs, which downed two B-52s. Of the two stricken BUFFs was able to stay in the air long enough to return to U-Tapao. The crew made it back to the main runway, attempted to land, then went nose up and crashed.\footnote{Michel, \textit{The 11 Days of Christmas}, 197-99.}

The bomber passed Charlie tower at eye-level, traveling so slowly that [Colonel Bill Maxon, commander of U-Tapao’s maintenance wing] Maxon knew with a sinking feeling it was about to stall about 150 feet above the ground and with no runway left ahead of it. ‘I simply cannot describe the horror I felt as I saw the wing navigation lights starting to rotate as the aircraft stalled, rolled and crashed upside down just off the end of the runway. After hours of struggle on the part of the aircrew to bring this shot up ‘bird’ back home safely, after all of the efforts by those of us on the ground to save her, we had lost. I had seen B-52s and other aircraft crash before, but never had I felt such anguish and helplessness and despair for the valiant crew.’\footnote{Ibid., 199.}

Both aircraft lost were D models flying as part of two-ship cells because one member of their three ship-cell had to abort en route.\footnote{Teixeira, “Linebacker II,” 22.} Flight orders were that if one aircraft dropped out of formation, the other two would join with the cell in front of them and form a five-ship cell.\footnote{McCarthy, \textit{View From the Rock}, 145.} Neither were able to join the larger formation.

\textbf{Day 10 – December 28, 1972}

The North Vietnamese agreed to President Nixon’s demands to continue preliminary talks between Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho. The talks were to set to resume on January 2, 1973. These demands included not reopening any previously resolved topics. Nixon promised to cease bombing north of the 20th parallel, contingent on strict adherence to his demands. Nixon forcefully told Hanoi that time was running out.\footnote{Chronology of SAC Participation in Linebacker II, 122; Tilford, \textit{Crosswinds}, 168–69; Clodfelter, \textit{The Limits of Air Power}, 188–89; Clodfelter, “Nixon and the Air Weapon,” 179–80.} The President then ordered a bombing halt of all missions north of the 20th parallel to commence thirty-six hours later at 7 p.m. Washington time on December 29th. Until then, there were two more bombing missions to run.

The targets on Day 10 were essentially a repeat of Day 9: Three SAM sites and rail facilities. Sixty B-52s and 99 support aircraft hammered the targets.\footnote{Teixeira, “Linebacker II,” 22.} Captain John R. Allen later reported that “By the tenth day there were no missiles, there were no MiGs, there was no AAA—there was no threat. It was easy pickings.”\footnote{McCarthy, \textit{View From the Rock}, 145.}

Although the BUFFs could and did bomb in all kinds of weather, most of the SAM sites remained intact because these tactical aircraft could not visually spot them. Throughout the whole course of

\footnote{McCarthy, \textit{View From the Rock}, 145; Teixeira, “Linebacker II,” 23.}
\footnote{Michel, \textit{The 11 Days of Christmas}, 197-99.}
\footnote{Ibid., 199.}
\footnote{Teixeira, “Linebacker II,” 22.}
\footnote{McCarthy, \textit{View From the Rock}, 145.}
\footnote{Chronology of SAC Participation in Linebacker II, 122; Tilford, \textit{Crosswinds}, 168–69; Clodfelter, \textit{The Limits of Air Power}, 188–89; Clodfelter, “Nixon and the Air Weapon,” 179–80.}
\footnote{Teixeira, “Linebacker II,” 25.}
\footnote{Clodfelter, \textit{The Limits of Air Power}, 189.}
LINEBACKER II, there were only twelve hours of good daylight visual bombing weather in twelve days.\textsuperscript{446}

Rather than the straight-ahead tactics of the previous nine days of missions, the formations returned to their SAC training, weaving and crisscrossing their paths. This aerial ballet required some cells and waves to execute flyovers while others executed sharp PTTs.\textsuperscript{447} All aircraft executed simultaneous initial Times On Target (TOT) and twenty-seven bombers flew (at different altitudes) within five miles of each other.\textsuperscript{448}

\textbf{Figure 62.} Briefing crews early in LINEBACKER II. Image Source: United States Air Force.

\textbf{Day 11 – December 29, 1972}

The missions for Day 11 mirrored those of the previous day. Sixty B-52s with 102 support aircraft attacked their targets in three waves, each with cells. Release times were coordinated and the bomb releases were simultaneous. The approach in to the targets were identical to Day 10.\textsuperscript{449} The NVA gunners had

\textsuperscript{446} Hearings Before Sub-Committees of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 93rd Congress (Tuesday, January 18, 1973) (Washington, GP0, 1973), 4.
\textsuperscript{447} Teixeira, “Linebacker II,” 25.
\textsuperscript{448} McCarthy, View From the Rock, 155-59.
\textsuperscript{449} Teixeira, “Linebacker II,” 26.
already launched almost all their missiles. On Day 11, only twenty-three SAMs were fired at the BUFS. No aircraft were damaged and all returned safely.

After all aircraft were recovered, CINCPAC received orders to terminate all military activity north of the 20th parallel that day, and President Nixon announced the resumption of the Paris peace talks.

TABLES

Table 6. LINEBACKER II targets. Source PACAF, table from Walter Boyne, “LINEBACKER II,” 52.

![Table 6. LINEBACKER II targets. Source PACAF, table from Walter Boyne, “LINEBACKER II,” 52.]

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450 McCarthy, View From the Rock, 155-59.
451 Teixeira, “Linebacker II,” 26
Table 7. LINEBACKER II sorties. Source Walter Boyne, “LINEBACKER II, 54.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day/Date</th>
<th>B-52 Attack</th>
<th>SEAD</th>
<th>CAP/Escort</th>
<th>Chaff</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1: Dec. 18</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>231</td>
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<td>2: Dec. 19</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>197</td>
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<tr>
<td>3: Dec. 20</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: Dec. 21</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>75</td>
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<tr>
<td>5: Dec. 22</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>87</td>
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<td>6: Dec. 23</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>58</td>
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<td>7: Dec. 24</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>84</td>
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<tr>
<td>8: Dec. 26</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>195</td>
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<td>9: Dec. 27</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>32</td>
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<td>10: Dec. 28</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>118</td>
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<td>11: Dec. 29</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>741</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>1,510</td>
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</table>

Of 741 planned B-52 sorties, 12 were aborted. The Air Force SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses) mission was carried out by F-105, F-4C, and F-4E fighters. CAP (combat air patrol), escort, and chaff dispersal were carried out by numerous types. In addition, US Navy and US Marine aircraft flew a total of 277 night support sorties in A-6, A-7, and F-4 aircraft.

Table 8. LINEBACKER II losses. Source Walter Boyne, “LINEBACKER II, 57.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Call Sign</th>
<th>Target (Mission)</th>
<th>Cause</th>
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<td>Hanoi Radio</td>
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<td>B-52G</td>
<td>Charcoal 01</td>
<td>Yen Vien complex</td>
<td>SA-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 18</td>
<td>B-52G</td>
<td>Peach 02</td>
<td>Yen Vien complex</td>
<td>SA-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>B-52G</td>
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<td>Quilt 03</td>
<td>Yen Vien complex</td>
<td>SA-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 20</td>
<td>B-52G</td>
<td>Brass 02</td>
<td>Yen Vien complex</td>
<td>SA-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 20</td>
<td>B-52G</td>
<td>Orange 03</td>
<td>Yen Vien complex</td>
<td>SA-2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec. 20</td>
<td>B-52G</td>
<td>Straw 02</td>
<td>Gia Lam rail yard</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 20</td>
<td>B-52G</td>
<td>Olive 01</td>
<td>Kinh No complex</td>
<td>SA-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 20</td>
<td>B-52G</td>
<td>Tan 03</td>
<td>Kinh No complex</td>
<td>SA-2</td>
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<td>B-52D</td>
<td>Scarlet 03</td>
<td>Bac Mai airfield</td>
<td>SA-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>B-52D</td>
<td>Blue 01</td>
<td>Bac Mai airfield</td>
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Source: Pacific Air Forces
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### DAY 2
December 19, 1972

#### OV 20
Da Nang, South Vietnam

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### DAY 3
December 20, 1972

#### B-52
Beale AFB, CA; Andersen AFB, Guam

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### B-52
Loring AFB, MA; Andersen AFB, Guam

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<td>307th SW</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Deputy Airborne Commander</td>
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<td>Co-Pilot</td>
<td>Capt. George B. Lockhart</td>
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<td>Radar Navigator</td>
<td>Major Bobby A. Kirby</td>
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<td>Navigator</td>
<td>1st Lt. Charles E. Darr</td>
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**A-6**

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**DAY**

December 21, 1972

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<tr>
<td>Pilot</td>
<td>Capt. Peter J. Giroux</td>
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<td>Capt. Thomas W. Bennet, Jr</td>
<td>KIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Radar Navigator</td>
<td>Lt Col. Gerald W. Alley</td>
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**B-52**

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**A-6**

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<td>Capt. Joel Ray Birch</td>
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December 22, 1972

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<td>1st Lt. William W. Wilson</td>
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**DAY 6**
December 23, 1972

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**AC-130**
16th SOW
Ubon, Thailand

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**F-111**
429th TFS
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VMFA-333,
USS America
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<td>Major H.S. Carr</td>
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<td>Major George Frederick Sasser</td>
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<td>Capt. William Robert Baldwin</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Major Henry James Repeta</td>
<td>KIA</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capt. Charles Francis Riess</td>
<td>POW</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capt. Paul Vernon Jackson, III</td>
<td>KIA</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Major Nutter J. Wimbrow, III</td>
<td>KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAY</td>
<td>Capt. Robert J. Morris, Jr.</td>
<td>KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAY</td>
<td>1st Lt. Robert M. Hudson</td>
<td>POW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAY</td>
<td>Capt. Michael H. LaBeau</td>
<td>POW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAY</td>
<td>1st Lt. Duane P. Vavrock</td>
<td>POW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAY</td>
<td>Major Nutter J. Wimbrow, III</td>
<td>KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAY</td>
<td>TSgt. James R. Cook</td>
<td>POW</td>
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<td>1st Lt. Duane P. Vavrock</td>
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**DAY 7**

**December 24, 1972**

**A-7**

353rd TFS, 354th TFW

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<td>Capt. Paul Vernon Jackson, III</td>
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**DAY 8**

**December 26, 1972**

**B-52**

49th BW, 307th SW

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<tr>
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<td>Capt. Michael H. LaBeau</td>
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<tr>
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**B-52**

22nd BW, 307th SW

**D**

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**DAY 9**

December 27, 1972

**B-52 D**

7th BW, Mather AFB, CA; March AFB, CA; Andersen AFB, Guam

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<td>Co-Pilot</td>
<td>Capt. Samuel B. Cusimano</td>
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<td>Radar Navigator</td>
<td>Major James C. Condon</td>
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<td>Navigator</td>
<td>1st Lt. Ben L. Fryer</td>
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<td>EWO</td>
<td>Major Allen L Johnson</td>
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**B-52 D**

28th BW, Ellsworth AFB, SD; Carswell AFB, TX; Utapao, Thailand

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<tr>
<td>Radar Navigator</td>
<td>Capt. William E. North</td>
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<td>Navigator</td>
<td>1st Lt. William L. Robinson</td>
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**F-4 E**

13th TFS, Udorn, Thailand

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**HH-53**

40th

Nakon Phnom, Thailand

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<td>AC</td>
<td>Rick Shapiro</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co-Pilot</td>
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<td>Chuck Rouhier</td>
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<td>PJ</td>
<td>John Carlson</td>
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<td>Robert Jones</td>
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<td>Photographer</td>
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**F-4E**

Udorn AB, Thailand

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VMA (AW)-533, Mag-15, Udorn AB, Thailand

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**DAY**

December 28, 1972

**RA-5C**

RVAH-13, USS Enterprise

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**DAY**

December 29, 1972

**EA-6**

VMCJ-2, NAS Cubi Point, Philippines

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<td>Co-Pilot</td>
<td>MSgt. Frederick E. Killebres</td>
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CHAPTER 7
Consequences and Changes in Strategic Thought

Operation LINEBACKER II, like any major military operation, has been discussed, researched, dissected, argued over, written about, and judged for its worth. Forty-five years after the 11-Day operation, scholars still find it worthy of contemplation. Several questions are at the forefront of LINEBACKER II’s legacy. Was it successful? Could the war have been ended earlier without LINEBACKER II? Did it matter considering the political climate at home and abroad? What changes did it bring about in strategic thinking? Was Air Force doctrine influenced by the campaign? Where does the campaign fit in the study the history of aerial warfare? Was the campaign influential in later operations, even today? What were the lessons learned and legacies from LINEBACKER II? This essay will sample the literature and attempt to both answer some of these questions and, hopefully, will shed new light on the legacy of Operation LINEBACKER II.

Was LINEBACKER II successful?

Operation LINEBACKER II was successful on the three primary fronts: political, economic, and military. Politically, it forced the North Vietnamese to return to the negotiating table in Paris with no stalling tactics and assured they would come to terms quickly. Finally, after nine years of micromanagement from two presidents, The Air Force was allowed conduct a full-scale conventional air war. It fit in well with the lessons of history, particularly strategic bombing in Europe and the Pacific in World War II.

LINEBACKER II was “a classic example of the use of a well-planned and executed military operation to achieve a political goal.”452 The relaxation of Rules of Engagement (ROE) allowed the war to be taken to the enemy’s heartland, without excessive civilian casualties, and “overwhelm the enemy’s military and industrial complex, and, thus, its will to continue the war.”453

Economically, as former Presidential advisor and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger described, “Linebacker II cost much less than the continuation of the war, which was the other alternative.”454 Speaking of the economics and political implications of continuing the war, Kissinger added:

Any other course would almost certainly have witnessed an endless repetition of the tactics of December. Faced with the prospect of an open-ended war and continued bitter divisions, considering that the weather made the usual bombing ineffective, Nixon chose the only weapon he had available. His decision speeded the end of the war; even in retrospect I can think of no other measure that would have.455

With prior artificial, sometimes arbitrary, geographic constrictions placed upon American airpower, LINEBACKER II enforced the primary tenant of strategic warfare: it imposed an irrevocable change in the will of the North Vietnamese to continue the war. It became too costly for them to continue.456 Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp quoted Sir Robert Thomson, the former chief of the British Advisory Mission to Vietnam concerning success of LINEBACKER II:

453 Harris, “The Linebacker Campaigns,” 23.
455 Kissinger, White House Years, 1461.

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In my view, on Dec 30, 1972, after 11 days of B-52 attacks on Hanoi area, you had won the war. It was over! They had fired 1,242 SAM’s; they had none left save for a mere trickle which would come in from China. They and their whole rear base at that point were at your mercy. They would have taken any terms. And that is why, of course, you actually got a peace agreement in January, which you had not been able to get in October.\textsuperscript{457}

One view that is not often mentioned is that of Soviet advisors on location in North Vietnam during LINEBACKER II. The most important of these was Colonel-General Anatoliy Ivanovich Khyupenen, who arrived in Hanoi in 1972 to direct the Soviet air defense advisory effort.\textsuperscript{458} Colonel-General Khyupenen directed the after-action report entitled \textit{Combat Actions of the Air Defense Forces and Air Forces of the Vietnamese Peoples’ Army in December 1972}.\textsuperscript{459} Although most statistical information came from the North the Vietnamese, the observational remarks are strikingly accurate.

Operation “Linebacker-2” began on the evening of 18 December 1972 as US aviation simultaneously struck all the principle fighter airbases of the air forces of the DRVN. Throughout the years, the large collection of B-52 strategic bombers conducted the initial combat strike, which developed into the primary combat strike. Participating in the operation were all the B-52 strategic bombers located at Andersen airbase on the island of Guam and at U Tapao airbase in Thailand.\textsuperscript{460}

It must be noted that the B-52s were used only during nighttime, their actions were thoroughly planned and they were supported by a significant force of fighters providing cover for the strike force, sealing the airbases, suppressing the air defenses with ordnance and radio-electronic combat and also conducting observation of the airspace over the territory of the DRVN.\textsuperscript{461}

Thus, operation “Linebacker-2” planned for the use of massed B-52s, so the American command had to thoroughly organize and support their combat actions. The essence of the combat use of the strategic bombers included: mass force for the strikes; attach tactical aviation for combat support of the B-52s; carefully select the targets; the times to inflict the strikes and the flight routes; use massed electronic combat means.\textsuperscript{462}

Massing force to inflict strikes on targets in the DRVN during the operation dictated the necessity of achieving important military-political goals in a short time. Characteristically, up until December 1972, the significant bombing attacks on targets in

\textsuperscript{457} Ibid.


\texttt{www.dtic.mil/dtic/aulimp/citations/gsa/2007_117432/142557.html}


\textsuperscript{460} Drenkowski and Grau, “Patterns and Predictability,” 4.

\textsuperscript{461} Ibid. DRVN refers to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam).

\textsuperscript{462} Ibid.
the DRVN involved only a single B-52 or a small group, while the massed strikes by strategic aviation were carried out only in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia where it was necessary for the American command to disrupt the preparations of the patriotic forces of liberation and to conduct powerful offensive operations against them. \(^{463}\)

The second characteristic peculiar to the use of B-52s was the careful thought and excellent organization of the combat support by tactical aviation. The combat formation of aviation in a mass raid consisted of strike groups of B-52 bombers, groups for passive ECM and blocking airfields, groups for finding and suppressing air defenses and groups to provide direct cover against Vietnamese fighters. The B-52 combat formation, as a rule, consisted of a “column of squadrons” (from two to seven), separated by a time interval of five to seven minutes. \(^{464}\)

The combat support group constituted 60-70% of the aircraft participating in the raid. Tactical aviation, supporting the strategic bomber raid, provided uninterrupted cover of the B-52 formations throughout their entire flight over the DRVN, particularly during strikes on Hanoi, Hai Phong and targets in the central provinces. F-4 and F-105 fighters, based in Ubon and Udorn, Thailand were attached for this mission. They joined the bomber groups over Laos near the city of Sam Neua. The primary mission of the F-105 was to find and suppress air defense systems along the B-52 flight path and in the strike area. F-4 fighters provided direct cover to every B-52 detachment and they flew close to the B-52 combat formations. \(^{465}\)

The third characteristic particular to the use of strategic aviation in these operations was the careful selection of the B-52 flight path, the direction of approach to the target and the delivery of the strike. The B-52 flight from U Tapao and Andersen airbase merited particular attention. A B-52 from Andersen airbase carried a bomb load of nine-ten tons (27-29 bombs weighing 340 kilograms each) in the fuselage. The flight to the target passed through a refueling area which was located east of the Philippines. At check point “Lima” (150-200 kilometers southeast of Da Nang), the flight routes were divided with the objective of overcoming the weaker air defense systems of the DRVN. To breakthrough the air defenses from the southwest and west, the operational-tactical flight direction from checkpoint “Lima” proceeded west to the Mekong River, then north to Laos to the vicinity of Sam Neua, [195800 Latitude and 1044100 Longitude—translator] and then into the DRVN to the cities of Phu Tho, Yen Bai or Viet Chi (depending on the designated target and the selection of the combat course) and then the flight path went directly to the target. \(^{466}\)

In the majority of cases, the breakthrough of the air defenses occurred in the western and southwestern approaches, since it was a shorter approach to the target (particularly from U Tapao), using ground orientation. Having dropped their bombs, the B-52s withdrew over Laos (in the majority of cases) or over the Tonkin Gulf. If the bombers were returning to Andersen Airbase, they had to have a fuel reserve of 56 to 65 tons of fuel remaining after dropping their bombs. If it was necessary, they could conduct an aerial refueling at an altitude of 7000-7,500 meters and a speed of 680-720

\(^{463}\) Ibid.
\(^{464}\) Ibid., 5.
\(^{465}\) Ibid.
\(^{466}\) Ibid., 5-6.
kilometers/hour. A B-52 would take on an average of 20 tons of fuel during air refueling. The KC-135 aircraft was used for this mission.467

B-52 bombers flying from U Tapao flew over Korat when selecting the southeast breakthrough of the air defenses) or Vientiane and Sam Neua (when selecting the western or southwestern breakthrough of the air defenses). The time from takeoff to landing took 12-13 hours from Andersen Airbase and 4-5 hours from U Tapao Airbase. On the flight route, the B-52s averaged 840-870 kilometers/hour at an altitude of 10,000-11,000 meters. Some 60-70 kilometers from the objective, the B-52 detachment lay on a combat course assuming the height and speed that they would maintain until they released their bombs. Afterward, this course was immediately changed with a turn of not less than 40-50 degrees and the B-52s dropped chaff.468

The fourth characteristic particular to the use of strategic aircraft in these operations was the high level of use of radio-electronic combat employed by the American command. Without this radio-electronic combat, the slow-moving B-52s would have been a much easier target for the air defense missiles of the Vietnamese Peoples Army.469

Strategic bombers were also used for carrying out single strikes (using one or two detachments) against targets located south of the 20th parallel where the air defense system was weaker. These targets were primarily concentrations of troops and equipment at crossing points, on road marches and in assembly areas. Usually, the sorties for these missions were flown out of U Tapao airbase. The bombing was conducted from a horizontal plane from a height of 10,000-11,000 meters. The combat support, in this case, was simply direct cover by F-4s along the entire flight route and the staging of EB-66 aircraft for jamming which joined them temporarily over Laos and the Gulf of Tonkin.470

When flying the air route over the DRVN, the B-52s were covered by special groups of F-4s flying direct protection against the Vietnamese fighters. The F-4s flew 1,000-2,000 meters lower than the main strike groups. During the flight over the DRVN, the F-4s flew the “snake” anti-missile maneuver several times and, in the region of the B-52 strike, they moved 15-20 kilometers away from the formation. If they detected air defense missile battalions, radar companies or command posts, they bombed them, after which the F-4s re-occupied their positions in the formation.471

The airborne command post maintained two-way radio traffic with the B-52 raiding aircraft and also the covering F-4s and F-105s as they approached the link-up site. As the mission continued, it became one-way traffic between the airborne command post and the B-52 crews until they completed their mission and exited from DRVN airspace. The fighters providing direct cover used the navigation lights of the strategic bombers for orientation.472

467 Ibid., 6.
468 Ibid.
469 Ibid., 7.
470 Ibid.
471 Ibid., 9.
472 Ibid.
Colonel-General Khyupenen also pointed out weaknesses in Air Force procedures which aided the North Vietnamese in countering the B-52 strikes.\textsuperscript{473} He states, “the American command was able to reduce the effectiveness of the electronic equipment of the [People’s Army of Vietnam Anti-Aircraft Defenses].” However, “the jammers were turned on in the entire wave range before the [B-52s] approached the RT [Radar Troops] zones.”\textsuperscript{474} When the B-52 EWOs tested their ECM equipment at Andersen AFB and U-Tapao RTNAFB, the North Vietnamese assets saw giant blooms on their radar screens and that provided the warning of the coming missions.\textsuperscript{475} Later, the jammers were turned at the range the jammers would be effective and his would alert the missile and AAA batteries of when to expect the attacks.\textsuperscript{476} Khyupenen noted: “Premature switching on of EW equipment and continuous jamming (without taking into account the operating time of the target radar) enabled the PAVN’s electronic and air defense forces to detect B-52 strike groups in time, provide target acquisition data to the ADMF, and prepare the necessary initial firing data.”\textsuperscript{477} These practices were remedied after five of the LINEBACKER II campaign.

There are opposing opinions of the effectiveness of LINEBACKER II, of course. The most vocal is Kenneth P. Werrell, who asserts:

I disagree. First, the bombing of North Vietnam was fatally flawed by the lack of proper targets. Second, while political restrictions inhibited the airmen, inadequate tactics and equipment contributed significantly to the high losses and lack of results. Third, the bombing did not have decisive political/diplomatic results.\textsuperscript{478}

Werrell lists the gamut of thought from 1973 through 1987. He groups them by concepts.\textsuperscript{479}

The U.S. should have demanded its own terms as opposed to following the discussions from the previous October.\textsuperscript{480}

a. The U.S. could have used a LINEBACKER II type operation earlier to end the war much sooner.\textsuperscript{481}

b. The campaign was a “classic example” of using a military force to achieve a rapid end to hostilities.\textsuperscript{482}


\textsuperscript{474} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{475} Drenkowski and Grau, “Patterns and Predictability,” 12.

\textsuperscript{476} Khyupenen, “Organizatsiya VVS…” 36.

\textsuperscript{477} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{479} Ibid., 51.


c. The campaign was an exercise in futility: morally bankrupt, militarily ineffective, and diplomatically unnecessary. 483

d. The bombing alone brought the North Vietnamese back to the Paris peace talks. 484

At the end of his review Werrell cites his reasons for his beliefs:

Could bombing have been decisive? Those who believe so emphasize the lack of political will by the civilian decision makers, at least up until December 1972. These critics underestimate the power of public opinion in a democracy, both domestically and internationally, and clearly Johnson felt very much constrained in both areas. He also feared, with good reason, the reactions of the Russians and Chinese. Certainly political factors restricted American use of air power.

Nevertheless, strategic bombing of North Vietnam was unable to achieve decisive results for two other reasons. First and foremost, there were no vital strategic targets in the North, with the possible exception of people. Second, American airmen were neither adequately equipped nor tactically ready to carry out decisive nonnuclear operations. Linebacker II was not, and could not be, decisive in the Vietnam War. 485

Werrell’s comments are thoughtful and concerted, however, if strategic air power and tactical airpower were properly used early in the war, the outcome would most likely have yielded positive results. By not allowing the Air Force to do its job in 1964-1966, i.e. bombing the incipient military industrial complexes in and around Hanoi and Haiphong, making the lives of North Vietnamese citizens a nightmarish reality, and convincing the Russians and Chinese to stay out of it, the tables would be turned. The lack of strategic targets did not mean that there was nothing worth bombing north of the 20th parallel. His comments about aircrew training are well taken. SAC crews were solely trained in the nuclear mission role. Crews were forced into extremely short training cycles to learn or re-learn the lessons of World War II-style bombing missions.

Gregory S. Clark authored a paper for the Naval War College on LINEBACKER II. 486 In his “Linebacker II: Achieving Strategic Surprise,” he states:

We are analyzing Linebacker II as a military campaign. President Nixon clearly stated his political objective [ends]. Strategic airpower providing the [ways] of achieving this objective. Linebacker II was the plan that provided the [means] by which military

485 Werrell, 49-51.
power would be employed. The final [cost] was a two percent loss rate. The use of unrelenting and overwhelming force rapidly dominated the battle space producing the synergistic effects of “shock and awe” on Hanoi’s psyche. With the will of the people broken, air defense systems depleted, and the government demoralized, the Paris Accords were signed.487

SAC aircraft, including nuclear role attack aircraft, for example, the F-105 Thunderchief, were forced into missions they were not intended to conduct. They became excellent platforms. The B-52D models configured to the “Big Belly” allowed more internal bomb loads of conventional munitions. Without these rapid enhancements, the B-52s, lethal as they were, could not create the damage needed to thwart the elusive targets under the triple-canopy jungle cover.

Werrell’s comments about aircraft sent into battle without adequate upgrades also merit discussion. The B-52G models lost during the first three days of LINEBACKER II did not possess upgraded electronic warfare platforms. Aircraft there were deployed to assist the bombers sometimes caused inadvertent problems. Radio jamming aircraft, especially the EB-66s, designed to degrade the SAM Fan Song radars, also jammed American radio channels.488

Over control by SAC headquarters, and using tactics that did not fit the aircraft in the conditions of the jungle war in Southeast Asia, do not dismiss the central fact – LINEBACKER II was a major success.

**Could the war have been ended earlier without LINEBACKER II?**

Air Force Chief of Staff and former commander of the Strategic Air Command, General Curtis LeMay, stated that the Air Force could have ended it [the war] in any ten-day period you wanted to, but they would never bomb the target list we had.”489 LeMay wanted to implement a ninety-four-target plan devised to bomb North Vietnam. It was based upon his history as the commander of the 20th Air Force in the Pacific during World War II. The plan was abandoned by President Johnson and his advisers and it was resurrected by the Air Force strategists for Operations LINEBACKER and LINEBACKER II.

The consensus of historians and military leaders, particularly Air Force commanders, is that the war could have been greatly shortened. The Johnson Administration badly mishandled the entire Southeast Asia political and military issue. The Nixon Administration inherited a morass of problems from the previous administration and it still took four years to complete the task. During the Johnson White House, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forcefully argued for “dramatic, forceful, application of air power. Instead the U.S. adopted a strategy of a graduated military response.”490 The Johnson Administration allowed itself to be hamstrung by a fear that the Soviet Union or the Peoples Republic of China would enter the war militarily as China had done in the Korean War. President Johnson made this fear into a shroud that covered all of this thinking about Southeast Asia.

The graduated approach is analogous to the carrot and stick theory. The Johnson Administration believed that the United States could militarily win the war using conventional tactics. The president and his closest advisors, particularly Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, did not understand asynchronous warfare, particularly a major guerilla insurgency like that employed by the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese. This problem was geometrically compounded by a succession of corrupt South Vietnamese

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487 Ibid., 12.
488 Karl Eschmann, _The Role of Tactical Air Support; Linebacker II_ (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff College thesis, 1985), 60, 63; Clodfelter, “By Other Means,” 121.
regimes. At every juncture when massive military airpower was brought to bear on the enemies, successes were frittered away by bombing halts, refusal to allow the Air Force, Navy, and Marine bombers and ground attack aircraft to punish the North Vietnamese in and around their capital, Hanoi, and their primary port, Haiphong. The “carrot” consistently failed. The North Vietnamese did not negotiate in good faith until late December 1972. The “stick” approach worked.

The North Vietnamese made two attempts to win the war by using conventional military strategy. The first was in the Tet Offensive in 1968 and the second was the Easter Offensive in 1972. In both cases the enemy created mass chaos and captured large amounts of real estate. In both cases airpower caused them huge numbers of casualties. The 1972 Easter Offensive was neutralized by Operation LINEBACKER I, but it took LINEBACKER II to complete task of bringing the North Vietnamese to negotiations with sincerity.491

With the earlier major bombing campaigns of ARC LIGHT and, particularly, ROLLING THUNDER, mismanaged under the Johnson Administration, it was General LeMay’s concept, resurrected during the third year of the Nixon Presidency, that finally fulfilled the mission of extricating the United States from the quagmire of Vietnam.492 Among those disagreeing with LeMay is Mark Clodfelter. In his The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of Vietnam, the author asserts that strategic bombing did not work in Vietnam.493 Clodfelter believes because Vietnam was a limited war with few legitimate targets. He does believe LINEBACKER II was a successful military operation, but that it succeeded because it “was based in the campaign’s limited objective of forcing the North Vietnamese to negotiate.”494

**Did the campaign matter considering the political climate at home and abroad?**

Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp, in his treatise Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect, was justifiably harsh on the civilian leaders, particularly in the early years of the war. As he termed it, their “strategy of equivocation,” was particularly harmful.495 He complained bitterly that the “no-win” strategy ultimately eroded and destroyed our national unity.496

Huge anti-war protests that continued from the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in 1968 through the end of Nixon’s first term in office split this nation more than since the Civil War. Nixon, like his predecessor, failed to win the war through escalation and coercion.497 President Nixon’s promise to end the war by preserving “Peace with Honor,” meant that he would use any means to settle the war diplomatically, but with new a coercive initiative to make the peace talks fruitful. The President’s new course of action reflected what the American military learned from Operation LINEBACKER I and reflected the mood of the Congress, the press, and an impatient public to end the war.

President Nixon used an infusion of material and emergency aid to South Vietnam to ensure their seat at the negotiating table. The President’s delicate handling of the wayward ally was essential to ending the war. This was done despite the presence of 150,000 to 200,000 North Vietnamese troops within South

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495 Sharp, Strategy for Defeat, 269-70.
496 Ibid.
Vietnam at the beginning of LINEBACKER II.\textsuperscript{498} The presidential administrations from Eisenhower through Johnson miscalculated the political philosophy of the North Vietnamese, who were absolute Marxist-Leninists, closer at that point than even the Soviets. Nathan Leites observed in 1951:

> that the Communist code affirms that neither “feelings of distress about retreating,” nor “conceptions of dignity” should be allowed to keep the Party from executing an expedient retreat: And retreat is expedient when the experience gained in attempting to hold an attacked position shows that not to retreat would involve greater losses. In Lenin’s words, “to think we shall not be thrown back is utopian.”\textsuperscript{499}

Hanoi believed that the Easter Offensive would have a similar effect on America as the Tet. Anti-war protests would topple a president as it had done with Lyndon Johnson. Their misjudgment was in the difference in the resolve of the presidents. “Although Nixon continued to worry about the antiwar movement and its possible impact on Congress, he had survived the agitation that followed the invasion of Cambodia and the shootings at Kent State University and seemed increasingly likely to win reelection.”\textsuperscript{500} General William Momyer wrote of the 1972 Easter offensive and U.S. reactions:

> With the U.S. withdrawing, they probably thought the U.S. public wouldn’t permit a bombing campaign against their homeland. The fact that the U.S. sus-pended the peace talks on 4 May as the offensive was in full swing must have also been cause for concern among the North Vietnamese leadership. Surely their miscalculations on the employment of U.S. airpower, both in South Vietnam and against the homeland, were two most significant factors in their turn around in attitude about the negotiations.\textsuperscript{501}

It was Richard Nixon, who was the anti-communist’s role model, that broke the mold and reached out to Soviets and Chinese to begin détente. This wedge between the North Vietnamese and their benefactors made LINEBACKER II successful.

Headlines in American and European newspapers, describing LINEBACKER II, decried the “carpet bombing of a densely populated city, an interpretation based principally on the reports of a French journalist at Hanoi.”\textsuperscript{502}


\textsuperscript{502} Schlight, \textit{A War Too Long}, 100.
What changes did LINEBACKER II bring about in strategic thinking?

Edward E. Rice wrote a remarkable treatise on the effects of Third World warfare in 1988, entitled *Wars of the Third Kind: Conflict in Underdeveloped Countries.* The author penned what could be an obituary of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam:

Wars of the third kind, besides devastating the lands in which they are fought, can pose serious dangers to powers that become involved in them. These risks are of two kinds: they can lead to military disaster, and they can undermine the polity of the state. These dangers arise from initial underestimation of the problems that wars against the weak can pose for the strong, and subsequent inability to bring them to a successful conclusion.

Frustration over inability to bring a war of the third kind to a successful conclusion and unwillingness to cut their losses tend to cause a country's leaders to look beyond the theater in which it is being fought for the root of their difficulties. In doing so they are likely both to extend the geographic scope of the conflict and to enlarge the dimensions of their problem. Leadership implies an ability to choose right paths, whereas turning back would imply admission of error. Because such admissions are seldom willingly made, it is in the democracies, with their freedom of the press, their competition between political parties, and their provisions for the peaceful transfer of power, that there is the best chance of abandoning a wrong course before it ends in disaster.

The Vietnam War remains a perplexing reality to both strategic thinkers and historians. The so-called “wars of the third kind,” that is wars in the Third World, offer many lessons but are not easily observed. Counterinsurgency conflict, such as Vietnam, “remains the forgotten stepchild of strategy.” American politicians and strategists had either never learned about historical parallels, particularly the Philippine Insurrection, fighting Poncho Villa in Mexico, or, most egregiously, forgot the French debacle in Vietnam. Vietnam was considered to be a “one-of” in these circles. It was so painful to the national psyche that it was all but ignored in post war planning. Some lessons are derived from Edward Rice’s treatise—never extend local wars to adjacent states and do not make comparative analogies with war scenarios that are more comfortable, conventional wars.

The war offered many questions among war planners, both ground and air, about in what types of scenarios should certain weapons systems be used and whether massive numbers of ground troops should be deployed. In an almost pure guerrilla insurgency, can large scale insertion of ground troops control whole areas the sizes of provinces? The Spanish-American philosopher said in an often-repeated quote that “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” The maxim can be traced back at least to the Crusades, when the Christian kingdoms owned the Holy Land during the day and patrolled from their protected castles in armed sweeps. The Muslims owned the night and eventually swallowed the Christian kingdoms. The United States and its ally South Vietnam did not learn this lesson. Insurgents swarmed by the tens of thousands, even during the major bombing campaigns.

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504 Wars of the First Kind are nuclear confrontations. Wars of the Second Kind are conventional wars.
505 Rice, *Wars of the Third Kind*, 118.
507 Rice, *Wars of the Third Kind*, 119-149.
One question that arose from this was “could coercion from the pure use of airpower work on an enemy who adopted a conventional warfare vulnerable to air power?” The answer is yes. The massive use of air power blunted both the Tet Offensive (1968) and the Easter Offensive (1972). During Hanoi’s switch to conventional warfare in 1972, Hanoi’s capabilities “were severely weakened due to the destruction of their war making materiel and infrastructure.”\footnote{Phan, “An Analysis of Linebacker II,” 22.}

The reverse of the above scenario is also pertinent. If an enemy is willing to bear the cost of demoralizing damage, might it be impervious to coercion? Again, the answer in Vietnam was yes, up to a point. The misguided strategies of two American presidents to dangle enticements, with hopes to lure the North to come to the negotiating table actually aided North Vietnam in its quest to unify the Vietnam. The north had little to lose and foreign aid from Russia and China to replenish its materiel losses. It was only the détente begun by President Nixon that separated the Russians and Chinese from the client state that allowed the Linebackers to succeed. Hanoi’s population was largely indifferent to coercion during the Johnson Administration.\footnote{Pape, Bombing to Win, 209-210.} Only when President Nixon broke with Johnson’s strategy of ARC LIGHT and ROLLING THUNDER missions, and unleashed LINEBACKER I and LINEBACKER II, did the American’s achieve their goal of getting out of Vietnam.\footnote{Edgar Ulsamer, “The Lessons of Vietnam: USAF Prepares for Future Contingencies,” Air Force Magazine (June 1973): 36.}

From post-World War II to the beginning of the Vietnam War, strategic bombers existed to execute their missions as part of the Strategic Air Command in a nuclear war. Vietnam changed that. After the “Big Belly” conversion of B-52D models, and use of wing pylons for additional ordnance, strategic bombers delivered massive non-nuclear devastation at a relatively low economic cost. The LINEBACKER II missions allowed planners and designers to allow for such missions with the B-1 Lancer and the B-2 Spirit.\footnote{Phan, “An Analysis of Linebacker II,” 22.} Warfare in an environment that is prone to constant cloud cover and monsoonal seasons meant that all-weather bombers could attack the enemy when tactical strike aircraft could not. It also forced Air Force planners to mix ordnance using guided smart weapons and unguided munitions.\footnote{Ulsamer, “The Lessons of Vietnam,” 36-38.}

The nature of how campaigns are fought and the political landscape behind them is evident in the differences between the Johnson and Nixon administrations. “Unlike President Johnson, who preferred close personal control over individual targets, President Nixon tended, with some exceptions, to authorize strikes against areas or classes of targets and leave the details to his military commanders.”\footnote{Schlight, A War Too Long, 91.}

Was Air Force doctrine influenced by the campaign?

Airpower doctrine evolved directly from both Linebacker campaigns. LINEBACKER I prepared the way for precision engagement and LINEBACKER II proved the concept, first espoused by Giulio Douhet, that airpower is a tool of influence.\footnote{Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 126.} Since the end of the Vietnam War, airpower doctrine theorists have studied two distinct ideas: precision attack at little cost to aircraft and crews, and the ability to deliver widespread destruction to coerce the enemy to bowing to one’s will.\footnote{Robynn C. Rodman, Hanoi to Baghdad: Linebacker’s Impact on Modern Airpower (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, 2006), 20.} These concepts came to maturity in 1972.
Technological advances in precision guided munitions (PGM) came into mainstream combat during LINEBACKER I and LINEBACKER II. Tactical attack aircraft, particularly F-4 Phantoms and F-105 Thunderchief “Wild Weasels” hit SAM radars with regularity as soon as they turned on their search radars (“Fan Songs”). During the first three days of LINEBACKER II, tactical escort fighters did not accompany the B-52s. Loss estimates prior to the campaign placed a probability of three percent. The total number of BUFFs lost during the eleven-day was fifteen. The loss of these big bombers, the pride of SAC, and the ultimate extension of airpower to the United States, created many problems in tactics and in morale. The B-52s dropped iron “dumb” bombs, but in massive amounts – 15,000 tons. TAC, Navy, and Marine aircraft dropped the “smart” bombs.

The ultimate questions asked and lessons learned were in what manner and at what time specific weapons systems should be used. Post-Vietnam airpower doctrine can be traced through the Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1. The role of the Air Force focused on fighting a conventional war in which the opponent is a first or second world nation. The manual showed little change in its 1984 revision, but the 1992 edition published immediately following Operation DESERT STORM, placed strategic bombing at a lower priority. Theorist Raymond W. Leonard believes that this was probably due to the end of the Cold War. The 1992 edition also places airpower in a secondary role in non-conventional wars.

Leonard also asserts that strategic thought about LINEBACKER II changed during the 1980s. Theorists split into two divergent camps. The traditionalists emphasized the success of the massive bombing campaign, devastating North Vietnamese defenses and infrastructure. The revisionists focused on the Air Force’s shortcomings in Vietnam and how strategic air power doctrine failed.

The answer lies somewhere in the middle. The destructive power of strategic bombers is immense. Deployment of B-52s, B-1 Lancers, and B-2 Spirits has been a regular feature of conflicts in Europe, the Middle East and Asia. These weapons platforms can and do carry a wide variety of specialized munitions used in stand-off missions. This allows the bombers to fire their ordnance at targets while at great distances and keep them relatively safe from harm. Air Power did not fail in the Vietnam War, particularly once rules of engagement were relaxed. Proper deployment of strategic bombers in conventional roles brought the North Vietnamese to their knees. At the same time, this could not have been sustained without massive assistance from specialized tactical fighter-bombers and electronic counter-warfare measures (ECM) aircraft.

Prior to Vietnam, SACs mission was to deliver thermonuclear weapons in a war with the Soviet Union. That was the entire reason for its existence. SAC did not want to be part of the Vietnam War. Its air crews were trained for the missions of conventional carpet bombing, as were their predecessors in World War II and Korea. The political whims of three U.S. presidents changed that mission forever. The prestige of the B-52s made them a powerful tool in coercive diplomacy. The loss of some those great bombers opened the door to other views and other missions.

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517 Ibid.
519 Ibid.
520 Ibid.
521 Ibid.
Where does the campaign fit in the study and history of aerial warfare?

LINEBACKER II is often referred to as an 11 Day War. It compressed destruction dramatically in time and intensity to achieve political will over the enemy that took years in World War II. General William W. Momyer penned perhaps the best summary of the campaign’s place in history:

The 11-day campaign came to a close on the 29th of December 1972 when the North Vietnamese responded to the potential threat of continued air attacks to the economic, political, social, and military life of their country. It was apparent that airpower was the decisive factor leading to the peace agreement of 15 January 1973. The concentrated application of airpower produced the disruption, shock, and disorganization that can be realized only by compressing the attack and striking at the heart with virtually no restraints on military targets which influence the enemy’s will to fight.

LINEBACKER II became the gold standard for planners in subsequent campaigns. It ushered in completely new ways of thinking about how to use air assets, both individually and in concert with others. LINEBACKER I and LINEBACKER II illustrated the limitations of thought about what strategic bombers should be used for, how they should be used, what were the limits of supporting them from maintenance, escort aircraft, refueling, and the targets for which they were appropriate. The United States demonstrated, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, that bombers from the Continental United States or from forward bases in the western Pacific or Indian oceans, can strike targets anywhere. B-52s and their sisters can use force multiplier weapons, such as air launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) with nuclear or conventional warheads (CALCMs) to deliver pinpoint accuracy precision anywhere. LINEBACKER II was the origin of this capability.

Was the campaign influential in later operations, even today?

Without a doubt. The following list of operations illustrates how later campaigns built upon the knowledge and expertise gained from LINEBACKER II.

1986 – Operation EL DORADO CANYON

During the fourteen intervening years between LINEBACKER II and the next mission to use the attack principles developed in that operation, the Air Force honed new skills and tactics. The United States intended to make a broad statement about fostering terrorism and perhaps remove one of its principal players. Operation EL DORADO CANYON used several FB-111s, dropping Laser Guided Bombs (LGBs) on a private compound in Libya to either kill President Muammar el-Qaddafi, or to dissuade him from his global terror activities. The Aardvarks flew the entire route to and from the target over water.

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524 An excellent list and brief explanation for the following operations is found in Barbara Salazar Torreon, “U.S. Periods of War and Dates of Recent Conflicts,” (Washington: Congressional Research Service, October 11, 2017).
to eliminate the threat of terror attacks on allies.\textsuperscript{526} Although the raid did not kill Qaddafi, it did remove one of his sons and some of his top aides. The raid achieved its purpose in proving that precision airpower can coerce a foe into changing his behavior.\textsuperscript{527} EL DORADO CANYON moved airpower to the forefront of military planning and political thinking by the early 1990s.\textsuperscript{528}

![Map of the Middle East and North Africa](http://www.afhso.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD120823-032.pdf)


**1990-1991 – Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM**

Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 and the United States and its allies responded by reconquering Kuwait and driving the Iraqis back toward Baghdad. Air Force planners did not want a repeat of the years of problems associated with the Vietnam War. The final plan, after hard-fought ideological battles, was to use


\textsuperscript{528} Rodman, “Hanoi to Baghdad,” 20.
Colonel John Warden’s five concentric-ring theory. This turned Clausewitzian theory on his head. Clausewitz, the great strategic thinker of the Napoleonic wars, believed that “Armies would clash on the periphery of each side’s territory and then penetrate to the interior. This time, the Air Force would wage war from the inside out, the first truly strategic air war.” Warden called his plan INSTANT THUNDER, an homage to ROLLING THUNDER in Vietnam. It was an unfortunate analogy, LINEBACKER would have been better. INSTANT THUNDER became the first portion of Operation DESERT STORM.

Not everyone endorsed Warden’s plan. Lt Gen Chuck Horner, the Joint Air Component Commander for Desert Storm, did not personally like Warden or his plan. General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, did not like the plan because it did not call for any strikes on Iraqi ground troops that had invaded Kuwait. Navy planners referred to the plan as Distant Blunder. Distant because Warden worked at the Pentagon and Blunder because they believed attacking Baghdad at the beginning of the campaign was a miscalculation.

Warden’s plan did indeed work. The opening mission of Operation DESERT STORM was Operation SENIOR SURPRISE. Seven B-52s from Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana, carried out the first raid of the war. They used the first weapons of their type – Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missiles (CALCMs). This opening round blinded the Iraqi forces, took out most of their power generating capacity, and eliminated their communication ability.

Figure 64. Second Bomb Wing B-52 H from Barksdale AIR FORCE BASE launching a AGM-86C CALCM. Source: Federation of American Scientists file photo.

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530 Ibid., 80.
532 Michael, “The Strategic Significance of Linebacker II,” 15.
The Iraqi defenders fired blindly into the night of January 16, 1991, not knowing that their adversaries never crossed into their air space. SAC intelligence officers rated the damage assessment between 80 and 91 percent. SENIOR SURPRISE, nicknamed SECRET SQUIRREL due its highly secret status, was the longest combat mission in history until that time. Its planning heritage was LINEBACKER II sorties and the FB-111 mission of EL DORADO CANYON. This time, however, the massive ordnance load capability of the venerable B-52 matched with the long-range destructive nature of the CALCM, gave new life to the both the bomber and increased its necessity as a major weapons platform.

1995 – Operation DELIBERATE FORCE

The former Yugoslavia was wracked by civil strife among its many ethnic groups after the end of the Cold War. Bosnian Serbs all but destroyed the city of Sarajevo. Negotiations continued over three years before the United Nations, NATO, and the United States took action. This was the first time in which air

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power, with no troops on the ground, brought about a peace agreement.\textsuperscript{534} Coercive air power was the key to bringing the Serbs to the negotiating table.

\textbf{1999 – Operation NOBLE ANVIL / ALLIED FORCE}

The remnants of Yugoslavia, principally Serbia and Herzegovina, continued military operations and attacked its former component state, Kosovo. NATO responded. The action was opposed by China, Russia, and the United States, however, NATO went ahead with the operation. This was the first instance in which NATO conducted an operation without the approval of the United Nations Security Council.\textsuperscript{535} The air component in this operation was decisive. A RAND Corporation assessment of the air component validated Clausewitz’s concept that war is an extension of diplomacy by other means\textsuperscript{536}:

The most remarkable thing about Operation Allied Force is not that it defeated Milosevic in the end, but rather air power prevailed despite a NATO leadership that was unwilling to take major risks and an alliance that held together only with often paralyzing drag… After years of false promises by its outspoken prophets, air power has become an unprecedentedly capable instrument of force employment in joint warfare. Even in the best of circumstances, however, it can never be more effective than the strategy it is intended to support.\textsuperscript{537}

\textbf{2002 – Operation ANACONDA}

The first operation on the War on Terror, which began with the suicide aircraft disasters on September 11, 2001, was an attempt to eliminate the terrorist plotters from their hideouts in Afghanistan. Operation ANACONDA was a combined arms affair with U.S. Army troops, CIA operatives, and local allies attempted to destroy al-Qaeda and Taliban forces, fighting high in the Shahi-Kot Valley and Arma Mountains southeast of Zormat.

Army personnel were forced to fight in the high mountains without artillery support and relied upon Air Force bombers for close support. The Taliban evacuated with heavy casualties after heavy fighting. Army generals, particularly the commander in Afghanistan, Major General Franklin Hagenbeck, complained about Air Force response to his forces’ needs.\textsuperscript{538} Thirty years after LINEBACKER II, the role of close support for ground troops remained controversial.\textsuperscript{539} Despite the Army’s criticism, it is highly unlikely that the ground forces would have carried the day in the engagement.

\textsuperscript{534} Michael, “The Strategic Significance of Linebacker II,” 16.
\textsuperscript{537} Rand Corp, “NATO’s Air War Over Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001).
\textsuperscript{538} Michael, “The Strategic Significance of Linebacker II,” 17.
\textsuperscript{539} Ibid.
2003 – 2010 – Operation IRAQI FREEDOM

The destruction of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq was the focus of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) chose ‘Shock and Awe’ for the name of the pending air operation. As in LINEBACKER II, airpower was envisioned as the means to coerce the enemy to change its behavior.\(^{540}\) Shock and Awe was indeed impressive, but targeters made great mistakes. They hoped that the aerial assault would be so impressive that the Iraqi people would topple the dictator. Several principal targets in and near Baghdad were intentionally left off the list.\(^{541}\) One planner at CENTCOM explained, “There was a hope that there would be a complete and utter collapse of the regime early on. In order to let that come to fruition, [air commanders] initially held back those targets.”\(^{542}\) The Iraqis stood by their dictator in this first crucial action in the war. The crucial lesson from LINEBACKER II was to create target lists that minimized civilian casualties and focus on military units and facilities. The full brunt of aerial bombing fell upon the elite Iraqi Republican Guards Medina, Baghdad, and Hammurabi divisions two weeks after Shock and Awe devastated Baghdad.\(^{543}\) Following cessation of hostilities, coalition troops remained in Iraq, President Obama declared the mission completed with reduced forces put in place to assist in nation building and to fight ISIS.\(^{544}\)

\(^{540}\) Rodman, “Hanoi to Baghdad,” 23.


\(^{542}\) Ibid.

\(^{543}\) Ibid., 174-75.

2001 – 2014 – Operation ENDURING FREEDOM

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM was the continuation of Operation ANACONDA. This operation saw massive American ground troop involvement supported by Air Force bombers. The Second Iraq War pulled much of the ground force from Afghanistan, but troop levels increased again in 2009.545 President Obama announced the end of ENDURING FREEDOM on December 28, 2014, however, combat still continues today.546 Airpower played a huge part in this operation, particularly blasting away at mountain strongholds held by the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Precision weapons continued to be the weapon of choice, targeting caves and training camps while leaving villages unharmed. Two B-2 bombers from the 509th Bomb Wing in Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, conducted the longest bombing mission in history on November 13, 2014.547

2010 – 2011 – Operation NEW DAWN

Operation NEW DAWN was the new name for military operations in Iraq effective September 1, 2010.548 On December 15, 2011, U.S. Armed Forces in Baghdad marked the official end of the war in Iraq.549

2015 – Present – Operation FREEDOM’S SENTINEL

Beginning January 1, 2015 and continuing today, Operation FREEDOM’S SENTINEL is the continuation of ENDURING FREEDOM. Basically, this operation is a reduced troop strength training operation for Afghani forces to aid in state building. Air strikes remain to combat Taliban concentrations. As in previous Afghan operations, strategic bombers are deployed from outside bases as needed.550

2014 – Present Islamic State-Operation INHERENT RESOLVE

Beginning October 15, 2014 and continuing, Operation INHERENT RESOLVE targets the

Islamic State (IS, ISIS, ISIL, Daesh) in Iraq and Syria.\footnote{DOD, Operation Inherent Resolve, at http://www.inherentresolve.mil/About-Us/.} Coalition forces are heavily engaged in both areas in what is, perhaps, the most complex political, military, and ethnic strife since the Yugoslavian issues of the 1990s. U.S. Air Force tactical and strategic bombers provide close air support to allied ground troops. Separately, Russia provides aircraft, advisors, and naval units provide assistance to the Syrian government against the Islamic State. The two sides are not mutually compatible.\footnote{The difference in the terms “IS, ISIS, and ISIL” is associated with the speaker’s or writer’s leanings rather than the terror group. IS refers to the so-called Islamic State, a self-imposed caliphate, based in Syria, but with factions in other countries. ISIS refers to the Islamic State in Syria. ISIL refers to the Islam State in the Levant (the eastern Mediterranean coast and hinterland from south of Turkey to the Gaza Strip. This term is used by those who do not want to recognize the State of Israel. Daesh” (or Da’ish) is an Arabic acronym formed from the initial letters of the group's previous name in Arabic - "al-Dawla al-Islamiya fil Iraq wa al-Sham.” It does not have a meaning in Arabic. An excellent article on the terms is found in Faisal Irshaid, “Isis, Isil, IS or Daesh? One group, many names” BBC Monitoring http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27994277 posted December 2, 2015.}

What were the lessons learned and legacies?

Military operations always yield results that may be hoped for or feared. In this case, the December 1972 bombing of North Vietnam yielded the desired response. North Vietnam returned to the negotiating table in Paris for the very first time with sincerity. The peace accords were signed less than three weeks after the attacks. If history is that simple, this operation would simply be a marker in a longer list of missions and that would end its study. LINEBACKER II must be considered in multiple contexts.

The first consideration is the timing of the operation, which was launched late in 1972 after the very successful LINEBACKER I missions of earlier that year. President Nixon halted that campaign, just as his predecessor Lyndon Johnson had done many times. The simple reason was to allow the North Vietnamese to see that the United States was sincere about negotiating. Every attempt to use this tactic allowed the North Vietnamese to rest, resupply, and become more entrenched in South Vietnam.

Second, planning from higher command headquarters, the Pentagon, and the White House must be viewed through the lens of commanders in direct contact with the enemy or their immediate superiors. LINEBACKER II made certain “truths” obsolete:

1. World War II saturation bombing was too predictable. Massed heavy bombers without fighter protection and using unchanged paths of ingress and egress yields loss of aircraft and crews.
2. Crew information MUST be used in planning upcoming raids.
3. Combined air offensive with TAC and Navy assets MUST be used to suppress defensive systems.
4. High Altitude Reconnaissance images (visual and multi-spectral) are required to properly assess damage on infrastructure and must be used real-time.
5. Numbered Air Force level leadership MUST be able to alter or interpret higher orders (within reason).
6. The one-day halt on Christmas emboldened North Vietnamese leaders and gave them time to resupply. The following days remedied that.
7. Constant pressure MUST be placed on the enemy. No rest. 24-hour raids.

Third, “smart” weapons and “dumb” weapons each have a place in the modern munitions inventory. Precision guided weapons (PGMs) are the weapon of choice for most missions. Targets in densely
populated areas or near high value cultural sites can be destroyed without harming (hopefully) civilians.\textsuperscript{553} A significant drawback to PGMs is that although highly accurate, less force lessens the shock factor.\textsuperscript{554} The Shock and Awe phase of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM looked great on television and took out command and control centers and defense communications targets, but it did not convince the Iraqi populace to rise up and remove their dictator. One Iraqi commented on the precision weapon attack on the Baghdad telephone exchange: “Speaking logically, they are precise, even if the goal is inhuman…With all the American’s power, we expected the strike to be more devastating, we expected it to be leveled to the ground.”\textsuperscript{555} Iron bombs, or “dumb” bombs still have their place in the threat environment. Afghanistan and Syria are recent significant examples.

Fourth, prior to Vietnam, SACs sole purpose was the nuclear mission. When the big bombers were sent to the SEA theatre, crews had to learn a different set of skills, mentally retrofitting to World War II era tactics. This new set of procedures fit well into SACs method of rigid rules. However, the first three days of LINEBACKER II proved that the old bomber formations used over Germany and Japan did not translate to modern defenses, particularly SAMs. Not all crews were trained equally. Although all B-52s in the Vietnam War conducted conventional missions, some crews suffered from this during the First Iraq War.\textsuperscript{556} Following that war, Air Combat Command (ACC) replaced SAC, shifting focus from nuclear to conventional. Now, crews trained for either nuclear or conventional roles by Wing and Squadron. The new century brought a revolution in weaponry that increased the flexibility and responsiveness, while the required training time shrunk.\textsuperscript{557} This included training for ground crews as well as air crews. An incident in 2007 in which a B-52 from Barksdale Air Force Base accidentally brought a live nuclear warheaded cruise missile back to Louisiana from Minot Air Force Base (where the nuclear stockpiles were stored) illustrated a large gap in attention to rules and defining the seriousness of everyday procedures. The pendulum had swung far toward the conventional side.\textsuperscript{558}

Fifth, Dr. Richard Hallion noted in \textit{Storm Over Iraq} that the principal airpower lessons garnered between LINEBACKER II and the First Gulf War were technological.\textsuperscript{559} The Air Force still utilizes the now much-upgraded B-52s. Newer bombers have joined the fleet, but it is still the B-52 that has the weapons capacity to delivery massive loads of ordnance.

Sixth, Dr. William P. Head posited perhaps the most telling legacy of the airpower strategy following Vietnam.

\begin{quote}
In many ways, the Vietnam experience has had a reverse impact on operations. Airpower has been applied in America’s most recent operations (e.g., the Persian Gulf War, Bosnia, and Kosovo) not according to the old theory of tactical aircraft performing only tactical roles and strategic aircraft performing only strategic roles but bomber, fighter, and
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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{553} John J. Nichols, \textit{Three Reasons For Linebacker II’s Success} (Montgomery, AL; Air Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, 2006), 2
\item \textsuperscript{554} Rodman, “Hanoi to Baghdad,” 25.
\item \textsuperscript{555} Murrary and Scales, \textit{The Iraq War: A Military History}, 168.
\item \textsuperscript{556} Ryan E. Gorecki, “Finding Balance for Dual-Role Bombers” Master’s thesis (Maxwell AFB, AL: School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 2011), v.
\item \textsuperscript{557} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{558} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{559} Richard P. Hallion, \textit{Storm over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War} (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992).
\end{itemize}
fighter-bomber air assets—often carrying precision ordnance—accomplishing a variety of tactical and strategic missions. In these cases, circumstances dictate usage. Airmen no longer refer to aircraft as tactical or strategic aircraft, rather tactical or strategic assets that they realize can perform a variety of missions. Does this suggest that all future air campaigns will be fought under the same conditions as the Persian Gulf? The Bosnian and Kosovan intervention suggests, this will not be the case. Thus, one must ask: What if the United States finds itself in a low-intensity insurgency conflict containing jungle terrain and climate? Will Air Force doctrine and theory provide airmen with the foundation necessary to successfully prosecute such a war?560

Seventh, Lee Kennett authored a chapter in *Case Studies in Strategic Bombardment* entitled “Strategic Bombardment: A Retrospective,” in which he pondered the need for strategic bombers.

A half-century has passed since the incineration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Although it certainly would be premature to speak of the current epoch as “postnuclear,” the menace of this form of city killing no longer looms so heavily as once it did. During this period, land- and sea-based ballistic missiles largely replaced the bomber in the strategic nuclear role, while fighter-bombers increasingly displaced it in the precision bombardment role. Configured for the contemporary come-as-you-are contingency war, however, the strategic bomber may yet know something of a renaissance and achieve some of the hopes held for it when it was still only an idea. It possesses features and capabilities that promise much: an internal bomb bay offers heavier, more diverse weapon loads; a multiperson crew permits extended, long-range missions; stealth technology masks its presence to the enemy; and by means of air-launched cruise missiles and laser-guided bombs, in recent years it has acquired the ability to direct incredible destructive power with extreme accuracy. We still have a great deal to learn from the Gulf War, but it has offered us a glimpse of a strategic air weaponry of extraordinary “efficacy.”

Eighth, and perhaps the most forward reaching subject from a leadership point, is the transition from bomber commanders to fighter commanders since the end of the Vietnam War. Two of the most prolific thinkers on this legacy are Mark Clodfelter and Mike Worden.

Clodfelter, in his *Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam*, describes the evolution and chronology of bombing during the Vietnam War. He describes the view from the senior commanders throughout the war as being ham-strung by political restrictions and the final loosening of requirements during 1972 by the Nixon Administration.562 He compares the Johnson Era war plans to that of the politicians and commanders in 1914, with continued blundering with no end in sight and no firm vision to either win or end war.563 Clodfelter states: “Difficult to fathom is the air chiefs’ lingering conviction that their doctrine was right throughout Vietnam – and that it is right for the future.”564 Speaking

564 Ibid.
of bomber general air chiefs in particular, he adds “Unlike generals after World War I, post-Vietnam air commanders have advocated no sweeping doctrinal changes. They parade Linebacker II as proof that bombing will work in limited war, and they dismiss the notion that too much force could trigger nuclear devastation.” Clodfelter is referring to Air Force Doctrine, which tends to ignore the lessons learned by the Vietnam War except for the conventional war actions by the North Vietnamese.

Rather than seeing a single-minded approach to deploying strategic airpower in every potential limited war, Clodfelter sees five variables that each result in required questions being answered. The result is a sliding scale of appropriateness. His variables are: 1. Nature of the enemy, 2. The type of war waged by the enemy, 3. Nature of the combat environment, 4. Magnitude of military controls, and 5. Nature of political objectives. Using these five variables, it is difficult to agree with the decisions made by the Johnson White House and the early Nixon White House (1968-1971). Winning the Vietnam War by airpower alone was not possible and in many cases, should not have been employed in the jungle warfare of most of the war. Airpower was successful against conventional war scenarios during the Tet Offensive in 1968 and the Easter Offensive in 1972. Richard Nixon’s decision to not win the war, but extricate America from it, made the goals of the two LINEBACKER campaigns successful.

Mike Worden created the most in-depth study of the transition of Air Force leadership from “bomber generals” to “fighter generals.” Although the data is now largely outdated and suffers from realignments of commands and the creation of new Major Commands (MAJCOMs) from 1992 through the present, his points are still relevant.

Worden divides Air Force Air Force leadership by when they graduated from West Point or other universities and their ascension to power during World War II, at the end of World War II, the early Cold War, the early years of Vietnam, and beyond. The strategies and tactics evolved from the 1920s through the Korean War were almost purely created by men who had risen through the ranks in the bomber commands. Their efforts reached a pinnacle of success during the massive campaigns against Germany and Japan. Worden calls these generals “absolutists.” The most stalwart of these leaders was General Curtis LeMay. The development of the Strategic Air Command, largely under LeMay, was designed to do one thing – defend the United States with nuclear weapons while destroying any enemy (the Soviet Union) to the degree that only American would survive an all-out nuclear war. The most visible, and arguably the pinnacle of SACs power came during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962.

SAC all but gutted Tactical Air Command of funds in its quest for more bomber wings, more nuclear weapons, and more bases. The fighter wings under SACs control were all nuclear capable. The SAC commanders believed there would be no reason to have TAC if the enemy was the USSR and the war was thermonuclear.

When the United States became involved in Vietnam, SAC wanted no part of the operations. They were drawn in under the umbrella of Flexible Response. For the first time, B-52s would be used in a type of warfare in which they were not designed to perform. Bombing unseen targets under a triple canopy of jungle could not guarantee results. As Kenneth P. Werrell suggested, the B-52s were not the correct weapon in Vietnam because there were few, or perhaps no, worthy targets. There certainly were viable targets in North Vietnam, particularly in and around Hanoi and Haiphong, but they were out of bounds due to severe political restrictions during the Lyndon Johnson presidency. The senior Air Force commanders, all bomber

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565 Ibid., 209-10.
566 Ibid., 218-21.
569 Ibid., 103-125.
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generals, except for TAC, were overwhelmingly bound by tight ROE.574

Following the election of Richard Nixon as president, Air Force leaders were slowly allowed more leeway in ROE. Operations LINEBACKER and LINEBACKER II in 1972, unleashed the power of the SAC heavy bombers, and finally ended with North Vietnam coming to the peace talks in earnest in January 1973. LINEBACKER II was such a powerful coup de grâce, that it was almost a separate war by itself. This was the vindication of the bomber generals.

Vietnam also saw a great need for TAC to be increased substantially. Funding for tactical fighter and fighter-bomber aircraft increased exponentially and bomber funding was reduced.575 Within a seven-year period, the need for fighter pilots and ground crews increased with the multitude of new mission types.576 Fighter pilots were and are trained differently than bomber crews. They are taught to be individual risk takers and make snap judgments. Worden and others believe that is why they have come to preeminence in command positions.577

During the two decades between 1973 and 1993, the primacy of bomber generals gave way to fighter generals in drastic fashion. Julie Bird cited the fact that by 1993, seven percent of all officers in the United States Air Force were fighter pilots, while seventy percent of all MAJCOMs were fighter pilots.578 Simultaneously, all Air Force four-star generals were fighter pilots and more than half of three-star generals were as well.579 Finally, eighty-five percent of all three- and four-star generals were rated (pilots).580

Air doctrine has seemingly ignored the Vietnam War as a “one-of.” Limited war is viewed as the primary threat around the world rather than the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) theory of the Cold War. SACs success in LINEBACKER II may have been the beginning of its undoing. The training of the SAC crews and the perception of saving the B-52s from harm allowed mission planners to abort bombing missions if there was a perceived threat from SAMs.581 When, as early as 1967, B-52s sortied into ground threat environments, Seventh Air Force TAC fighters covered them, suppressed SAM and AAA sites and performed air-to-air protection (MiGCAP).582

The preconception among SAC commanders that the B-52s could force their way into the high-threat areas of North Vietnam above the twentieth degree parallel with no fighter suppression and MiGCAP brought disaster to the BUFFs. During the campaign, fifteen of the heavy bombers were lost. Tactics used were simply World War II and Korea vintage carpet bombing techniques which will not work in a hostile environment that can launch hundreds of SAMs at a time. The losses decreased and ended during the middle and particularly the end of the operation. The North Vietnamese Army simply ran out of missiles and their supply lines were cut. The B-52s handled that part beautifully, but it was the tactical aircraft of the Seventh Air Force and the Navy’s Task Force 77’s tactical fighter-bombers, that kept the SAM and AAA fire down.

Another issue was the type of ordnance the B-52s delivered. The typical payload was a combination of 500 lb. and 750 lb. “dumb” bombs for saturation bombing. The fighter-bombers utilized high precision television or laser guided “smart” munitions. This increased accuracy, made the delivery “cheaper,” and changed the minds of military planners and Congress toward the efficacy of all-purpose weapons platforms. If a fighter-bomber could carry the equivalent payload of a World War II B-17 or greater, what is the need

574 Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals, 57-177.
579 Ibid.
580 Ibid.
581 Momyer, Air Power in Three Wars, 283.

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for strategic bombing platforms? The days of carpet bombing were thought to be over. The necessities of flying a bomb run straight and level for several minutes before bomb release and then making a sharp predictable turn afterward, invite almost sure death in the modern threat environment.

The next notable mission to use smart weaponry in strategic bombers came in 1986 with FB-111s using laser-guided munitions (LGMs) in Operation EL DORADO CANYON. Although imperfect, it led the way for strategic aircraft to deploy stand-off weapons. The opening night of the First Gulf War featured B-52s from Barksdale Air Force, Louisiana, fly from their base on an extremely long mission (Operation SENIOR SURPRISE), deploy Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missiles (CALCMs) and return home to Barksdale.

SAC and TAC were combined following the end of the First Gulf War. The Air Combat Command was believed to be a major cost cutting measure to integrate the two communities (strategic and tactical). The concept did not work as hoped. The styles of training, the philosophies of mission planning, the need for different personality types to command and conduct bomber and fighter missions are too diverse. It was widely perceived that due to cost cutting and a laxity of attitudes, training, and operational awareness reached an all-time low. A new MAJCOM came into existence on August 7, 2009 following an unintended nuclear weapons transfer from Minot Air Force Base to Barksdale Air Force Base in 2007.\textsuperscript{583} ACC retained TAC fighter assets as well as tanker aircraft. All B-52s and B-2s were placed under the Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC). Recently both B-1 wings were reacquired by AFGSC. Strike Command houses all intercontinental ballistic missile wings, making it the operator of two thirds of the nuclear triad. AFGSC is headquartered at Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana and is commanded by a four-star rank general (General Robin Rand.) Without the official moniker attached, “SAC is back.”

Tactical thinking changed the way strategic bombers evolved in the post-Vietnam world. The weapons used by TACAIR saw new life in a changing mission role for the strategic bombers. With the advent of the B-1 Lancer, and later the B-2 Spirit, the United States Air Force now has three different platforms for different missions. The B-52 is still a premier penetrator platform using CALCMs. It can also use nuclear war-headed Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs) in a nuclear threat environment. The B-1, due to politically enforced design changes (during the Jimmy Carter Administration) lost its penetrator role, but retains the ability to deploy massive amounts of ordnance in a stealthy configuration. The B-2 is a true stealth penetrator platform, but the cost per aircraft forced Congress to limit the number of them. The newly designed B-21 Raider will, theoretically, replace the B-1 and augment the B-52 and B-2 fleets.

Ultimately, the legacy of LINEBACKER II is that strategic bombers are relevant to the doctrine, needs, and duties to the United States Air Force. They operate over extremely long distances that tactical aircraft cannot perform without extensive refueling requirements. They carry geometrically more ordnance than their smaller cousins, can deploy cruise missiles hundreds of miles away and leave before detonation. Ultimately, they project American power and force of will anywhere in the world, as SAC believed. Strategic bomber theory, espoused by Douhet and Mitchell, remains pertinent.

\textsuperscript{583} See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_United_States_Air_Force_nuclear_weapons_incident for the details and fallout of the incident.
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