The Crying of Humanity: Tragedy, Subjectivity, and Disintegral Praxis

Daniel Gustav Anderson

INTRODUCTION

Tragedy is conventionally taken to be a variety of perversion wrapped in a mantle of high seriousness. While critics since Aristotle have identified a degree of elevation as proper to it, tragedy also invites a series of questions: *Why participate—why celebrate the sorrow, pain, and catastrophe of another? And is this seriousness to be taken seriously?* It is worthwhile to consider the possibility that, generally, human subjects are in some ways made to participate in tragedy and made to like it, that the gravity Aristotle prescribed for it is ideological in form and function—but also that tragedy can function in a way that undermines all ideological work. This is suggested by a straightforward observation with elaborate and fruitful consequences—that Shakespeare’s tragedies work on people. They carry a certain current, in performance and on the page. How did it happen that these documents developed what Stephen Greenblatt calls “compelling force” (5)? Greenblatt appropriates a concern of Early Modern rhetorical tradition, “energia,” as a tool for understanding the force encoded in a play or an institution,
“provided we understand that its origins like in rhetoric rather than physics and that its significance is social and historical” (6). It may be productive to take physical energy as a metaphor for social energy—to participate in a tragedy is in a sense to be plugged into a machine of moving parts and affects that produces a certain effect. After all, according to Greenblatt, social energy can only be understood “indirectly, by its effects: it is manifested in the capacity of certain verbal, aural, and visual traces to produce, shape, and organize collective physical and mental experiences” (6). Affect
 in this instance is an “integral” problem, psychosocial (collective, transactional, experiential) in nature, and demands a specific set of critical tools to explicate.

The means of production of this affect, the early theater, was, in Greenblatt’s words, “partial, fragmentary, conflictual; elements were crossed, torn apart, recombined, set against each other; particular social practices were magnified by the stage, others diminished, exalted, evacuated. What then is the social energy that is being circulated? Power, charisma, sexual excitement, collective dreams, wonder, desire, anxiety, religious awe, free-floating intensities of experience” (Greenblatt 19). The theater is a machine, a social and technical machine like a marketplace or a factory or a telecommunications network—and for Deleuze and Guattari, everything is production, and production is predicated on desire—regardless of what is produced. Plays of the period and performances of them bear the imprint of this “conflicted” mode of production, generating multiple, distinct positions and therefore distinct affective functions. If affect represents an integral problem, it is on the order of disintegration—a disintegral production.
Articulating mechanisms of desiring-production represents the positive, affirmative aspect of the Deleuze-Guattarian project. According to Judith Butler, this “theory proceeds in two complementary ways: (1) as a critique of desire as negativity and (2) as the promotion of a normative ideal for desire as affirmation. The former project involves ideology-critique, and the latter entails a reconstruction of Nietzsche’s will-to-power and Spinoza’s conatus in the service of a theory of affective emancipation” (205). The re-imagining of the Nietzschean will to power of which Butler writes is called the productive unconscious, or desiring-production. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri present it in an explicitly Marxist idiom:

Desire appears here as a productive space, as the actuality of human cooperation in the construction of history. This production is purely and simply human reproduction, the power of generation. Desiring-production is generation, or rather the excess of labor and the accumulation of a power incorporated into the collective movement of singular essences, both its cause and its completion (387-88).

This account of human activity relies on nothing exotic or elevated, such as Nietzsche’s aestheticism and elitism—or the elaborate and ultimately tedious castrations and Oedipalizations of psychoanalysis.

It does, however, break open to interpretation counterintuitive, even putatively pathological human phenomena, such as masochism or the theater generally and tragedy specifically. As Bryan Reynolds observes, “Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of the productive unconscious attempts to explain irregularities and unconventionalities in human thought and behavior in relation to the antiproductivity with which they are
commonly associated” (193). This model also demonstrates one way in which Aristotle’s conventional account of tragic production is lacking—he has no explanation for why people practice mimesis, a largely nonproductive activity on the surface, except for the observation that it is in fact something people do, suggesting that Aristotle’s purpose may have been prescriptive, and therefore ideological, rather than descriptive. This calls for a turn to an interpretation of the politics of mass spectacle and group desire, a disintegral space where this context the ancient and vexed Problem of Tragedy—the counterintuitive and perhaps pathological desire to participate in simulated suffering, a practice that elicits real affective response, including pleasure—can be explicated concretely.

Social and technical machines, such as theaters, are not exclusively productive of consumer goods and services. They also produce *energia*, desire—“desiring-machines are indeed the same as technical and social machines, but they are their unconscious, as it were: they manifest and mobilize the investments of desire that “correspond” to the conscious or preconscious investments of interest, the politics, and the technology of a specific social field” (BS 144). “All these machines are already there,” Deleuze and Guattari insist; “we are continually producing them, manufacturing them, setting them in motion, for they are desire, desire just as it is—although it takes artists to bring about their autonomous presentation. Desiring-machines are not in our heads, in our imagination, they are inside the social and technical machines themselves” (BS136). Desiring machines function in two senses of the word *machine*: as agents of desiring-production, as a machines that make desire flow; and as regulators of desire, *machining* desire. “Desiring machines are binary machines,” always working in conjunction or coupled with another machine (AO 5)—such as the breast that either produces milk or
does not, coupled with the mouth that either swallows or does not. These couplings are potentially infinite in variation and extension. Taking the case of the theater as an example, one can see that a subject, a spectator, is a desiring machine; an actor and the character he plays also; the stage/script/properties assemblage as well. What instrument could be more explicitly a mechanism for desiring-production and regulation than performance, elaborate mechanical and temporal reproduction, than the theater?

These plays work on people. They manufacture desire, and regulate it, in the spectator. Desiring-machines, or alternately assemblages, manufacture and regulate precisely the flow of energia Greenblatt describes, producing the affect he observes. Reading or watching a play plugs one into this flow of energy. A flow is “a belief or desire (the two aspects of every assemblage); a flow is always of a belief and of desire” (TP 219). When one undertakes a project, or seeks out a pleasure—attending a play, for one—implicit in this is a belief in the potential at least for gratification—the expectation of met expectations. Plays, as desiring-machines, regulate that flow, and according to Greenblatt contribute “to the general store of social energy possessed by the theater and hence to the sustained claim that the theater can make on its real and potential audience” (14). This is why the audience, who “appears to be excluded from practical activity” (Greenblatt 14) in the theater—audience members do not attend plays explicitly to conduct business or manufacture wares—participates in the machine: the straightforward desire to do so. Thinking of plays and productions as desiring-machines explains the need for novelty—new plays, new properties, new actors, since “[d]esiring-machines […] continually break down as they run, and in fact run only when they are not functioning properly: the product is always an offshoot of production, implanting itself upon it like a
Draft, and at the same time the parts of the machine are the fuel that makes it run” (AO 31). Older material must be punched up as it is consumed—reconfigured—in order to produce, while connecting intertextually to older yet and newer still plays. The flow, in short, sweats from itself a set of functional forms, as a worker bee seats the wax of her cell in the factory that is the honeycomb. Tragedy, then, does ideological work, and the subject is the site at which this happens. I propose that tragedy and the affective flows that it induces, with the production of subjectivity that repeats this induction, can be a means of social control, and can also threaten the integrity of the historical bloc (and the means of control of the regime at hand) by becoming a space of contradiction in that bloc. I call the production of this kind of space disintegral praxis.

The next question must be: what differentiates flows of energy that are ideologically conservative from those productive of revolution—that is, what machines desire to tend toward one kind of flow or another? The regime at hand. “There is no reason to identify a regime or a semiotic system with a people or historical moment” Deleuze and Guattari explain (TP 119). “There is such a mixture within the same period or the same people that we can say no more than that a given people, language, or period assures the relative dominance of a certain regime” (TP 119). To generalize, regimes can be arborescent or rhizomic—a distinction that is not a precise correspondence to the Apollinian and Dionysian poles of Nietzschean tragic theory but what might be called a political affiliation. For Deleuze and Guattari, the arborescent is a function of “Transcendence: a specifically European disease” (TP 18)—the monolithic Tree of Knowledge, the Logos around which the cosmos is said to be wrapped, or is ideologically made to wrap. This is the model of containment to which scholars such as Greenblatt and
Jonathan Dollimore refer, containment of centrifugal forces or escapes by one regime. “In contrast to centered (even polycentric) systems with hierarchical modes of communication and preestablished paths, the rhizome is an acentered, nonhierarchical, nonsignifying system without a General and without an organizing memory or central automaton, defined solely by a circulation of states” (TP 21). Rhizomic mappings are unplanned, transformational. The arborescent and rhizomic are not necessarily mutually exclusive, nor are they totalizing concepts that account for all phenomena. “The important point is that the root-tree and canal-rhizome are not two opposed models: the first operates as a transcendent model and tracing, even if it engenders its own escapes”—such as, in the case of Antony and Cleopatra, Caesar’s staging of Antony’s burial, or Antony’s personal escape from Rome and Caesar—“the second operates as an immanent process that overturns the model and outlines a map, even if it constitutes its own hierarchies, even if it gives rise to a despotic channel” (TP 20). For example, the regime under which Shakespeare worked seems positively schizophrenic, productive of arborescent and rhizomic valences, and aware of both. As Greenblatt explains:

It is precisely because of the English form of absolute theatricality that Shakespeare’s drama, written for a theater subject to state censorship, can be so relentlessly subversive: the form itself, as a primary expression of Renaissance power, helps to contain the radical doubts it continually provokes. Of course, what is for the state a mode of subversion contained can be for the theater a mode of containment subverted (65).

Greenblatt suggests that the distinction between subversion and containment may be rooted in genre; he cites a tragedy, King Lear, as the most subversive moment in
Shakespeare, and observes that “the histories consistently pull back from such extreme pressure” (65). Tragedy marks an instance where containment is or can be subverted—or one kind of tragedy does, while another may produce a desire for containment, paranoia, complacency or complicity.

The history of tragic theory bears this out, beginning with Aristotle, the genre’s first historian. Augusto Boal writes that

Aristotle constructs the first, extremely powerful poetic-political system for intimidation of the spectator, for elimination of the ‘bad’ or illegal tendencies of the audience. This system is, to this day, fully utilized not only in Western fills as well: movies, theater, and television united, through a common basis in Aristotelian poetics, for the repression of the people (xiv).

More precisely, it is the strategy of subjectification that Boal finds in Aristotle that remains in use in the contemporary complex of corporate desiring-machines. In *The Poetics*, Aristotle defines tragedy as a means of production—“through pity and fear effecting the proper purgation of these emotions” (23)—that is, making purgation of something by means of pity and fear. That is, pity and fear are productive of purgation. This desiring machine works by means of identification and manipulates the goodwill and the selfishness of the spectator at once, in that “pity is aroused by unmerited misfortune, fear by the misfortune of a man like ourselves” (45). One has compassion for Oedipus in his sorrows, but would not willingly introduce his hubris into oneself in the face of the State, after witnessing the consequences Oedipus suffers.

When he identifies Aristotle’s loyalties with the already-empowered, Boal does not exaggerate. “Since the objects of imitation are men in action,” Aristotle explains,
“and these men must be either of a higher or a lower type (for moral character mainly
answers to these divisions, goodness and badness being the distinguishing marks of moral
differences)” (11). This observation of Aristotle, that moral good is coincident with high
social status, comes well in advance of Nietzsche’s observation that the powerful
manufacture for themselves the value “good” and cast those who may threaten their
power as “bad.” But where Nietzsche’s critique puts “morality” in question marks and
status into relativity, eschewing appeal to absolute realities and therefore stable
ideologies, Aristotle’s prescription for the theater reveals an ideological investment in
serving the political status quo.

Boal emphasizes that it “is not in the tragic characters that pity and fear manifest
themselves—but rather in the spectators. Through those emotions the spectators are
linked to the heroes” (29). This identification is the mechanism that subjectifies the
audience, “because, as Aristotle says, something undeserved happens to a character that
resembles ourselves” (29-30). For Boal, the Aristotelian theater processes territorializes
its audience in a way favorable to the law; “since all that is unjust is foreseen in the laws,
the impurity which the tragic process is destined to destroy is therefore something
directed against the laws,” specifically something in the person of the audience
member—“a social fault, a political deficiency” (Boal 32). Only under an arborescent
regime could there be such a hamartia, where difference in kind or production would be
of concern—that is, the regulation of everyone’s desiring-production only serves the
interests of arborescent regimes. Rhizomes simply grow independently, but in
connection to others. “Hamartia,” this inconvenient flaw, “is the only thing that can and
must be destroyed” in the Aristotelian system, “so that the whole of the character’s ethos
may conform to the ethos of the society”—where ethos is defined “as the whole of the faculties, passions, and habits” (34). The whole of them—this is a totalizing, absolute process, properly integral rather than disintegral. Hegel or A.C. Bradley would call the Aristotelian ethos Universal Justice. “A whole is that which has a beginning, a middle, and an end” (31), according to Aristotle—prescribing a self-totalizing system, putatively without escape. Territorialization and subjectification seem appropriate names for this process of revising the subjectivity of an audience to conform more comprehensively to a set of legal or political imperatives, marking a subject as territory or of it. Boal asserts that this form of theater is “the most perfect artistic form of coercion” (39).

The political imperatives Boal identifies with Aristotle’s treatment of tragedy are also evident in Hegel’s, and by extension, in A.C. Bradley’s ideas of about Shakespearean tragedy. Both rely on arborescent, unitary strategies—in the case of Aristotle, the good; in Hegel, absolute spiritual or moral justice—which builds a relationship of hierarchy of the presentation over the spectator, and from that grows the kinds of coercion Boal mistrusts. Hegel writes, “The genuine content of tragic action subject to the aims which arrest tragic characters is supplied by the world of those forces which carry in themselves their own justification” (46). The self-evident good—whatever it may be—determines this “genuine content,” the Real Idea of the play. In true tragedy, for Hegel, the conflict of the play always ends so that “Eternal Justice is operative in such aims and individuals under a mode whereby it restores the ethical substance and unity in and along with the downfall of individuality which disturbs its repose” (49). Order is restored, centrifugal forces are contained, and an enforced “repose” is achieved. There is no escape from Universal Justice.
For A.C. Bradley, this is strictly impersonal. “It is not the work of chance or blank fate; it is the act of the ethical substance itself, asserting its absoluteness against the excessive pretensions of its particular powers,” and following Hegel, Bradley calls this action “eternal justice” (72). Bradley declares that “Antigone is the determination to do her duty to her dead brother” and that “Romeo is not a son or a citizen as well as a lover, he is lover pure and simple, and his love is the whole of him” (72). These characters have been reduced to singular, unitary functions—representative of total subjectification. Not even Aristotle is this reductive: “Unity of plot does not, as some persons think, consist in the unity of the hero,” according to Aristotle, because one person’s actions are too multiple and heterogenous to construct from them a credible unity (Hegel 33). By contrast, Bradley is concerned about a total unity, and a unification of good and justice as such. “The essentially tragic fact is the self-division and intestinal warfare of the ethical substance, not so much the war of good with evil as the war of good with good” (71). The self divided is the enemy of enforced repose. But is Bradley’s good opposed to good from the perspective of the state, where the One is working out its goodness in itself—or the spectator in relationship to the state? In both examples Bradley has chosen, Antigone and Romeo and Juliet, Eternal Justice sides with the state. Antigone suffers for disobeying Creon and burying her brother; Romeo pays for his family disloyalty, which is state disloyalty in Shakespeare’s Verona. What appears to be dialectical abstraction in Bradley is an ideological sympathy with the arborescent pushed to its logical conclusion: the death of the dissenting lover or sister for the sake of the state’s arbitrary imperatives.

The choice is to be in a particular way—to be subject to a particular way of being—or not to be at all. The hamartia par excellence is to insist on being as one
desires to be, if that desire is machined rhizomically. Deleuze and Guattari write that “Althusser clearly brings out this constitution of social individuals as subjects: he calls it interpellation [...] and calls the point of subjectification that Absolute Subject” (TP 130). But where Althusser famously describes interpellation as a function of an ideological apparatus of the state, Deleuze and Guattari think of it as a part of a working system of production: “an organization of power that is already fully functioning in the economy, rather than superposing itself upon contents or relations between contents determined as real in the last instance” (TP 130). The psychoanalyst subjectifies the patient—and in one of Deleuze and Guattari’s more compelling examples, Richard and Lady Anne subjectify each other in Richard III (TP 131). If subjectification is, in short, an affective function of political and economic relations already at work, then desiring-production must be involved in it: “[s]ubjectification carries desire to such a point of excess and unloosening that it must either annihilate itself in a black hole or change planes” (TP 134). Subjectification is a reterritorialization by means of deterritorialization—Eternal Justice at one pole, productive and momentary (in temporal terms), immanent (in spatial ones) disintegration at another.

Deleuze and Guattari celebrate in Kafka an implosion or evaporation of Hegel’s theater of being, directly contradicting Hegel’s treatment of Antigone: “Desire could never be on a stage where it would sometimes appear like a party opposed to another party (desire against the law)” (K 50). This is because opposition to one form of desire is itself a form of desire, or more properly, a desiring-machine; Creon’s desire is to oppose Antigone’s movements, while Antigone’s is to act in spite of Creon’s opposition. Deleuze and Guattari invite readers to consider “tragic representation as presented by
Hegel: Antigone and Creon move on stage as if they were two parties” (K 50). Their movement is dialectical, and representational, staged appropriately, as if each were pushed along to the repose of transcendence by different and mutually exclusive forces. But just as there is no proscenium in Shakespeare’s theater—it had not been instituted yet in England—this dialectical staging is abolished in Kafka: “The theater in Amerika is no more than an immense wing, an immense hallway, that has abolished all spectacle and all representation” (K 50). Kafka constructs a field in which connections can be made in any direction, rather than monodirectional hierarchies constructed. Historically, this amounts to a restoration in a novel of the conditions of Early Modern theatrical production. Margreta de Grazia argues, following Raymond Williams and Catherine Belsey, that the institution of the proscenium in 1660 carries “significance” that “can be extended to nondramatic phenomena that have come to signal the onset of the modern”—dualism of subject and object, for example, “a setting up of the world in such a way that it can be perceived and known” (19), or a staging of good opposed to good in the body of Universal Justice, or a tragic hero with whom one empathizes but wishes not to be. Althusser’s conception of ideology’s footprint— an ordinary subject’s self-implicating response to an anonymous “Hey You!” from a police officer—is also predicated on this proscenium staging. The subject makes of herself an object under the perceived gaze of the State in the person of a cop. No proscenium: this suggestion of freedom from the imposition of arborescence on the stage produces certain of the multiple, generative qualities of Early Modern tragedy.

In Radical Tragedy, Dollimore celebrates precisely this anti-ideological function in this literature. Dollimore accepts, with some reservations, Althusser’s model of
ideology and state apparatus, but in a way that is particularly relevant to the impulses of the Early Modern period. Through a series of juxtaposed quotations from Althusser and Montaigne, Dollimore demonstrates that Montaigne’s understanding of ideology is nearly identical in principle to Althusser’s. “Both Althusser and Montaigne see ideology (or custom) as so powerfully internalized in consciousness that it results in misrecognition, Dollimore explains; we understand it (insofar as we ‘see’ it at all) as eternally or naturally given instead of socially generated and contingent” (18). What a twentieth-century Marxist understands as ideology, an Early Modern thinker labeled custom—and this consciousness bears out on stage. Contrary to Bradley’s representation of subjective violence as repose, as Dollimore proposes “Jacobean tragedy discloses ideology as misrepresentation; it interrogates ideology from within, seizing on and exposing its contradictions and inconsistencies and offering alternative ways of understanding social and political process” (8). For Dollimore, simply presenting this multiplicity undermines any subjectifying or ideological desiring-production (11). Modern tragedy is a remarkably long-lived site of sustained reflection on the nature and function of ideology, as much as it is a function of multiple ideologies. Further, playwrights and directors developing a theater that undermines arborescent production often look to the Early Modern stage generally and to Shakespeare specifically for tools with which to build. As Dollimore observes, “[i]t is no accident that Artaud and, to a much greater extent, Brecht, were indebted to Jacobean drama” (3).

Brecht’s counterintuitive practice of intentionally alienating the spectator from the action onstage disrupts the coercive pattern of identification of the audience with the action on stage; Brecht explicitly calls it “non-aristotelian” (91)—counterintuitive
because Brecht is of course interested in influencing his audience, specifically inducing in them the critical consciousness Dollimore identifies with the Early Modern theater and Nietzsche identifies with his own practice, and so does not want to alienate his audience to such a degree that affect is not produced. Brecht seeks an audience plugged into his machine, and aware of the plugging-in and the machinic quality of the process. This, according to Benjamin Bennett, is why Brecht and Artaud are often linked in criticism on tragedy—the theaters of Brecht and Artaud “agree in what they are opaque or impervious to, what they repel, which is primarily sympathy, that comfortable feeling of human togetherness by which the theater (or literature, or art in general) supposedly reconciles us to the difficult external conditions of our existence” (80), in short, from the enforced solace of paranoia Bradley promotes. For Dollimore, Brecht’s theater is explicitly a Marxist revision of the Shakespearean stage (xlv). Dollimore does not state if Brecht’s formulations on the theater and the specifics of his practice bears more of his Marxist politics or his understanding of Shakespeare; likely, Brecht simply words what Greenblatt calls the energia of the Shakespearean stage and the details of its workings in a more explicitly Marxist idiom. In Artaud, one sees the materials from which Deleuze and Guattari craft certain of their concepts—that is, the genealogy of the Body without Organs (BwO) begins in theories of tragedy developed independently by Nietzsche and Artaud. The BwO will become an essential tool in understanding an important and historically overlooked post-affective function of tragedy.

Even though Boal does not reference Artaud or Deleuze and Guattari, the seeds for a rhizomic theory of tragedy are already present in his treatment of Aristotle and his theatrical practice. The trajectory of Boal’s motivation and the spirit of his movement are
closer to those of Deleuze and Guattari’s than those of Brecht. Where Brecht seeks to reverse any implicit subject/object dichotomy through the alienation effect—making the audience the object of the play, or making a stage of the crowd—Boal scraps any subject/object duality in the figure of the Joker. The Joker bears a strong relationship of resemblance to the Deleuze-Guattarian practice of nomad thought. In Brian Massumi’s paraphrase: “The modus operandi of nomad thought is affirmation,” which corresponds to Nietzsche’s formulations of the gay science and tragic rapture (6). “With the ‘Joker,’” Boal writes, “we propose a permanent system of theater...which will contain all the instruments of all styles or genres” (176). This is explicitly multiple and schizophrenic in the sense Deleuze and Guattari celebrate, in that “realism, surrealism, the pastoral, the tragicomedy, and any other genre or style are available to the director or author, without his being obliged for this reason to utilize them” (176). Boal advocates the kind of experimentation Nietzsche practiced in his own writing, and Deleuze and Guattari invoke and recommend to their readers, “writing plays that are fundamentally trials” where “the fragments of each intervention, or testimony, can have their own form, without damage to the particular form of the trial” (Boal 176-77). Here, Boal evokes the *Essays* of Montaigne, of which Shakespeare was a devoted reader, as well as the stylistic excess of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*.

A concrete example—the vicarious us-opposed-to-them landgrabblings of American football, or right-wing talk radio—will help clarify the relationships among an arborescent regime (productive of effects such as “ideology” and subjectification), a theater of cruelty such as Artaud describes, and the flows of desire Deleuze and Guattari identify as an unconscious affective economy. This will give some insight into Caesar’s
motivations and methods in dealing with Antony and his subjects. For clarity’s sake, consider a hyperbolic example—the Two Minutes Hate, as George Orwell imagines it in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*:

The horrible thing about the Two Minutes Hate was not that one was obliged to act a part, but that it was impossible to avoid joining in. Within thirty seconds any pretense was always unnecessary. A hideous ecstasy of fear and vindictiveness, a desire to kill, to torture, to smash faces in with a sledge hammer, seemed to flow through the whole group of people like an electric current, turning one even against one's will into a grimacing, screaming lunatic. And yet the rage that one felt was an abstract, undirected emotion which could be switched from one object to another like the flame of a blowlamp. Thus, at one moment Winston’s hatred was not turned against Goldstein at all, but, on the contrary, against Big Brother, the Party, and the Thought Police; and at such moments his heart went out to the lonely, derided heretic on the screen, sole guardian of truth and sanity in a world of lies (15-16).

Goldstein, the object of the Hate, “was the commander of a vast shadowy army, an underground network of conspirators dedicated to the overthrow of the State” (15). By imagining and implementing the fiction of Goldstein and the Brotherhood, the State-as-tree projects onto itself fictional dissenting vines. The State has constructed its rhizomic Other, Goldstein and his Brotherhood, in order to foreclose the potential for antiarborescent or disintegral development in Oceania, to give a lived experience of the impossibility of undermining the state and to engender in subjects the desire for the State’s inevitability and rightness in the face of the other. Winston and the others are
made to want this to be so. But just as, according to Deleuze and Guattari, capitalism manufactures schizophrenia—a subjective agent destructive of capitalist means and ends—the Hate as a desiring-machine induces an alternate desire for its opposite, the rhizomic pole represented by the Brotherhood. The Hate is a fascist Theater of Cruelty, an irresistible, immediate, pornographic valence of tragedy. Orwell describes here, in detail, how the performance of the Hate induces the flow of desire toward these two state-sanctioned ends.

With the Two Minutes Hate, Winston and the other subjects of Oceania lose themselves in an orgy of desire to destroy the Enemy, but as Winston observes, the Hate evokes an equally potent desire to be of the Enemy. While this is a moment of deterritorialized affect, it is also the multiplicity of the hero of which Aristotle wrote, per Boal’s interpretation. The hamartia is this desire, hidden away within the subject—the State had invented Goldstein, produced the desire to hate him and to follow him at once in its subjects, in order to manufacture a catharsis of that flaw. Effectively, the State manufactures paranoia. Winston must internalize ever-watching Big Brother, and root out the enemy-to-repose within. In this fashion, Orwell gives a very clear description of Aristotelian tragedy as a paranoid or fascistic desiring machine and its potential use as a proto-Panopticon, as an internalized means of control.

But there are other regimes. Nietzsche had much to say about these. While Nietzsche does offer many productive ideas, his tragic theories generally are ambivalent regarding subjectification, as evidenced by the ideologically divergent interpretations thinkers such as Martin Heidegger, Walter Benjamin, and Nietzsche himself have generated. Deleuze summarizes Nietzsche: “Multiple and pluralist affirmation—this is
the essence of the tragic” (17). Conventionally, this *gaya scienza* is the work of the poet, the maker—the one who knows and reveals—but Nietzsche is describing a social (ultimately nondual) and not a solitary means of production: “the *mystery doctrine of* tragedy: the fundamental knowledge of the oneness of everything existent, the conception of individuation as the primal cause of evil, and of art as the joyous hope that the spell of individuation may be broken in augury of restored oneness” (BT 74). It must be emphasized that the Apollinian and Dionysian are “artistic energies which burst forth from nature herself, without the mediation of the human artist” (BT 38)—effectively as alternate valences of Greenblatt’s impersonal *energia*. If impersonal, plural, multiple—then affirmation of what, by whom? Desire and the machinery of desire. Dorothea Olkowski explains that “[t]ragic thinking, in the sense of joyous and multiple affirmation […] is this existential basis that distinguishes Nietzsche’s tragic thought from any sort of idealism or dialectic,” which Deleuze emphasizes in his reading of Nietzsche, “while leaving behind the inscription of Greek heroics” (136).

The Apollinian is personal, a function of individuation, and therefore a fiction and a production of fiction, akin to dream. According to John Sallis, the purpose of the Apollinian is “to veil life, to veil the terrors and horrors of the existential underground, to veil and withdraw from sight that the very vision of which would otherwise incapacitate life and provoke its negation” (37). Remembering Boal’s reading of Aristotle, one can see the political use that can be made of this veiling as a means of subjectification. There is an appropriate response to this veiling or manufactured gestalt; Nietzsche reminds his readers to, in a sense, *remain awake in the dream*—“perhaps many will, like myself, recall how amid the dangers and terrors of dreams they have occasionally said to
themselves in self-encouragement, and not without success: ‘It is a dream! I will dream on!’” (BT 35). This is Apollinian affirmation. In *Antony and Cleopatra*, it is Antony’s response to the proto-fascistic Caesar when called back to Rome—while he remains with Cleopatra, specifically under her command, he intentionally and willfully carries on “dreaming” himself as Antony in Rome. *I am Antony yet.* Nietzsche would approve of this: “My formula for greatness in a human being is *amor fati*: that one wants nothing to be different, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity. Not merely bear what is necessary, still less conceal it—all idealism is mendaciousness in the face of what is necessary—but *love* it” (EH 714). This is the tragic affirmation Deleuze describes, and is precisely what Winston lacks during the Two Minutes Hate.

In *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche quotes—actually revises slightly—a passage from the *Twilight of the Idols* that, he claims, gives the origin of the “‘tragic’ and at long last the psychology of tragedy”:

‘Saying Yes to life even in its strangest and hardest problems; the will to life rejoicing over its own inexhaustibility even in the very sacrifice of its highest types—that is what I called Dionysian, that is what I understood as the bridge to the psychology of the tragic poet. Not in order to get rid of terror and pity, not in order to purge oneself of a dangerous affect by its vehement discharge—Aristotle misunderstood it that way—but in order to be oneself the eternal joy of becoming, beyond all terror and pity—that joy includes even joy in destroying’ (EH 729).

Nietzsche gives this in the Apollinian context, where appeal to a personal genius is a function of subjectivity—the Apollinian experiences herself as an individual, and practices self-fashioning—even as the Apollinian is an impersonal force. One embraces
even the “evil” of one’s individuation to a degree of heroic being. This leads Nietzsche to intense hyperbole in his speculation: “There are heights of the soul from which even tragedy ceases to look tragic; and rolling together all the woe of the world—who could dare to decide whether its sight would necessarily seduce us and compel us to feel pity and thus double this woe?” (BGE 236).

There can be no reconciliation between this intense individuation as an escape from individuation, such as Antony pursues through becoming-woman and persistent masochism, and the *en masse* elision of individuation, subjectification, and stratification that the Dionysian presents. The Dionysian is a *leveler* in the seventeenth-century sense—it empties the audience of social strata, and therefore, social control; “the rapture of the Dionysian state with its annihilation of the ordinary bounds and limits of existence contains, while it lasts, a lethargic element in which all personal experiences of the past become immersed” (BT 59). Containment subverted indeed. It is deeply significant Nietzsche chooses Shakespearean tragedy as the exemplum of the semi-barbarism of modernity and of the leveling, deterritorializing function of the Dionysian: “Shakespeare, that amazing Spanish-Moorish-Saxon synthesis of tastes that would have all but killed an ancient Athenian of Aeschylus’ circle with laughter or irritation”—much as Nietzsche, or even more so, Deleuze and Guattari causes trauma to Anglophone analytic philosophers—“But we—accept precisely this wild abundance of colors, this medley of what is most delicate, coarsest, and most artificial […]]; and the disgusting odors and the proximity of the English rabble in which Shakespeare’s art and taste live we do not allow to disturb us” (BGE 342), because the Dionysian levels out the social distinctions *within* the spectator that would cause irritation with the “sewer smells of the
plebian quarter”—or, from the perspective of the groundlings, the aroma of affectation, what Nietzsche will in a moment of hindsight label the “Hegelian” stench, of the bourgeois and the courtly.

The ambivalence or polyvalence of Winston’s taste of the Dionysian is simply an effect—an affect—of the machine as such. As Jill Marsden observes, “[u]nlike Apollinian rapture, which concentrates and proliferates forms of itself, Dionysian rapture is trans-formative, both in the sense that it is a destructive, metamorphic power and in the sense that it seems to migrate between forms” (39). This transformation is induced, according to Nietzsche. “If we add to this terror”—that of suddenly apprehending an exceptional phenomenon—“the blissful ecstasy that wells up from the innermost depths of man, indeed of nature, at this collapse of the principium individuationis, we steal a glimpse into the nature of the Dionysian” (BT 36). This sublime introduces a deterritorializing affective flow into the mechanisms of experience, as a hallucinogen might. Incipit tragoedia.

Marsden insists that the Dionysian must be understood not as a transcendence of the fallen world of form but an embodied rapture, an affect of embodiment. Heidegger does not disagree in this instance; for him, “Rapture is always rapturous feeling,” specifically “[f]eeling, as feeling oneself to be, is precisely the way we are corporeally […] We do not ‘have’ a body in the way we carry a knife in a sheath” (98). Through affect, the body is transformed experientially, which is a kind of existential learning. This transformation, which differentiates the enforced ignorance of Winston from the tragic heroes of Shakespeare, in one way very resembles the problematic hamartia Boal sees in Aristotle—“true knowledge, an insight into the horrible truth, outweighs any motive for
action, both in Hamlet and in the Dionysian man” (BT 60). Two observations follow from this. First, Nietzsche again cites Shakespeare and not Aeschylus or Sophocles to give a precise understanding of the Dionysian, and does so in opposition to Aristotle’s prescription of the tragic hero, whose actions cause his downfall. For Nietzsche, Hamlet is not flawed, and does not pursue a flawed agenda; his knowledge nauseates him, preventing action, because “action could not change anything in the eternal nature of things” (BT 60). Hamlet’s inaction is, thus, out of character and in bad faith—including his active envy of Fortinbras, the prince who can and does act, and ultimately takes Hamlet’s job. It is also a symptom Hamlet shares with Antony—the inertia of the Body without Organs—which is in Antony’s case a positive, willed outcome, not an exercise in bad faith. And second, why, again, do we see Shakespeare uncomfortably used to explain what is according to Nietzsche a function arising with the Greeks, declining with Socrates, and only reborn in Wagner?

According to James Porter, “Dionysianism seems in fact to be a recognizably modern phenomenon. What this means is that buried at the heart of Nietzsche’s project is, in effect, a troubling anachronism” (6). Carol Jacobs argues, from what at first appears a contradictory position, that “[i]n no way, then, can the frenzy and convulsiveness be contained in an original Dionysian period, for all of history is one single convulsion, the birth pangs of a chain of reproductions in which each descendant may be recognized by one single birth mark—a congenital defect, the stammer.” (22). The distinction is one of regime. Capitalism generally, even the early capitalism of Jacobean England, is one regime capable of producing the frenzy of Dionysus. Deleuze and Guattari acknowledge as much when they observe that capitalism “produces schizos
the same way it produces Prell shampoo or Ford cars, the only difference being that the schizos are not salable” (AO 245). Even under the most totalizing regime imaginable, Orwell’s Oceania, the Dionysian can be invoked (in order to be foreclosed). The anachronism Porter observes—Nietzsche’s attribution of an affective response to a properly modern phenomenon to the culture of ancient Greece—is a function of the “offensively Hegelian” odor Nietzsche himself observes in the *Birth of Tragedy*.

When Nietzsche finds himself producing “truths,” he moves to correct his work. Heidegger abuses Nietzsche’s fiction-making in attributing a “system” of thought, a “philosophy,” to the nomadic philologist⁶. Porter identifies some of the difficulties of interpreting Nietzsche, and abstracting from Nietzsche’s writings a system of ideas: “the entanglement of his surface narratives, in the self-consuming artifice of his writing, in the interplay of his voices, posturings, and ironies—in a word, in his staging of meaning rather than in his advocacy of this or that position” (4). Further, “it is not even a foregone conclusion that Nietzsche himself believed, or needed to believe, whatever he wrote. There is a sense in which his beliefs were experimental, or better yet, theatrical; he liked to try on a concept as one would an article of clothing, without giving oneself entirely over to it” (29). Affirmation is multiple and polyvalent, recognized to be a dream. Nietzsche’s writing practice is fully Apollinian in this regard. Nietzsche is a poet, producing a machine and obsessed (if not with full consciousness of being obsessed) with the workings of machines such as the tragic and the body. Just as the Dionysian, like schizophrenia, may be condition of modernity, Gary Shapiro observes that Nietzsche’s literary styles, such as his use of aphorism, directly reflect his position as a writer of the “postal age.” Nietzsche writes a kind of railway system: his “aphorisms […] can be read
as junctions in an indefinitely rarified network. Not only can varying sense be ascribed to a single aphorism but the ‘same’ aphorism will vary depending upon whether it is a point of departure, way station, or terminus with regard to others” (2). In Deleuze and Guattarian terms: Nietzsche’s oeuvre is rhizomic, and his aphorisms are lines of flight, and this aestheticism is a celebration of production, of aesthesis—the transformative capacity of a text on subjectivity. Nietzsche writes, “let anyone have the ability to behold continually a vivid play and to live constantly surrounded by hosts of spirits, and he will be a poet; let anyone feel the urge to transform himself and to speak out of other bodies and souls, and he will be a dramatist” (BT 64). In the theatrical context, and given the precedent Nietzsche sets (including the “early Nietzsche”), the apparently bizarre Deleuze and Guattarian vocabulary—bodies without organs, becoming-other—loses its novelty: “to see oneself transformed before one’s own eyes and to begin to act as if one had actually entered into another body, another character” (BT 64).

Becoming-other is a transrational project, a function of desire rather than thought. Nietzsche dismisses what Brecht would identify as an early alienation effect as a symptom of decay in ancient tragedy, calling it a Euripidean “rationalistic method” (BT 84). During a production of a Euripides play, according to Nietzsche, “the right spectator, whoever he might be, must always remain conscious that he was viewing a work of art and not an empirical reality. But the tragic chorus of the Greeks”—specifically of Aeschylus—“is forced to recognize real beings in the figures on stage” (BT 57). For Nietzsche, the spectator must side with Aeschylus’s intention and identify with the production precisely as reality for the energies of the theater and the play to circulate, out of disgust for the falsely tragic, the contrived and antiseptic conventional
productions of the magician that produce nothing. In genuine tragedy, even that which Nietzsche seems to disapprove of—Shakespeare and by extension Brecht—production is produced, a map of production. This differs from the rationality Nietzsche ascribes to Euripides and Socrates, and the performance of conventional tragic tropes Zarathustra beats the magician for producing in Book Four of *Thus Spake Zarathustra*. When the magician produces “the tragic,” he makes a mixed salad of purple exclamations:

Who loves me still?—Give hot hands,
Give a heart as glowing coals,
Give me, the loneliest
Whom ice, alas, sevenfold ice

Teaches to languish for enemies (TSZ 366).

The magician simply falls upon the contrived thorns of poetic life, bleeds stale ink, and calls it tragedy. After a vigorous beating at Zarathustra’s hands, the magician admits his fraud, and (again in purple verse) laments his inability to produce a reality from himself.

Unlike the magician’s performance, the theater that is also a functional desiring-machine produces *productive affect*. The action onstage and in the stands map desire, and map practices of desire such as Antony’s experiments with the Body without Organs, Othello’s scopophilia, and Hamlet’s introspective plateau. Olkowski observes that the significance of Nietzsche’s aestheticism is not in his tastes but in his method of establishing value⁷, which can be interpreted as a method of making joy not as an exchangeable commodity but as an immanent use-value. “There is, writes Deleuze, an ‘aesthetic form of joy’ instituted as affirmation and creation, and not as the passive sensation of Kantian aesthetics” as well as in the act of evaluation (Olkowski 121)—
where Kantian aesthetics would conform to the desire for the falsely tragic, the made-for-TV.

The ground of Nietzsche’s evaluations ought not to be accepted uncritically; in fact, Nietzsche does not always accept it. For instance, he is willing to extend his critique of all values to his own celebration of the immanent, the real: “what forces us all to suppose that there is an essential opposition of ‘true’ and ‘false’? Is it not sufficient to assume degrees of apparentness and, as it were, lighter and darker shadows and shades of appearance—different ‘values,’ to use the language of painters? Why couldn’t the world that concerns us—be a fiction?” (BGE 236-37). This is one context for Deleuze and Guattari’s preoccupation with intensities of experience, and the mechanisms that produce them, in Nietzsche’s words the “pathos” or affect that is a “domineering fundamental total feeling on the part of a higher ruling order in relation to a lower order, to a ‘below’—that is the origin of the antithesis of ‘good’ and ‘bad’” (GM 462). This familiar Nietzschean theme carries within it a curious ambivalence that marks a point of departure from Nietzsche for Deleuze and Guattari, as well as the genealogy of their botanical leitmotifs. Nietzsche is at once opposed to the “good” values of European culture, the slave moralities of ressentiment and bad faith he identifies with Christianity—and in favor of a cultural elitism, the machine that produced precisely the “good” he reserves his finest vintage of venom for. Here, the botanical metaphor marks a point of departure for Deleuze and Guattari from Nietzsche. Where Nietzsche imagines the elite, “able to raise itself to its higher task and to a higher state of being—comparable to those sun-seeking vines of Java—[…] that so long and so often enclasp an oak tree with their tendrils until eventually, high above it but supported by it, they can unfold their crowns in the open
light and display their happiness” (BGE 392), Deleuze and Guattari would prefer simply to chop down the trees for fertilizer and let the vines grow as they will, horizontally resolving the ambivalence in Nietzsche between high culture and the fruit of bad faith it necessarily produces as a function of a stratified, subjectifying regime.

In both metaphors, of the trees and of the sun-seeking rhizomes, a desire is articulated. Olkowski notes that “Nietzsche calls such desire will to power—a desire that does not need to be interpreted. Deleuze drops this heroic expression and simply emphasizes that desire is what experiments with forces” (131). This experimentation is emphasized, material and of-life, not spiritual transcendence, conventional mysticism, nor the new-age repose underlying much of integral thought. “Thought in terms of the libidinal rather than the liminal,” Marsden writes, “ecstasy describes a feeling of life, not the definition of a self-exceeding presence” (22). This is the precise contrary of the “disease” of transcendence, of absenting oneself from phenomena—and must be differentiated from representational, Apollinian production. For Deleuze, “a representation of power can only be a representation of an already existing power, a current state of affairs, insofar as representation is not a creative act of affirmation” (Olkowski 132). This is in sympathy with Boal’s critique of Aristotle, whereby tragic action is a representation that produces an effect on behalf of the rooted organism, the status quo. Contrary to tragic rapture and affirmation of sorrow characteristic of a theater of cruelty, a theater of affect—the Cineplex, the television, the Two Minutes Hate—functions as a narcotic rather than a tonic. Nietzsche writes, “[t]his alone, I surmise, constitutes the actual physiological cause of ressentiment, vengefulness, and the like: a desire to deaden pain by means of affects” (GM 563). Nietzsche identifies this desire to
transcend the contradictions of existence, *Schein*, as a sickness—or more properly the ground of sickness, while Deleuze proposes from Nietzsche’s project a program for becoming-real, or coming-to-health.

For Deleuze and Guattari, it is possible to desubjectify—an optimism not necessarily shared with Nietzsche. Nietzsche desubjectifies his own ideas, however, in at least one significant instance. In his “Attempt at a Self-Criticism,” Nietzsche laments something in the *Birth of Tragedy* that has an offensive, “Hegelian” odor. The concept “Hegelian,” used so far as a term for transcendence, totalization, nationalisms—in short, arborescence, and not without reason—is itself contested. *Hegelian* does not necessarily represent a putatively coherent system of representation composed and presented by Hegel, but instead an abstraction of precisely the kind of totalizing, teleological, and nationalistic thinking Nietzsche and Deleuze and Guattari most detest, although Hegel did work toward this end and did prescribe it. Further, in his own practice Hegel was not at all the systematic and foreclosing bugbear this application of his name suggests. As Walter Kaufmann shows in *Tragedy and Philosophy*, Hegel’s intellectual practice, opposed to his aims and ends—especially when approaching the problem of tragedy—was characterized primarily by speculation, fragmentation, and inconsistency. Not all of Hegel’s followers have understood this, however—foremost among them, as Kaufmann observes, the Shakespearean critic A.C. Bradley, a thoroughgoing Hegelian in the Nietzschean (or simply polemical) sense. According to Kaufmann, Bradley misunderstands Hegel’s working method as much as he does Shakespeare in his attempt to “assimilate Shakespeare to the Greeks” (327). In other words, Bradley understood Hegel’s *purpose* better than Hegel did, and was more willing to pursue it than Hegel was.
What could “Hegelian” have meant to Nietzsche’s nose in this instance—what does Nietzsche smell in his treatise on tragedy that could be called Hegelian?

Surely not the “disease” of transcendence Deleuze and Guattari diagnose on Nietzschean lines of critique in idealistic European thought and that Heidegger constructs for him root and trunk; even early in his writing career, Nietzsche favors Schein over Sein, embodied frenzy over any purely spiritual function. Similarly, it would be inaccurate to claim that Nietzsche is manufacturing the sort of totalizing scheme of Universal Justice that Hegel sought. According to James Porter, “[t]he opposition between Apollo and Dionysus was never intended to be all-inclusive or of unlimited utility” (23-24). These two forces as Nietzsche imagines them do not resolve into One, nor do they account for all and everything in unresolved opposition. Nothing in Nietzsche’s corpus transcends or is transcended.

However, Nietzsche is willing to sacrifice some of the multiplicity he characteristically celebrates elsewhere in the Birth of Tragedy toward a putatively Hegelian aim. Nietzsche bends his genealogy of tragedy and tragic form into a nationalistic teleology, and in the process uses Shakespeare as a straw-man antitype—of sorts. The germ of this comes from Nietzsche’s impulse to praise Wagner, to mythologize his person and oeuvre as a reborn, ebullient Aeschylus—a German Aeschylus. In “The Case of Wagner,” Nietzsche himself identifies Wagner and his imperatives with polemic Hegelianism. “The same human type that raved about Hegel, today raves about Wagner; in his school they even write Hegelian” (CW 634). It is not precisely as if the smell of Hegel serves as a cipher for that of Wagner, but that Wagner is a manifestation of the impulse toward arborescence Hegel represents.
If Nietzsche’s implicit project is to understand modern tragedy, explicitly to celebrate its rebirth in Wagner, why does he choose to emphasize the Greeks as Bradley does—taking on Aristotle’s task? He provides a Dionysian rationale for this and an Apollinian: “it is with them that the destruction of the principium individuationis for the first time becomes an artistic phenomenon” (BT 40), and because the Greeks dreamed more intensively of Homeric themes, or “in a deeper sense than that in which the modern man, speaking of his dreams, ventures to compare himself with Shakespeare” (BT 39). It is suggestive that Shakespeare is for Nietzsche the emblem of modern tragedy—hinting at his early bardolizing of Wagner—and that Nietzsche accepts his own contorted logic by which ancient Greece is a more intense example of modernity than Shakespeare, the cultural ground of modernity itself, while in late-Romantic Germany a more intense rebirth of tragedy is underway. Keith May observes that “what Shakespeare does superlatively among poet-dramatists” is precisely what Nietzsche prescribes for tragedy (117)—specifically, Nietzsche uses Hamlet as an example of an “old-style” tragic hero, who “talks more superficially than he acts” (BT 105). But by Nietzsche’s programmatic logic this “cannot be tragic because it is too individualized, non-mythic, and in an odd way even scientific,” according to May, in that “[w]atching or reading Shakespeare we encounter not a myth but specific people doing specific things,” as “Antony and Cleopatra make a heroism of their sensuality as against the needs, as well as the mediocrity, of nations” (117). This is because, for Nietzsche, “Shakespeare carries the Euripidean tendency to its highest point” (May 116). This is part of the teleology of Nietzsche’s arborescent agenda in the Birth of Tragedy, where the decline of Attic tragedy serves to heighten the glory of tragedy’s triumphant Teutonic rebirth. Nietzsche
willfully misreads Euripides in order to advance this nationalistic view of history; *The Bacchae* of Euripides is as Dionysian as anything in the Sophocles canon, and downright Nietzschean in its exploration of the body and the body politic.

Nietzsche’s schizophrenic comments on Shakespeare are not about Shakespeare—one aspect of his treatment of Shakespeare is to use him as an antitype to the Aeschylian tragedy that Nietzsche seeks to praise in *Wagner*. And this is Hegelianism beyond Wagner—to advance a Teutonic nationalistic agenda, Nietzsche bends his ideas to fit a systematic teleology. To a certain degree, this nationalism is self-apparent or assumed by Nietzsche’s German readership, as evident as a foul odor. As Peter Fenves notes, “[t]he touchstone of a certain Hegelianism is this very thesis: Germania knows what Hellas merely intimated. And the proof of this statement lies close at hand: the *theory* of tragedy—the only theory of tragedy that has the courage to break with the late-born Aristotle—has blossomed on German soil” (242).

The only indisputable transformation in Nietzsche’s thought is his rejection of Wagner, as a part of his anti-Hegelian project—in deed as much as in invective. Alexander Nehemas’ insistence that Nietzsche’s writings be read as his attempt to make literature of his life affirms Deleuze and Guattari’s biographical interpretation of Nietzsche: his *corpus* (inflected multiply) reflects the trajectory of its production and its author’s self-fashioning. Schizophrenically, Nietzsche the German used his Swiss citizenship as a lever with which he could push his Germanness away; even though he traveled under a Swiss passport, when asked his nationality, he would claim Polish aristocracy as his blood heritage. A writer soaked to the bone in German literary and intellectual culture, of German birth and Swiss citizenship and Polish ancestry and in love
with Italy—this is the exemplum *par excellence* of Nietzschean affirmation and positive schizophrenia (the rhizome, the nomad) as Deleuze and Guattari understand it. Following Nehemas and Deleuze and Guattari, one can see Nietzsche’s mature life’s work as a commitment to the project of undermining, disintegrating this nationalism in himself and in his own cultural matrix.

And Nietzsche is not alone in turning the “Nietzschean Critique,” the “Labor of Dionysus” as Hardt and Negri call it, against this thread in the *Birth of Tragedy*. The most significant critique of Nietzsche’s *Birth of Tragedy* is Walter Benjamin’s study, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*. Benjamin objects to Nietzsche’s treatment on the same ground that the post-Wagner Nietzsche does—that foul smell, but in this case taken theologically, nationally and generically. Reda Bensmaia, in her introduction to Deleuze and Guattari’s study on Kafka, suggests that Benjamin’s critical project shares much in common with Deleuze and Guattari’s in motivation and in substance; Benjamin’s critique of Nietzschean tragedy, like Nietzsche’s own critique, is one connection of the kind Bensmaia may have had in mind. As Martha Hilfer observes, “Benjamin’s philosophical program of constructing ‘constellations’ of ideas is surprisingly similar to Nietzsche’s genealogical method: both critical discourses represent non-teleological historical-philosophical reconstructions of an *Ursprung*” (191). One may characterize *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* in similar terms as well.

Benjamin found in Georg Lukács’s idealistic vision of tragedy and tragic action—the language of revelation and miracles—a precedent for a theological treatment of tragedy without a gloss of moralization or didacticism, and without straying far from Nietzsche’s productive insights. For Lukács, “every true tragedy is a mystery play. Its
real, central meaning is a revelation of God before the face of God” (154). Lukacs cites *Macbeth* as an example of tragedy as revelation. By contrast, for Lukacs “the gods of reality, of history, are obstinate and harsh” (154). In germ, here is Benjamin’s distinction between tragedy as prophecy and *Trauerspiel* as historical consciousness. It is significant that Benjamin does not cite any ancient Greek tragedies to describe ancient Greek tragedy, but he does devote some luminous pages to analysis of a verse from Exodus. Regarding *Trauerspiel*: “[h]istorical life, as it was conceived at the time, is its content, its true object. In this it is different from tragedy” (62). By contrast, for Lukacs tragedy is beyond any comprehensible time and space—comprehensible by the historical consciousness of modernity—“the time and space of tragedy have no perspective that might modify or mitigate them” (156). The “essence” of this space-time, unlike that of “ordinary life,” is “the pure experience of self” or “the painfully and immediately experienced reality of the great moments” (156-7). A great moment is a redemptive cognate to Nietzschean rapture: “In tragedy […] The self stresses its selfhood with an all-exclusive, all-destroying force” in an “extreme affirmation” that “finally cancels itself out” (Lukacs160). This is, again, a function of disindividuation, the Dionysian. Curiously, Lukacs replicates Nietzsche’s ambivalent treatment of Shakespeare, who “came essentially closer to the Greeks than their apparent successors; but he, like the French, offered explanations which were superficial, rationalistic, and therefore false” (159)—this after pronouncing *Macbeth* a revelation and a primary example of revelatory tragedy.

Benjamin assumes, following Moses Maimonides, that the age of prophecy closed with Moses—that the period of prophetic time (or mythic time) has passed. We live in a
historical and material world now, waiting for redemption. Tragedy for Benjamin must be the stuff of prophecy, following the logic of redemption Lukacs employs; the coming Messiah, not a hyperromantic and nominally schizophrenic German, can be the only agent of redemption, because only the Messiah has contemporary relevance for Benjamin—each moment being open to the coming of the Messiah. The ground of Benjamin’s dispute with Nietzsche is ultimately theological rather than methodological—the Jew in the shadow of the German, more precisely the odorous Hegelian of the Birth of Tragedy. According to Peter Fenves, Benjamin’s vision of tragedy is of “a onetime, epoch-making dramatic form, never to be repeated, least of all revived in whatever describes itself in terms of the tragic”—Benjamin writes against an belligerent Zeitgeist, “and this arrogance consists for the most part in a pernicious sentiment according to which our ‘culture’ is equal to the Greeks, which generally means, better than yours” (Fenves 239). It is on this ground that Benjamin objects to Nietzsche’s transhistorical, typological treatment of tragedy, which “can thereafter become something general, something ‘tragic,’ a matter for ‘Dionysiac man’” (241). This is Benjamin’s point of departure from Lukacs, who equated revelation with the Dionysian specifically and tragedy generally—identifying nationalism with the Dionysian and the sacred with the Apollinian—as well as a mirror of Nietzsche’s critique of his own project.

While Benjamin does not disagree with the broad outlines of Nietzsche’s description of tragedy’s function, he becomes concerned with the form “the tragic” can take generically once he has developed an alternative history for the genre to Nietzsche’s. The recontextualized theological vocabulary Benjamin inherited from Lukacs and Jewish tradition simply presents the Apollinian, in the dress of a nominally idealistic
Weltanschauung. This is Benjamin’s textual mysticism, where the intellect can bring salvation to objects: “It is the function of concepts to group phenomena together, and the division which is brought about within them thanks to the distinguishing power of the intellect is all the more significant in that it brings about two things at a single stroke: the salvation of phenomena and the representation of ideas” (35), where ideas are understood by the following analogy: “Ideas are to objects as constellations are to stars” (34). In that Benjamin is not seeking a transcendence of objects or bodies from ideologies but their Lurianic enlightenment from within, this is in keeping with the spirit of Nietzsche’s aestheticism. This is the motive behind Benjamin’s celebration of the Trauerspiel—into which playwrights such as Calderon and Shakespeare are drawn. Benjamin cites the ambiguity of Hamlet’s death as a characteristic of Trauerspiel (136-37). But ancient history functions mythically; for Shakespeare, ancient Rome and more ancient Egypt are the stuff of an absolute past. Contrariwise, a major object of Antony and Cleopatra, the Eros of politics, is to a high degree transhistorical. Thus, Benjamin’s historical taxonomy of tragedy and Trauerspiel can serve the specific purpose of disinfecting Nietzsche’s theory of tragedy from its nationalistic stench in the service of another concern entirely: spiritual living under very uncertain conditions.

As suggested earlier, the Body without Organs is one tool for articulating the Dionysian without appeal to the heroic or the proto-fascistic. The internal logic of Deleuze and Guattari’s presentation make a precise, singular, and arborescent definition of the BwO quite impossible; they seem content with a rhizomic treatment: “It’s not so much that it preexists or comes ready-made, although in certain respects it is preexistence. At any rate, you make one, you can’t desire without making one. […] This
is not reassuring, because you can botch it” (TP 149). Deleuze and Guattari discourage what questions in favor of how questions in this context; “[i]t is not at all a notion or a concept but a practice, a set of practices. You can never reach the Body without Organs, you can’t reach it, you are forever attaining it, it is a limit. People ask, So what is this BwO?—but you’re already on it, scurrying like a vermin, groping like a blind person” (TP 149-50). Some experiments in attaining the BwO include Kafkaesque becoming-animal or becoming-other, drug use, masochism, and anorexia, practices that either overload ones mindstream with sensory information, or what amounts to the same thing, empty it of all structures, so that “[t]he BwO is what remains when you take everything away. What you take away is precisely the phantasy” (TP 151). Removing from oneself the mechanisms of subjectification, one is left with an open field—Antony calls this Space, and kingdoms Clay—in which to work directly among the shapes-of-things in which one has ones being. Following this, Deleuze and Guattari conclude “[t]he BwO is the field of immanence of desire, the plane of consistency specific to desire (with desire defined as a process of production without reference to any exterior agency)” (TP 154). This means that one can approach the BwO through affect as a form of desire, and that one approaching the BwO will desire differently than the others in a given group—noticeably so. What measure does Antony overflow—what threshold represents the edge of the stratum over which Antony sails? Enobarbus knows, because this is a consensus function; “every group desires according to the value of the last receivable object beyond which it would be obliged to change assemblage” (TP 439), the first one out of reach and beyond a given desiring machine or assemblage (the terms “desiring machine” and “assemblage” are synonymous). The next play for the theater, the next Sunday
multimedia event for the megachurch; “[t]he alcoholic makes a subjective evaluation of how much he or she can tolerate. What can be tolerated is precisely the limit at which, as the alcoholic sees it, he or she will be able to start over again”—and in another context but the same sense, “[t]he same goes for having the last word in a domestic squabble assemblage” (TP 438). Just as the regime of a given historical bloc is structured so that the relations of production will also be reproduced, foreclosing any change in those relations, performances are structured to enable the next performance, the one out of reach. In Shakespeare, there is no question that the men in Antony’s group desire the one beyond their grasp—Cleopatra. Antony’s distinction is in having changed assemblages, desiring-production, in such a way as to overflow “the measure.” But Antony overdoes even this overflow, with disappointing consequences. The point is to decrystallize, disintegrate; per Deleuze and Guattari, “[y]ou don’t do it with a sledgehammer, you use a very fine file. You invent self-destructions that have nothing to do with the death drive” (TP 160). The conflation of death and desire is most pronounced in Antony’s case—as in the masochists and junkies Deleuze and Guattari use as examples of the BwO, which is “why we encountered the paradox of those emptied and dreary bodies at the beginning: they had emptied themselves of their organs instead of looking for the point at which they could patiently and momentarily dismantle the organization of the organs we call the organism” (TP 160-61).

But what in or of the body constitutes the organs that are decrystallized into this solution of affective flow? According to Deleuze and Guattari, “[t]he first things to be distributed on the body without organs are races, cultures, and their gods […]. The full body does not represent anything at all. On the contrary, the races and cultures designate
regions on this body—that is, zones of intensities, fields of potentials. Phenomena of individuation and sexualization are produced within these fields” (85). The Dionysian frequency of affect is precisely that which undermines individuation, and as such, it decodes the BwO of its territorial bands, its stratified organs; it is the plateau of inertia, of disindividuation and freedom from “truth and falsehood” and the hegemonic relations that manufacture those consensus values, as Nietzsche understands them. As Deleuze and Guattari explain, “[t]he full body without organs is the unproductive, the sterile, the unengendered, the unconsumable. Antonin Artaud discovered this one day, finding himself with no shape or form whatsoever, right there where he was at that moment” (AO 8). When desiring-machines (and concomitantly flows of affect) fall away, and the Body without Organs is approached, desiring-production ebbs. This is why, as Antony gets near the Body without Organs, he accomplishes very little but what Cleopatra tells him to do—what his masochistic practice, his affective approach to the BwO, demands of him.

According to Boal, Aristotelian “tragedy imitates man’s actions, but only those produced by the habits of his rational soul. Animal activity is excluded, as well as the faculties and passions that have not become habitual” (13). It follows, then, that nonrational, transrational, or antirational activities such as a man becoming an animal, or habitual activities such as masochism or addiction, would be obvious choices for one such as Antony, seeking escape from Rome’s imperatives. Becoming-animal has its limits, however; “the acts of becoming-animal cannot follow their principle all the way through—[…] they maintain a certain ambiguity that leads to their insufficiency and condemns them to defeat” (K 15). Becoming-other is often logistically impracticable or undesirable; under the conditions of misogyny, a woman becoming a man is a
territorializing, stratifying, Apollinian function—and such are the regenderings in *Twelfth Night* and *The Merchant of Venice*. But for a man to become a woman—this is a sure way to willfully desubjectify, as he would have to renounce the real and imaginary privileges contingent on masculinity, as Antony does. Massumi paraphrases Deleuze and Guattari’s contested views on gender: “A body does not *have* a gender: it is *gendered*” (87). Gendering is a territorialization, an Apollonian affair, a position not distant from Butler’s insistence that gender is performed. According to Massumi, the purpose of this practice of becoming-woman is, for Deleuze and Guattari, “neither to redefine, misapply, or strategically exaggerate a category, nor even to invent a new identity. Their aim is to destroy categorical gridding altogether, to push the apparatus of identity beyond the threshold of sameness, into singularity” (88). Antony’s becoming-woman is taken strictly in the context of his masochistic practice—if Cleopatra insists, he will trade clothes with her, and trade gender roles.

Masochism is the practice of the BwO, or one that leads to the BwO, that Antony pursues most comprehensively. As one would assume, masochism is a function of desire—“the perverse machines of the masochist, which are machines in the strict sense of the term, cannot be understood in terms of phantasy or imagination […] There is no phantasy, he says, but—and this is something totally different—a programming” (BS 125). These machines, like the machines and “mechanicals” who work the theater and make it work, are the social-technical machines that double as desiring-machines. Nietzsche gives *amor fati* as an Apollinian function of tragedy, and in Antony’s case, this practice is masochistic—his acceptance of his fate, unlike Hamlet’s knowledge of his fate and unwillingness to act, is masochistic. And it is so because Antony desires it to be. He
produces for himself a fate to love that, according to Lisa S. Starks, precisely resembles male masochism as Deleuze explicates it in his essay, “Coldness and Cruelty,” where he examines masochism as it manifests in the writings of Sacher-Masoch. “The educational undertaking of Masoch’s heroes, the submission to a woman, the torments they undergo, are so many steps in their climb toward the Ideal,” precisely in a theological sense (Deleuze 21). Deleuze does not hesitate to identify Masoch’s ideal with the villain he shares in common with Nietzsche, polemic Hegelianism: “when Masoch invokes the dialectical spirit, the spirit of Mephistopheles and that of Plato in one, this must not merely be taken as proof of his romanticism; here too particularity is seen reflectively in the impersonal Ideal of the dialectical spirit” (23). Masoch’s ideal is clearly repellent to Deleuze the Nietzschean—and evocative of the domination and pain that this regime can produce. It is more significant that there is a willed purpose to Masoch’s practice. Masoch undertakes this program as a means to an end; like Antony, he creates a very intense fate to embrace. Regarding Antony, Starks observes that it “is almost as if he expects his destiny to take this course, that his fate dictates Cleopatra’s betrayal of him for the young ‘boy’ Octavius Caesar” (68).

“You can botch it.” The conditions of Antony’s dissolution and death evoke failure—it appears he cannot find means to live to pursue his own agenda or to competently end his own life—but it is not true that he is without success. In his inability or implicit unwillingness to end it completely, or his active willingness to prolong the waves of pain he experiences, Antony attains a plateau of desire—remembering that a plateau “is always in the middle, not at the beginning or the end. A rhizome is made of plateaus” (TP 21). In contrast to Caesar, who manufactures beginnings and ends, Antony
builds for himself “a continuous, self-vibrating region of intensities whose development avoids any orientation toward a culmination point or external end” (TP 22) among those who have no sense of the future of time, beginnings or endings. In short, Shakespeare dramatizes the body politic going all to pieces in a tragic hero, in such a way that the audience may recognize this as a *hamartia* or as an attempted jailbreak—this is what I call *disintegral praxis*, the opening of the contradictions latent in the historical bloc with the intent to desubjectify the socius, functionally equivalent to the desire to create wholly new values.

The answer to the question *Why Tragedy?* is twofold, because tragedy produces two kinds of subjectivities. First—because it is a pleasurable means of social control already built into our culture as well as our socio-political and economic structures that is readily marketable and inexpensive to produce. The second aspect is admittedly utopian: to experience, momentarily and vicariously but in a very real way, a taste of a destratified, appositional, and by extension non-exploitative life.
WORKS CITED

The abbreviations used in the parenthetical citations refer to the following texts:

Nietzsche:
BGE, Beyond Good and Evil
BT, The Birth of Tragedy
CW, “The Case of Wagner”
EH, Ecce Homo
GM, The Genealogy of Morals
TSZ, Thus Spoke Zarathustra

Deleuze and Guattari:
AO, Anti-Oedipus
BS, “Balance-Sheet Program for Desiring Machines”
K, Kafka
TP, A Thousand Plateaus


---. *The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music*. In Kaufmann (1992), 31—144.
---. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. In Kaufmann (1982), 121—439.


Starks, Lisa. “’Like the lover’s pinch, which hurts and is desired’: The Narrative of Male Masochism and Shakespeare’s Antony and Cleopatra.” *Literature and Psychology* 45:4 (1999), 58—73.

---

1 See Bonnitta Roy’s “Process Model of Integral Theory” for an explicitly integral treatment of affect.

2 My paper “Of Syntheses and Surprises” exposes the ideological position of integral theory as one affiliated in its historical precedent with the conservative idealism of imperial Britain, while recognizing the contribution a critically aware integral theory can offer an inquiry such as the present one. The neologism “disintegral” is intended to represent the capacity to work integrally, that is to say, to approach an interrelated set of problems with a coordinated critical vocabulary and strategy, while maintaining a radically critical position and motivation.

3 Antonio Gramsci proposes that the philosophy of praxis is the task of identifying and exposing the cracks and contradictions latent in a given moment of history, the ensemble of social forces he calls the historical bloc. I propose that disintegral praxis *makes a subject such an opening*, and that tragic rapture bears all the formal features of a disintegral praxis. In Marxist terms, this is a moment of authentic revolutionary potential.

4 Here “integral” denotes the arborescent tendencies in integral theory, which I have argued elsewhere arise in the same historical and cultural matrix as Bradley’s theories of poetry and culture (Anderson 2006), as well as Baudrillard’s interpretation of contemporary life as an Integral Reality—a “utopia. And yet this is what, by a gigantic artifice, is being imposed on us” (31)—in this case technologically-enforced repose.

5 Even as radical playwrights and philosophers see an ally in Artaud and critics link his project with those of writers such as Brecht, the political valences of his project are at best ambivalent. In Artaud’s words, “the Theater of Cruelty proposes to resort to a mass spectacle; to seek in the agitation of tremendous masses, convulsed and hurled against each other, a little of that poetry of festivals and crowds when, all too rarely nowadays, the people pour out into the streets” (85). Naomi Greene speculates that “Artaud’s notion of a collective, violent, ‘theater of cruelty’ corresponded to the mass rallies organized by the Nazis” (103). It bears repeating here that the desire produced by mass spectacle is a function of regime, specifically regime type. It is in this context that when Deleuze and Guattari announce that there “is no ideology and never has been” (TP 4), and that only desiring-machines exist, it means that functions and affects historically identified as ideology, such as Althusser’s “Hey You!,” are territorialized flows of desire,
paranoid flows. Ideological functions do their work. In this way only is Naomi Conn Liebler correct when she argues that Brecht and Artaud share a common ancestor in terms of theatrical practice in Aristotle—since all three advocated a kind of transformational theater, one that “shook people up” (46).

6 Heidegger abstracts from Nietzsche’s thought experiments something of an orthodoxy, an “assertion” that is effectively a Chomskian “deep structure” to Nietzsche’s manifold utterances, gestures, presentations, and silences—a systematic Sein to Nietzsche’s spectacular Schein:

In opposition to all the disparate kinds of confusion and perplexity vis-à-vis Nietzsche’s doctrine of return, we must say at the outset, and initially purely in the form of an assertion, that the doctrine of the eternal return of the same is the fundamental doctrine in Nietzsche’s philosophy. Bereft of this teaching as its ground, Nietzsche’s philosophy is like a tree without roots. Yet we learn what a root is only when we pursue the question as to how the trunk stands upon its roots; in other words, when we ask in what and in what way the root itself is rooted. But if the doctrine of return is sundered and removed to one side as a “theory,” is observed as a compilation of assertions, then the resulting product is like a deracinated root, torn from the soil and chopped from the trunk, so that it is no longer a root that roots, no longer a doctrine that serves as the fundamental teaching, but merely an eccentricity (6).

Heidegger, no stranger to fascist tendencies, projects into Nietzsche’s vines an explicit arborescence to explain simply that the Dionysian is transhistorically available—a notion that antifascist Walter Benjamin will take pains to undermine.

7 Olkowski writes, “[a]s noble and powerful, the high-minded called themselves ‘good.’ In so doing they created ‘good’ as a value. […] Deleuze does not concur with Nietzsche’s valuations, rather he draws the conclusion than such evaluations are both critical and creative, both ethical and aesthetic” (121).

8 Deleuze gives a precise anatomy of ressentiment as an internalized imperative to behave against active desire—to obey, to seek the hamartia of arborescent tragedy in oneself and suppress it:

[F]or Nietzsche, what counts is not the quantity of force considered abstractly but a determinate relation in the subject itself between the different forces of which it is made up. This is what he means by a type. Whatever the force of the subject itself, the man of ressentiment only uses the latter to invest the trace of the former, so that he is incapable of acting and even of reacting to the excitation. There is therefore no need for him to have experienced an excessive excitation […] As a result of his type the man of ressentiment does not ‘react’: his reaction is endless, it is felt instead of being acted. This reaction therefore blames its object, whatever it is, as an object on which revenge must be taken (115).

Antony does not seek this kind of revenge—but Caesar does, and Big Brother does as well. Antony’s transformation, the topic of conversation among all parties early in the play, gives a clue as to how Antony and Caesar differ in this regard.